{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-136.98.0.179.oe2203sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nocteontx2-af: Fix possible null pointer dereference.\r\n\r\nThis patch fixes possible null pointer dereference in files\n\u0026quot;rvu_debugfs.c\u0026quot; and \u0026quot;rvu_nix.c\u0026quot;(CVE-2021-47484)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent\r\n\r\nThis patch is based on a detailed report and ideas from Yepeng Pan\nand Christian Rossow.\r\n\r\nACK seq validation is currently following RFC 5961 5.2 guidelines:\r\n\r\n   The ACK value is considered acceptable only if\n   it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) \u0026lt;= SEG.ACK \u0026lt;=\n   SND.NXT).  All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn\u0026apos;t satisfy the\n   above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.  It needs to\n   be noted that RFC 793 on page 72 (fifth check) says: \u0026quot;If the ACK is a\n   duplicate (SEG.ACK \u0026lt; SND.UNA), it can be ignored.  If the ACK\n   acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK \u0026gt; SND.NXT) then send an\n   ACK, drop the segment, and return\u0026quot;.  The \u0026quot;ignored\u0026quot; above implies that\n   the processing of the incoming data segment continues, which means\n   the ACK value is treated as acceptable.  This mitigation makes the\n   ACK check more stringent since any ACK \u0026lt; SND.UNA wouldn\u0026apos;t be\n   accepted, instead only ACKs that are in the range ((SND.UNA -\n   MAX.SND.WND) \u0026lt;= SEG.ACK \u0026lt;= SND.NXT) get through.\r\n\r\nThis can be refined for new (and possibly spoofed) flows,\nby not accepting ACK for bytes that were never sent.\r\n\r\nThis greatly improves TCP security at a little cost.\r\n\r\nI added a Fixes: tag to make sure this patch will reach stable trees,\neven if the \u0026apos;blamed\u0026apos; patch was adhering to the RFC.\r\n\r\ntp-\u0026gt;bytes_acked was added in linux-4.2\r\n\r\nFollowing packetdrill test (courtesy of Yepeng Pan) shows\nthe issue at hand:\r\n\r\n0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3\n+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0\n+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0\n+0 listen(3, 1024) = 0\r\n\r\n// ---------------- Handshake ------------------- //\r\n\r\n// when window scale is set to 14 the window size can be extended to\n// 65535 * (2^14) = 1073725440. Linux would accept an ACK packet\n// with ack number in (Server_ISN+1-1073725440. Server_ISN+1)\n// ,though this ack number acknowledges some data never\n// sent by the server.\r\n\r\n+0 \u0026lt; S 0:0(0) win 65535 \u0026lt;mss 1400,nop,wscale 14\u0026gt;\n+0 \u0026gt; S. 0:0(0) ack 1 \u0026lt;...\u0026gt;\n+0 \u0026lt; . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65535\n+0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4\r\n\r\n// For the established connection, we send an ACK packet,\n// the ack packet uses ack number 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32,\n// where 2^32 is used to wrap around.\n// Note: we used 1073725300 instead of 1073725440 to avoid possible\n// edge cases.\n// 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32 = 3221241997\r\n\r\n// Oops, old kernels happily accept this packet.\n+0 \u0026lt; . 1:1001(1000) ack 3221241997 win 65535\r\n\r\n// After the kernel fix the following will be replaced by a challenge ACK,\n// and prior malicious frame would be dropped.\n+0 \u0026gt; . 1:1(0) ack 1001(CVE-2023-52881)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nocteontx2-af: Use separate handlers for interrupts\r\n\r\nFor PF to AF interrupt vector and VF to AF vector same\ninterrupt handler is registered which is causing race condition.\nWhen two interrupts are raised to two CPUs at same time\nthen two cores serve same event corrupting the data.(CVE-2024-27030)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmedia: go7007: fix a memleak in go7007_load_encoder\r\n\r\nIn go7007_load_encoder, bounce(i.e. go-\u0026gt;boot_fw), is allocated without\na deallocation thereafter. After the following call chain:\r\n\r\nsaa7134_go7007_init\n  |-\u0026gt; go7007_boot_encoder\n        |-\u0026gt; go7007_load_encoder\n  |-\u0026gt; kfree(go)\r\n\r\ngo is freed and thus bounce is leaked.(CVE-2024-27074)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nft_flow_offload: reset dst in route object after setting up flow\r\n\r\ndst is transferred to the flow object, route object does not own it\nanymore.  Reset dst in route object, otherwise if flow_offload_add()\nfails, error path releases dst twice, leading to a refcount underflow.(CVE-2024-27403)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: mac80211: check/clear fast rx for non-4addr sta VLAN changes\r\n\r\nWhen moving a station out of a VLAN and deleting the VLAN afterwards, the\nfast_rx entry still holds a pointer to the VLAN\u0026apos;s netdev, which can cause\nuse-after-free bugs. Fix this by immediately calling ieee80211_check_fast_rx\nafter the VLAN change.(CVE-2024-35789)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/lima: fix a memleak in lima_heap_alloc\r\n\r\nWhen lima_vm_map_bo fails, the resources need to be deallocated, or\nthere will be memleaks.(CVE-2024-35829)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nriscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage\r\n\r\nchildregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread\nin user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-\u0026gt;gp is never used since\nthe kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the\ngp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other\nmeans.\r\n\r\n[From the email thread]\r\n\r\nThe /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used\nfor user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or\nwhen /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have\nPF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.\r\n\r\nchildregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable\nfrom userspace in at least five ways:\r\n\r\n1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting\n   register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has\n   sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers\n   zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.\r\n\r\n   This is a bug in its own right, but I\u0026apos;m unwilling to bet that it is the only\n   way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.\r\n\r\n2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread\n   before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only\n   happen at user/kernel boundaries.\r\n\r\n3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for\n   user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the\n   registers it returns.\r\n\r\n4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel\n   addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses\n   are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under\n   LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.\r\n\r\n5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have\n   not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user\n   registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.(CVE-2024-35871)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ni40e: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue\r\n\r\nIssue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace:\nWhen both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning\nin check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems\nto be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with\nthe WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not.\r\n\r\nSimilar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by\nremoving the flag. Do the same for i40e too.\r\n\r\n[Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[  +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is\nflushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0\n[  +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966\ncheck_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120\n[  +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq\nsnd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4\nnls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr\nrfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma\nintel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif\nisst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal\nintel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core\niTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore\nioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich\nintel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad\nxfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe\ndrm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel\nlibata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror\ndm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse\n[  +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not\ntainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1\n[  +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS\nSE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020\n[  +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e]\n[  +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120\n[  +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48\n81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd\nff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90\n[  +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282\n[  +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX:\n0000000000000027\n[  +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:\nffff94d47f620bc0\n[  +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:\n00000000ffff7fff\n[  +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12:\nffff94c5451ea180\n[  +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15:\nffff94c5f1330ab0\n[  +0.000001] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\n[  +0.000002] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[  +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4:\n00000000007706f0\n[  +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:\n0000000000000000\n[  +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:\n0000000000000400\n[  +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554\n[  +0.000001] Call Trace:\n[  +0.000001]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[  +0.000002]  ? __warn+0x80/0x130\n[  +0.000003]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120\n[  +0.000002]  ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0\n[  +0.000005]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70\n[  +0.000003]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70\n[  +0.000002]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20\n[  +0.000006]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120\n[  +0.000002]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120\n[  +0.000002]  __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0\n[  +0.000015]  ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000056]  __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000023]  ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000020]  i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma]\n[  +0.000022]  i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e]\n[  +0.000035]  i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e]\n[  +0.000024]  process_one_work+0x174/0x340\n[  +0.000003]  worker_th\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-36004)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix warning during rehash\r\n\r\nAs previously explained, the rehash delayed work migrates filters from\none region to another. This is done by iterating over all chunks (all\nthe filters with the same priority) in the region and in each chunk\niterating over all the filters.\r\n\r\nWhen the work runs out of credits it stores the current chunk and entry\nas markers in the per-work context so that it would know where to resume\nthe migration from the next time the work is scheduled.\r\n\r\nUpon error, the chunk marker is reset to NULL, but without resetting the\nentry markers despite being relative to it. This can result in migration\nbeing resumed from an entry that does not belong to the chunk being\nmigrated. In turn, this will eventually lead to a chunk being iterated\nover as if it is an entry. Because of how the two structures happen to\nbe defined, this does not lead to KASAN splats, but to warnings such as\n[1].\r\n\r\nFix by creating a helper that resets all the markers and call it from\nall the places the currently only reset the chunk marker. For good\nmeasures also call it when starting a completely new rehash. Add a\nwarning to avoid future cases.\r\n\r\n[1]\nWARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1076 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core_acl_flex_keys.c:407 mlxsw_afk_encode+0x242/0x2f0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 7 PID: 1076 Comm: kworker/7:24 Tainted: G        W          6.9.0-rc3-custom-00880-g29e61d91b77b #29\nHardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700/VMOD0005, BIOS 5.11 01/06/2019\nWorkqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work\nRIP: 0010:mlxsw_afk_encode+0x242/0x2f0\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n mlxsw_sp_acl_atcam_entry_add+0xd9/0x3c0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x5e/0xa0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_all+0x109/0x290\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0x6c/0x470\n process_one_work+0x151/0x370\n worker_thread+0x2cb/0x3e0\n kthread+0xd0/0x100\n ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36007)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/sched: taprio: extend minimum interval restriction to entire cycle too\r\n\r\nIt is possible for syzbot to side-step the restriction imposed by the\nblamed commit in the Fixes: tag, because the taprio UAPI permits a\ncycle-time different from (and potentially shorter than) the sum of\nentry intervals.\r\n\r\nWe need one more restriction, which is that the cycle time itself must\nbe larger than N * ETH_ZLEN bit times, where N is the number of schedule\nentries. This restriction needs to apply regardless of whether the cycle\ntime came from the user or was the implicit, auto-calculated value, so\nwe move the existing \u0026quot;cycle == 0\u0026quot; check outside the \u0026quot;if \u0026quot;(!new-\u0026gt;cycle_time)\u0026quot;\nbranch. This way covers both conditions and scenarios.\r\n\r\nAdd a selftest which illustrates the issue triggered by syzbot.(CVE-2024-36244)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/mlx5e: Fix netif state handling\r\n\r\nmlx5e_suspend cleans resources only if netif_device_present() returns\ntrue. However, mlx5e_resume changes the state of netif, via\nmlx5e_nic_enable, only if reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED.\nIn the below case, the above leads to NULL-ptr Oops[1] and memory\nleaks:\r\n\r\nmlx5e_probe\n _mlx5e_resume\n  mlx5e_attach_netdev\n   mlx5e_nic_enable  \u0026lt;-- netdev not reg, not calling netif_device_attach()\n  register_netdev \u0026lt;-- failed for some reason.\nERROR_FLOW:\n _mlx5e_suspend \u0026lt;-- netif_device_present return false, resources aren\u0026apos;t freed :(\r\n\r\nHence, clean resources in this case as well.\r\n\r\n[1]\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\nPGD 0 P4D 0\nOops: 0010 [#1] SMP\nCPU: 2 PID: 9345 Comm: test-ovs-ct-gen Not tainted 6.5.0_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_09_05_16_01 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:0x0\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at0xffffffffffffffd6.\nRSP: 0018:ffff888178aaf758 EFLAGS: 00010246\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? __die+0x20/0x60\n ? page_fault_oops+0x14c/0x3c0\n ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x140\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xb0\n blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3d/0x60\n mlx5_blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x22/0x30 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_core_uplink_netdev_event_replay+0x3e/0x60 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_mdev_netdev_track+0x53/0x60 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5_ib_roce_init+0xc3/0x340 [mlx5_ib]\n __mlx5_ib_add+0x34/0xd0 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5r_probe+0xe1/0x210 [mlx5_ib]\n ? auxiliary_match_id+0x6a/0x90\n auxiliary_bus_probe+0x38/0x80\n ? driver_sysfs_add+0x51/0x80\n really_probe+0xc9/0x3e0\n ? driver_probe_device+0x90/0x90\n __driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160\n driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90\n __device_attach_driver+0x7d/0x100\n bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xd0\n __device_attach+0xbc/0x1f0\n bus_probe_device+0x86/0xa0\n device_add+0x637/0x840\n __auxiliary_device_add+0x3b/0xa0\n add_adev+0xc9/0x140 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x22a/0x310 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_register_device+0x53/0xa0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x5c4/0x9c0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_init_one+0x3b/0x60 [mlx5_core]\n probe_one+0x44c/0x730 [mlx5_core]\n local_pci_probe+0x3e/0x90\n pci_device_probe+0xbf/0x210\n ? kernfs_create_link+0x5d/0xa0\n ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x60/0xc0\n really_probe+0xc9/0x3e0\n ? driver_probe_device+0x90/0x90\n __driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160\n driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90\n __device_attach_driver+0x7d/0x100\n bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xd0\n __device_attach+0xbc/0x1f0\n pci_bus_add_device+0x54/0x80\n pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2e6/0x320\n sriov_enable+0x208/0x420\n mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x9e/0x200 [mlx5_core]\n sriov_numvfs_store+0xae/0x1a0\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0\n vfs_write+0x291/0x3c0\n ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0\n do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0\n CR2: 0000000000000000\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000  ]---(CVE-2024-38608)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: sr: fix invalid unregister error path\r\n\r\nThe error path of seg6_init() is wrong in case CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL\nis not defined. In that case if seg6_hmac_init() fails, the\ngenl_unregister_family() isn\u0026apos;t called.\r\n\r\nThis issue exist since commit 46738b1317e1 (\u0026quot;ipv6: sr: add option to control\nlwtunnel support\u0026quot;), and commit 5559cea2d5aa (\u0026quot;ipv6: sr: fix possible\nuse-after-free and null-ptr-deref\u0026quot;) replaced unregister_pernet_subsys()\nwith genl_unregister_family() in this error path.(CVE-2024-38612)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngreybus: Fix use-after-free bug in gb_interface_release due to race condition.\r\n\r\nIn gb_interface_create, \u0026amp;intf-\u0026gt;mode_switch_completion is bound with\ngb_interface_mode_switch_work. Then it will be started by\ngb_interface_request_mode_switch. Here is the relevant code.\nif (!queue_work(system_long_wq, \u0026amp;intf-\u0026gt;mode_switch_work)) {\n\t...\n}\r\n\r\nIf we call gb_interface_release to make cleanup, there may be an\nunfinished work. This function will call kfree to free the object\n\u0026quot;intf\u0026quot;. However, if gb_interface_mode_switch_work is scheduled to\nrun after kfree, it may cause use-after-free error as\ngb_interface_mode_switch_work will use the object \u0026quot;intf\u0026quot;.\nThe possible execution flow that may lead to the issue is as follows:\r\n\r\nCPU0                            CPU1\r\n\r\n                            |   gb_interface_create\n                            |   gb_interface_request_mode_switch\ngb_interface_release        |\nkfree(intf) (free)          |\n                            |   gb_interface_mode_switch_work\n                            |   mutex_lock(\u0026amp;intf-\u0026gt;mutex) (use)\r\n\r\nFix it by canceling the work before kfree.(CVE-2024-39495)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net\r\n\r\nSyzkaller hit a warning:\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\nCode: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1\nRSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac\nRDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4\nR13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040\nFS:  00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0\n ? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\n ? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\n ? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30\n ? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140\n ? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\n get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0\n ? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10\n open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130\n __tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370\n ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0\n ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30\n ? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10\n tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160\n x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0\n do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7\nCode: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8\nRSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0\nR10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730\nR13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\nKernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...\r\n\r\nThis is trigger as below:\n          ns0                                    ns1\ntun_set_iff() //dev is tun0\n   tun-\u0026gt;dev = dev\n//ip link set tun0 netns ns1\n                                       put_net() //ref is 0\n__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS\n   net = dev_net(tun-\u0026gt;dev);\n   open_related_ns(\u0026amp;net-\u0026gt;ns, get_net_ns); //ns1\n     get_net_ns()\n        get_net() //addition on 0\r\n\r\nUse maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net\u0026apos;s ref is zero to fix this(CVE-2024-40958)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nscsi: qla2xxx: During vport delete send async logout explicitly\r\n\r\nDuring vport delete, it is observed that during unload we hit a crash\nbecause of stale entries in outstanding command array.  For all these stale\nI/O entries, eh_abort was issued and aborted (fast_fail_io = 2009h) but\nI/Os could not complete while vport delete is in process of deleting.\r\n\r\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c\n  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n  PGD 0 P4D 0\n  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\n  Workqueue: qla2xxx_wq qla_do_work [qla2xxx]\n  RIP: 0010:dma_direct_unmap_sg+0x51/0x1e0\n  RSP: 0018:ffffa1e1e150fc68 EFLAGS: 00010046\n  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000021 RCX: 0000000000000001\n  RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce208a7a0d0\n  RBP: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8ce378aac9c8\n  R10: ffff8ce378aac8a0 R11: ffffa1e1e150f9d8 R12: 0000000000000000\n  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R15: 0000000000000000\n  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d217f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n  CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 0000002089acc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0\n  Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  qla2xxx_qpair_sp_free_dma+0x417/0x4e0\n  ? qla2xxx_qpair_sp_compl+0x10d/0x1a0\n  ? qla2x00_status_entry+0x768/0x2830\n  ? newidle_balance+0x2f0/0x430\n  ? dequeue_entity+0x100/0x3c0\n  ? qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x6a1/0x19e0\n  ? __schedule+0x2d5/0x1140\n  ? qla_do_work+0x47/0x60\n  ? process_one_work+0x267/0x440\n  ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440\n  ? worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0\n  ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440\n  ? kthread+0x156/0x180\n  ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50\n  ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30\n  \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nSend out async logout explicitly for all the ports during vport delete.(CVE-2024-42289)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: flow_dissector: use DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE\r\n\r\nThe following splat is easy to reproduce upstream as well as in -stable\nkernels. Florian Westphal provided the following commit:\r\n\r\n  d1dab4f71d37 (\u0026quot;net: add and use __skb_get_hash_symmetric_net\u0026quot;)\r\n\r\nbut this complementary fix has been also suggested by Willem de Bruijn\nand it can be easily backported to -stable kernel which consists in\nusing DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE instead to silence the following splat\ngiven __skb_get_hash() is used by the nftables tracing infrastructure to\nto identify packets in traces.\r\n\r\n[69133.561393] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[69133.561404] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43576 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1104 __skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/\n[...]\n[69133.561944] CPU: 0 PID: 43576 Comm: socat Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7+ #379\n[69133.561959] RIP: 0010:__skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/0x2ad0\n[69133.561970] Code: 83 f9 04 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 45 85 c9 0f 84 aa 00 00 00 41 83 f9 02 0f 84 81 fc ff\nff 44 0f b7 b4 24 80 00 00 00 e9 8b f9 ff ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b e9 20 f3 ff ff 41 f6 c6 20 0f 84 e4 ef ff ff 48 8d 7b 12 e8\n[69133.561979] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006fc0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[69133.561988] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82f33e20 RCX: ffffffff81ab7e19\n[69133.561994] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffc90000007388 RDI: ffff888103a1b418\n[69133.562001] RBP: ffffc90000007310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[69133.562007] R10: ffffc90000007388 R11: ffffffff810cface R12: ffff888103a1b400\n[69133.562013] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff82f33e2a R15: ffffffff82f33e28\n[69133.562020] FS:  00007f40f7131740(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[69133.562027] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[69133.562033] CR2: 00007f40f7346ee0 CR3: 000000015d200001 CR4: 00000000001706f0\n[69133.562040] Call Trace:\n[69133.562044]  \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n[69133.562049]  ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0\n[ 1211.841384]  ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x107e/0x2860\n[...]\n[ 1211.841496]  ? bpf_flow_dissect+0x160/0x160\n[ 1211.841753]  __skb_get_hash+0x97/0x280\n[ 1211.841765]  ? __skb_get_hash_symmetric+0x230/0x230\n[ 1211.841776]  ? mod_find+0xbf/0xe0\n[ 1211.841786]  ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xe0\n[ 1211.841798]  ? bpf_ksym_find+0x56/0xe0\n[ 1211.841807]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x2a/0x70\n[ 1211.841819]  nft_trace_init+0x1b9/0x1c0 [nf_tables]\n[ 1211.841895]  ? nft_trace_notify+0x830/0x830 [nf_tables]\n[ 1211.841964]  ? get_stack_info+0x2b/0x80\n[ 1211.841975]  ? nft_do_chain_arp+0x80/0x80 [nf_tables]\n[ 1211.842044]  nft_do_chain+0x79c/0x850 [nf_tables](CVE-2024-42321)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmlxsw: spectrum_acl_erp: Fix object nesting warning\r\n\r\nACLs in Spectrum-2 and newer ASICs can reside in the algorithmic TCAM\n(A-TCAM) or in the ordinary circuit TCAM (C-TCAM). The former can\ncontain more ACLs (i.e., tc filters), but the number of masks in each\nregion (i.e., tc chain) is limited.\r\n\r\nIn order to mitigate the effects of the above limitation, the device\nallows filters to share a single mask if their masks only differ in up\nto 8 consecutive bits. For example, dst_ip/25 can be represented using\ndst_ip/24 with a delta of 1 bit. The C-TCAM does not have a limit on the\nnumber of masks being used (and therefore does not support mask\naggregation), but can contain a limited number of filters.\r\n\r\nThe driver uses the \u0026quot;objagg\u0026quot; library to perform the mask aggregation by\npassing it objects that consist of the filter\u0026apos;s mask and whether the\nfilter is to be inserted into the A-TCAM or the C-TCAM since filters in\ndifferent TCAMs cannot share a mask.\r\n\r\nThe set of created objects is dependent on the insertion order of the\nfilters and is not necessarily optimal. Therefore, the driver will\nperiodically ask the library to compute a more optimal set (\u0026quot;hints\u0026quot;) by\nlooking at all the existing objects.\r\n\r\nWhen the library asks the driver whether two objects can be aggregated\nthe driver only compares the provided masks and ignores the A-TCAM /\nC-TCAM indication. This is the right thing to do since the goal is to\nmove as many filters as possible to the A-TCAM. The driver also forbids\ntwo identical masks from being aggregated since this can only happen if\none was intentionally put in the C-TCAM to avoid a conflict in the\nA-TCAM.\r\n\r\nThe above can result in the following set of hints:\r\n\r\nH1: {mask X, A-TCAM} -\u0026gt; H2: {mask Y, A-TCAM} // X is Y + delta\nH3: {mask Y, C-TCAM} -\u0026gt; H4: {mask Z, A-TCAM} // Y is Z + delta\r\n\r\nAfter getting the hints from the library the driver will start migrating\nfilters from one region to another while consulting the computed hints\nand instructing the device to perform a lookup in both regions during\nthe transition.\r\n\r\nAssuming a filter with mask X is being migrated into the A-TCAM in the\nnew region, the hints lookup will return H1. Since H2 is the parent of\nH1, the library will try to find the object associated with it and\ncreate it if necessary in which case another hints lookup (recursive)\nwill be performed. This hints lookup for {mask Y, A-TCAM} will either\nreturn H2 or H3 since the driver passes the library an object comparison\nfunction that ignores the A-TCAM / C-TCAM indication.\r\n\r\nThis can eventually lead to nested objects which are not supported by\nthe library [1].\r\n\r\nFix by removing the object comparison function from both the driver and\nthe library as the driver was the only user. That way the lookup will\nonly return exact matches.\r\n\r\nI do not have a reliable reproducer that can reproduce the issue in a\ntimely manner, but before the fix the issue would reproduce in several\nminutes and with the fix it does not reproduce in over an hour.\r\n\r\nNote that the current usefulness of the hints is limited because they\ninclude the C-TCAM indication and represent aggregation that cannot\nactually happen. This will be addressed in net-next.\r\n\r\n[1]\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 153 at lib/objagg.c:170 objagg_obj_parent_assign+0xb5/0xd0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 153 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-custom-g70fbc2c1c38b #42\nHardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700C/VMOD0008, BIOS 5.11 10/10/2018\nWorkqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work\nRIP: 0010:objagg_obj_parent_assign+0xb5/0xd0\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __objagg_obj_get+0x2bb/0x580\n objagg_obj_get+0xe/0x80\n mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_mask_get+0xb5/0xf0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_atcam_entry_add+0xe8/0x3c0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_entry_create+0x5e/0xa0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_migrate_one+0x16b/0x270\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vregion_rehash_work+0xbe/0x510\n process_one_work+0x151/0x370(CVE-2024-43880)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()\r\n\r\nUserspace may trigger a speculative read of an address outside the gpio\ndescriptor array.\nUsers can do that by calling gpio_ioctl() with an offset out of range.\nOffset is copied from user and then used as an array index to get\nthe gpio descriptor without sanitization in gpio_device_get_desc().\r\n\r\nThis change ensures that the offset is sanitized by using\narray_index_nospec() to mitigate any possibility of speculative\ninformation leaks.\r\n\r\nThis bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis\nSecurity Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.(CVE-2024-44931)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndriver core: Fix uevent_show() vs driver detach race\r\n\r\nuevent_show() wants to de-reference dev-\u0026gt;driver-\u0026gt;name. There is no clean\nway for a device attribute to de-reference dev-\u0026gt;driver unless that\nattribute is defined via (struct device_driver).dev_groups. Instead, the\nanti-pattern of taking the device_lock() in the attribute handler risks\ndeadlocks with code paths that remove device attributes while holding\nthe lock.\r\n\r\nThis deadlock is typically invisible to lockdep given the device_lock()\nis marked lockdep_set_novalidate_class(), but some subsystems allocate a\nlocal lockdep key for @dev-\u0026gt;mutex to reveal reports of the form:\r\n\r\n ======================================================\n WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected\n 6.10.0-rc7+ #275 Tainted: G           OE    N\n ------------------------------------------------------\n modprobe/2374 is trying to acquire lock:\n ffff8c2270070de0 (kn-\u0026gt;active#6){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220\r\n\r\n but task is already holding lock:\n ffff8c22016e88f8 (\u0026amp;cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x210\r\n\r\n which lock already depends on the new lock.\r\n\r\n the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:\r\n\r\n -\u0026gt; #1 (\u0026amp;cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}:\n        __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc30\n        uevent_show+0xac/0x130\n        dev_attr_show+0x18/0x40\n        sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xac/0xf0\n        seq_read_iter+0x110/0x450\n        vfs_read+0x25b/0x340\n        ksys_read+0x67/0xf0\n        do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190\n        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\r\n\r\n -\u0026gt; #0 (kn-\u0026gt;active#6){++++}-{0:0}:\n        __lock_acquire+0x121a/0x1fa0\n        lock_acquire+0xd6/0x2e0\n        kernfs_drain+0x1e9/0x200\n        __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220\n        kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5e/0xa0\n        device_del+0x168/0x410\n        device_unregister+0x13/0x60\n        devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110\n        device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70\n        device_release_driver_internal+0x1c7/0x210\n        driver_detach+0x47/0x90\n        bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0\n        cxl_acpi_exit+0xc/0x11 [cxl_acpi]\n        __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x181/0x260\n        do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190\n        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\r\n\r\nThe observation though is that driver objects are typically much longer\nlived than device objects. It is reasonable to perform lockless\nde-reference of a @driver pointer even if it is racing detach from a\ndevice. Given the infrequency of driver unregistration, use\nsynchronize_rcu() in module_remove_driver() to close any potential\nraces.  It is potentially overkill to suffer synchronize_rcu() just to\nhandle the rare module removal racing uevent_show() event.\r\n\r\nThanks to Tetsuo Handa for the debug analysis of the syzbot report [1].(CVE-2024-44952)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbonding: fix xfrm real_dev null pointer dereference\r\n\r\nWe shouldn\u0026apos;t set real_dev to NULL because packets can be in transit and\nxfrm might call xdo_dev_offload_ok() in parallel. All callbacks assume\nreal_dev is set.\r\n\r\n Example trace:\n kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one\n kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0\n kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ #12\n kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014\n kernel: RIP: 0010:nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA\n kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 \u0026lt;83\u0026gt; 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one\n kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA\n kernel:\n kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60\n kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00\n kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014\n kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000\n kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000\n kernel: FS:  00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one\n kernel: Call Trace:\n kernel:  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n kernel:  ? __die+0x1f/0x60\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA\n kernel:  ? page_fault_oops+0x142/0x4c0\n kernel:  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x670\n kernel:  ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one\n kernel:  ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180\n kernel:  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n kernel:  ? nsim_bpf_uninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim]\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA\n kernel:  ? nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one\n kernel:  bond_ipsec_offload_ok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding]\n kernel:  xfrm_output+0x61/0x3b0\n kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA\n kernel:  ip_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x80(CVE-2024-44989)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbonding: fix null pointer deref in bond_ipsec_offload_ok\r\n\r\nWe must check if there is an active slave before dereferencing the pointer.(CVE-2024-44990)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: flowtable: initialise extack before use\r\n\r\nFix missing initialisation of extack in flow offload.(CVE-2024-45018)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndmaengine: altera-msgdma: properly free descriptor in msgdma_free_descriptor\r\n\r\nRemove list_del call in msgdma_chan_desc_cleanup, this should be the role\nof msgdma_free_descriptor. In consequence replace list_add_tail with\nlist_move_tail in msgdma_free_descriptor.\r\n\r\nThis fixes the path:\n   msgdma_free_chan_resources -\u0026gt; msgdma_free_descriptors -\u0026gt;\n   msgdma_free_desc_list -\u0026gt; msgdma_free_descriptor\r\n\r\nwhich does not correctly free the descriptors as first nodes were not\nremoved from the list.(CVE-2024-46716)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amd/display: Stop amdgpu_dm initialize when stream nums greater than 6\r\n\r\n[Why]\nCoverity reports OVERRUN warning. Should abort amdgpu_dm\ninitialize.\r\n\r\n[How]\nReturn failure to amdgpu_dm_init.(CVE-2024-46817)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\narm64: acpi: Harden get_cpu_for_acpi_id() against missing CPU entry\r\n\r\nIn a review discussion of the changes to support vCPU hotplug where\na check was added on the GICC being enabled if was online, it was\nnoted that there is need to map back to the cpu and use that to index\ninto a cpumask. As such, a valid ID is needed.\r\n\r\nIf an MPIDR check fails in acpi_map_gic_cpu_interface() it is possible\nfor the entry in cpu_madt_gicc[cpu] == NULL.  This function would\nthen cause a NULL pointer dereference.   Whilst a path to trigger\nthis has not been established, harden this caller against the\npossibility.(CVE-2024-46822)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nELF: fix kernel.randomize_va_space double read\r\n\r\nELF loader uses \u0026quot;randomize_va_space\u0026quot; twice. It is sysctl and can change\nat any moment, so 2 loads could see 2 different values in theory with\nunpredictable consequences.\r\n\r\nIssue exactly one load for consistent value across one exec.(CVE-2024-46826)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nplatform/x86: panasonic-laptop: Fix SINF array out of bounds accesses\r\n\r\nThe panasonic laptop code in various places uses the SINF array with index\nvalues of 0 - SINF_CUR_BRIGHT(0x0d) without checking that the SINF array\nis big enough.\r\n\r\nNot all panasonic laptops have this many SINF array entries, for example\nthe Toughbook CF-18 model only has 10 SINF array entries. So it only\nsupports the AC+DC brightness entries and mute.\r\n\r\nCheck that the SINF array has a minimum size which covers all AC+DC\nbrightness entries and refuse to load if the SINF array is smaller.\r\n\r\nFor higher SINF indexes hide the sysfs attributes when the SINF array\ndoes not contain an entry for that attribute, avoiding show()/store()\naccessing the array out of bounds and add bounds checking to the probe()\nand resume() code accessing these.(CVE-2024-46859)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amd/display: Avoid overflow from uint32_t to uint8_t\r\n\r\n[WHAT \u0026amp; HOW]\ndmub_rb_cmd\u0026apos;s ramping_boundary has size of uint8_t and it is assigned\n0xFFFF. Fix it by changing it to uint8_t with value of 0xFF.\r\n\r\nThis fixes 2 INTEGER_OVERFLOW issues reported by Coverity.(CVE-2024-47661)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-2295",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:46Z",
  "published": "2024-10-25T11:07:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2295"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47484"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52881"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27030"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27074"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27403"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35789"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35829"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35871"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36004"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36007"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36244"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38608"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38612"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39495"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40958"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42289"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42321"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43880"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44931"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44952"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44989"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44990"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45018"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46716"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46817"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46822"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46826"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46859"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47661"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-47484",
    "CVE-2023-52881",
    "CVE-2024-27030",
    "CVE-2024-27074",
    "CVE-2024-27403",
    "CVE-2024-35789",
    "CVE-2024-35829",
    "CVE-2024-35871",
    "CVE-2024-36004",
    "CVE-2024-36007",
    "CVE-2024-36244",
    "CVE-2024-38608",
    "CVE-2024-38612",
    "CVE-2024-39495",
    "CVE-2024-40958",
    "CVE-2024-42289",
    "CVE-2024-42321",
    "CVE-2024-43880",
    "CVE-2024-44931",
    "CVE-2024-44952",
    "CVE-2024-44989",
    "CVE-2024-44990",
    "CVE-2024-45018",
    "CVE-2024-46716",
    "CVE-2024-46817",
    "CVE-2024-46822",
    "CVE-2024-46826",
    "CVE-2024-46859",
    "CVE-2024-47661"
  ]
}