CVE-2026-104016 (GCVE-0-2026-104016)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-27 23:52 – Updated: 2026-10-27 23:52 X_Open Source
VLAI
Title
jackson-dataformat-protobuf: signed integer overflow in string-length paths allows unbounded array allocation and OutOfMemoryError
Summary
ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) <= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit. The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured. A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Assigner
HeroDevs CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 82/100 over 17 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
FasterXML jackson-dataformat-protobuf Affected: 2.6.0 , < 2.18.12 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.18.12 (maven)
Affected: 2.19.0 , < 2.21.8 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.21.8 (maven)
Affected: 2.22.0 , < 2.22.4 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.22.4 (maven)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
FasterXML jackson-dataformat-protobuf Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.1.8 (maven)
Unaffected: 3.1.8 (maven)
Affected: 3.2.0 , < 3.2.4 (maven)
Unaffected: 3.2.4 (maven)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
bewithyash cowtowncoder (Tatu Saloranta)
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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