CVE-2026-110782 (GCVE-0-2026-110782)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-17 17:55 – Updated: 2026-11-17 17:55| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/security/a… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/7b7… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/9a2… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/t… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/t… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| simplesamlphp | saml2 |
Affected:
>= 6.2.2, < 6.2.4
Affected: >= 7.0.0-rc1, < 7.0.0-rc2 |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "saml2",
"vendor": "simplesamlphp",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 6.2.2, \u003c 6.2.4"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 7.0.0-rc1, \u003c 7.0.0-rc2"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer\u0027s metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding\u0027s embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"description": "CWE-287: Improper Authentication",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T17:55:31.824Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/security/advisories/GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/security/advisories/GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/7b7fbb5322cb5607db3e5a329681f4886b1449fe",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/7b7fbb5322cb5607db3e5a329681f4886b1449fe"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/9a21edb96de1f3ece3b40ccbe3b7de761917a06f",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/commit/9a21edb96de1f3ece3b40ccbe3b7de761917a06f"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/tag/v6.2.4",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/tag/v6.2.4"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/tag/v7.0.0-rc2",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/simplesamlphp/saml2/releases/tag/v7.0.0-rc2"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no embedded-Issuer binding)"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-110782",
"datePublished": "2026-11-17T17:55:31.824Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-14T17:40:14.918Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T17:55:31.824Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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