CVE-2026-115644 (GCVE-0-2026-115644)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-28 16:45 – Updated: 2026-11-05 17:16- CWE-288 - Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/1… |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Kafka |
Affected:
2.4.0 , < 4.2.2
(semver)
Affected: 4.3.0 , < 4.3.2 (semver) |
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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