CVE-2026-12707 (GCVE-0-2026-12707)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-14 15:18 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:57- CWE-770 - Allocation of resources without limits or throttling
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare | quiche |
Affected:
0.15.0 , < 0.29.3
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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