CVE-2026-133613 (GCVE-0-2026-133613)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 07:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:07| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/607… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 06:54 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/607e23000ea39172ccff4d0de1fb1b7026c795c4.patch
08c621737fc4… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
607e23000ea3
|
fix: [security] Pass community data API keys outside child | 08c621737fc4… |
Fix summary
The launcher no longer forwards the admin API key in the child process command line. The key is now passed exclusively through the FLOWINTEL_ADMIN_API_KEY environment variable, which is not visible in process listings. A hidden terminal prompt (read -r -s) is provided for interactive use, and the Python helper reads the key from the environment by default. Legacy positional and --api-key argument forms remain functional for backward compatibility but emit a warning documenting the exposure risk.
Patch summary
launch.sh: Added a read_admin_api_key function that resolves the key from the FLOWINTEL_ADMIN_API_KEY environment variable, a hidden terminal prompt, or a legacy positional argument (with a warning). The test_data_community and delete_test_data_community functions now export the key as FLOWINTEL_ADMIN_API_KEY in the child environment instead of passing it as --api-key on the command line. init_community_data.py: Changed --api-key from required=True to default=os.environ.get('FLOWINTEL_ADMIN_API_KEY'), added a parser.error() guard when no key is available, and updated docstrings. README.md and doc/user-manual.md: Updated usage examples to remove the positional key argument and document the environment-variable and hidden-prompt workflows.
CVSS rationale
AV:L: The attacker must have local access to the host to read process arguments. AC:L: Reading process arguments via ps or /proc is trivial and requires no special conditions. AT:N: No data tampering is needed. PR:N: Any local user can read process arguments; no elevated privileges are required. UI:N: The attacker does not need victim interaction beyond the victim running the launcher. VC/VI/VA:N: The vulnerable component (launcher script) itself is not directly compromised. SC/SI/SA:H: The exposed admin API key grants full administrative access to the Flowintel REST API (a separate component), allowing complete read, write, and delete of all threat intelligence data, users, and configurations.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The admin API key is placed in process arguments (argv), which are readable by all local users via ps or /proc/<pid>/cmdline. This exposes a sensitive credential to unauthorized local actors.
- CWE-522 The credential (admin API key) is transmitted between the launcher and the helper process in a manner that does not protect it from local observation, failing to adequately safeguard the credential in transit.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The system places the API key in a context (process arguments) that is assumed to be private, but on multi-user Unix systems process arguments are visible to all local users. The attacker exploits this trust assumption by reading the key from the process table. This is the closest available CAPEC; no CAPEC specifically covers local process-argument sniffing, so CAPEC-66 is selected as the best approximation of exploiting a trusted-context assumption in an untrusted context.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; all versions prior to commit 607e23000ea39172ccff4d0de1fb1b7026c795c4 are assumed affected.
- The Flowintel REST API is assumed to be a separate component from the launcher script, justifying scope change (SC/SI/SA) in the CVSS vector.
- The CAPEC-66 mapping is approximate; no CAPEC specifically covers local process-argument information disclosure, so the closest plausible pattern was selected.
- PR:N assumes any unprivileged local user can read process arguments; on systems with restricted /proc access, PR may need to be raised.
- The exposure window is limited to the duration of the helper process execution, but this is sufficient for a local attacker to capture the key.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-06 09:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (607e23000ea39172ccff4d0de1fb1b7026c795c4): fix: [security] Pass community data API keys outside child https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/607e23000ea39172ccff4d0de1fb1b7026c795c4.patch
- 2026-11-20 06:54 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/607e23000ea39172ccff4d0de1fb1b7026c795c4.patch
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}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.