CVE-2026-133630 (GCVE-0-2026-133630)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 09:09 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:17
VLAI
Title
flowintel CI/CD Workflow Exposes Checkout Credentials in Docker Build Cache
Summary
The flowintel Docker build workflow used the GitHub Actions checkout action with default credential persistence, causing the job authentication token to be written into the repository's Git configuration file. This file became part of the Docker build context and could be retained in exported build cache layers, even though Git metadata was stripped from the final runtime image. An attacker with access to the CI/CD build cache or build environment could extract the persisted token and use it to gain unauthorized access to the private source repository. Impact: - Exposure of a valid authentication token to the private repository - Potential unauthorized read access to source code and repository metadata Affected versions: flowintel < 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 09:03 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 18:16 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials
  • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 09:03
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch 6cdbee24e7fd…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
6b26b3f8cf9f fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build 6cdbee24e7fd…
Fix summary

The checkout step is configured to not persist credentials into the workspace, and the full branch history is fetched during the authenticated checkout phase. This ensures the job token is never written to the Git configuration file that enters the Docker build context, eliminating the credential from build cache layers while preserving the ability to resolve release tags against the main branch.

Patch summary

In .github/workflows/docker.yml, the actions/checkout@v4 step is updated with persist-credentials: false to prevent the job token from being stored in .git/config, and fetch-depth: 0 to retrieve full history during the authenticated checkout. The subsequent git fetch origin main command in the branch-check step is removed since the origin/main reference is already available locally from the full-depth checkout.

CVSS rationale

AV:L: Exploitation requires local access to the CI/CD build environment or exported build cache; it is not remotely exploitable over a network. AC:L: Once build cache access is obtained, extracting the token from .git/config is straightforward. AT:N: No active user interaction is required. PR:H: The attacker needs high privileges (access to the CI/CD build infrastructure or build cache storage). UI:N: No user interaction is needed. VC/VI/VA:N: The CI/CD system itself is not directly compromised. SC:H: The exposed token grants full read access to the private repository, a separate system. SI:N: The job token typically has read-only scope by default; no evidence of write access. SA:N: No availability impact on the secondary system.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-522 The GitHub Actions job token (a bearer credential) was persisted in .git/config and included in the Docker build context and cache layers without being removed, constituting insufficient protection of credentials in a build artifact.
  • CWE-200 The credential was exposed in Docker build cache layers accessible to anyone with access to the build environment, constituting information disclosure of a sensitive authentication token.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-1 The closest plausible CAPEC is Session Hijacking: the exposed job token functions as a bearer credential that, if obtained from the build cache, allows an attacker to impersonate the CI/CD system's authenticated session and access the private repository. This is an imperfect mapping because the token is a CI/CD job token rather than a user session cookie, but the underlying mechanism (stealing a valid credential to assume an authenticated identity) aligns with the CAPEC-1 pattern. No CAPEC specifically covers credential leakage in build artifacts, so CAPEC-1 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
  • The GitHub Actions job token has read-only scope to the repository by default; if write scope is configured, SI could be elevated to Low.
  • The build cache is accessible to a limited set of actors (CI/CD operators or platform administrators); broader exposure (e.g., public Docker registry with cached layers) would change AV and PR ratings.
  • CAPEC-1 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically addresses credential leakage in CI/CD build artifacts.
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact first vulnerable release is not confirmed by the patch alone.
  • The vulnerability is specific to the GitHub Actions Docker build workflow and does not affect the flowintel application runtime.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-03 12:17 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05): fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch
  2. 2026-11-20 09:02 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch
Show details on NVD website

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                "timestamp": "2026-11-20T18:16:56.116043Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-11-20T10:17:10.827",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
            "url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-200"
              },
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-522"
              }
            ],
            "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}


Solutions

CNA · CIRCL
The checkout step is configured to not persist credentials into the workspace, and the full branch history is fetched during the authenticated checkout phase. This ensures the job token is never written to the Git configuration file that enters the Docker build context, eliminating the credential from build cache layers while preserving the ability to resolve release tags against the main branch.

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Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.