CVE-2026-19869 (GCVE-0-2026-19869)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 16:35 – Updated: 2026-08-19 16:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Privilege Escalation via Dropped Field-Level @authentication
Summary
@neo4j/graphql from 5.2.0 until the patched versions fails to enforce field-level @authentication rules on root custom-resolver fields when a type-level @authentication rule is also present on the same operation type. When both a type-level @authentication (on Query/Mutation) and a field-level @authentication (on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement — such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: "admin" }) — is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g. roles: ["user"]) is sufficient.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-18 19:09 UTC
CWE
- CWE-639 - Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/neo4j/graphql/security/advisor… | third-party-advisory |
| https://neo4j.com/security/CVE-2026-19869 | vendor-advisory |
Impacted products
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"value": "@neo4j/graphql\u00a0from\u00a05.2.0\u00a0until the patched versions fails to enforce field-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0rules on root custom-resolver fields when a type-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0rule is also present on the same operation type. When both a type-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0(on\u00a0Query/Mutation) and a field-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0(on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement \u2014 such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: \"admin\" }) \u2014 is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g.\u00a0roles: [\"user\"]) is sufficient."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-233",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-233 Privilege Escalation"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 7.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"description": "CWE-639 Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T16:35:19.878Z",
"orgId": "3b236295-4ccd-4a1f-a1c1-a72eecc8d7b6",
"shortName": "Neo4j"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"third-party-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/neo4j/graphql/security/advisories/GHSA-82m8-p9px-c3x5"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://neo4j.com/security/CVE-2026-19869"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade the library to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e7.5.7\u003c/code\u003e+ or\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e5.12.15\u003c/code\u003e+. v6 is end-of-life and will not receive a fix. v5 releases prior to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e5.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor users who cannot upgrade immediately: do not combine a type-level\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e@authentication\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;with a field-level\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e@authentication\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;on the same root operation type. Because the type-level annotation is what shadows the field-level rule, removing it restores correct enforcement \u2014 instead apply a complete\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e@authentication\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;directive to each root field individually, including the full stricter rule on the sensitive field. Alternatively, enforce the stricter requirement inside the custom resolver\u0027s own code.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Upgrade the library to\u00a07.5.7+ or\u00a05.12.15+. v6 is end-of-life and will not receive a fix. v5 releases prior to\u00a05.2.0\u00a0are not affected.\n\n\n\nFor users who cannot upgrade immediately: do not combine a type-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0with a field-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0on the same root operation type. Because the type-level annotation is what shadows the field-level rule, removing it restores correct enforcement \u2014 instead apply a complete\u00a0@authentication\u00a0directive to each root field individually, including the full stricter rule on the sensitive field. Alternatively, enforce the stricter requirement inside the custom resolver\u0027s own code."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Privilege Escalation via Dropped Field-Level @authentication",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.4"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "3b236295-4ccd-4a1f-a1c1-a72eecc8d7b6",
"assignerShortName": "Neo4j",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-19869",
"datePublished": "2026-08-18T16:35:19.878Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-14T11:22:26.042Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T19:09:31.066Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.