{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dani-garcia:vaultwarden:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "3EE3AB66-F61B-479C-A6C3-C2EEEB6FD55A",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.35.4",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Vaultwarden es un servidor compatible con Bitwarden no oficial escrito en Rust, anteriormente conocido como bitwarden_rs. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.35.4, cuando un Gestor tiene manage=false para una colecci\u00f3n determinada, a\u00fan puede realizar varias operaciones de gesti\u00f3n siempre que tenga acceso a la colecci\u00f3n. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 1.35.4."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-27803",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-06T19:45:27.070",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 8.3,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.5,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-04T22:16:18.210",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-285"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.35.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "vaultwarden"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27803"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nTesting confirmed that even when a Manager has `manage=false` for a given collection, they can still perform the following management operations as long as they have access to the collection:\n\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e/users` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `DELETE /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n* The Manager guard checks only whether the user **can access the collection**, not whether they have `manage` privileges. This check is directly applied to management endpoints.\nsrc/auth.rs:816\n  ```rust\n\n  if !Collection::can_access_collection(\u0026headers.membership, \u0026col_id, \u0026conn).await {\n      err_handler!(\"The current user isn\u0027t a manager for this collection\")\n  }\n  ```\n\n* The `can_access_collection` function does **not** evaluate the `manage` flag.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:140\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn can_access_collection(member: \u0026Membership, col_id: \u0026CollectionId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)\n          \u0026\u0026 (member.has_full_access()\n              || CollectionUser::has_access_to_collection_by_user(col_id, \u0026member.user_uuid, conn).await\n              || ...\n  ```\n\n* A separate management-permission check exists and includes `manage` validation, but it is **not used** during authorization for the affected endpoints.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:516\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn is_manageable_by_user(\u0026self, user_uuid: \u0026UserId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(user_uuid, \u0026self.org_uuid, conn).await else {\n          return false;\n      };\n      if member.has_full_access() {\n          return true;\n      }\n      ...\n  ```\n\n* The actual update and deletion endpoints only accept `ManagerHeaders` and do not perform additional `manage` checks.\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:608\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_organization_collection_update(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:890\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_collection_users(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n  \n\nsrc/api/core/organizations.rs:747\n\n```rust\n  async fn delete_organization_collection(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n  ```\n\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker is a **Manager** within the target organization.\n* The attacker has access to the target collection (`assigned=true`).\n* The attacker\u2019s permission for that collection is `manage=false`.\n* A valid API access token has been obtained.\n\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm that the attacker\u2019s current permissions for the target collection include `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2015\" height=\"636\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/58ddc733-e37c-4766-a980-b1ea1918ceb4\" /\u003e\n\n2. As a control test, verify that update operations fail for collections the attacker cannot access.\n\u003cimg width=\"2021\" height=\"852\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8699442-2dfc-4d73-8940-ec10f4a175f0\" /\u003e\n\n3. Confirm that update operations succeed for the target collection where `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2013\" height=\"690\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33d9845d-d18e-456c-a58c-e780911347a9\" /\u003e\n\n4. Use `PUT /collections/{col_id}/users` to set `manage=true`, confirming that the attacker can escalate their own privileges.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"488\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/da8c5246-cf2a-46c2-9a25-e99d907f852d\" /\u003e\n\n5. Verify that deletion of the collection succeeds despite the Manager lacking management rights.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"487\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a97c8fb2-4f97-4c2a-a90b-9d95dbde84fd\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n## Required Minimum Privileges\n\n* Organization Manager role (Owner/Admin privileges are not required)\n* Works even with `access_all=false`\n* Only access rights to the target collection are required (`manage` privilege is not required)\n\n\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA restricted Manager (intended for read/use-only access) directly invokes the API to update collection settings, elevate their own privileges to `manage=true`, and even delete the collection.\n\nThis allows the user to bypass operational access restrictions and effectively gain administrator-equivalent control over the collection.\n\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Expansion of access scope through unauthorized privilege escalation and configuration changes.\n* **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection settings and assignments; potential disabling of access controls.\n* **Availability:** Deletion of collections may disrupt business operations.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vaultwarden\u0027s Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role"
}