CVE-2026-45696 (GCVE-0-2026-45696)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-18 20:31 – Updated: 2026-06-18 20:31
VLAI
Title
OpenEXR HTJ2K decoder heap buffer over-read in ht_undo_impl() (DoS)
Summary
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, the HTJ2K (High-Throughput JPEG 2000) decoder, ht_undo_impl() in OpenEXRCore is vulnerable to a heap-buffer-overflow READ. The ht_undo_imp function copies decoded pixels out of a per-line OpenJPH buffer using the EXR channel's declared width as the iteration count. The codestream embedded in the EXR chunk can declare different (smaller) tile/line dimensions than the EXR header advertises, but ht_undo_impl() does not validate this — it pulls width 32-bit samples from cur_line->i32[] without checking the OpenJPH line buffer's actual length. A crafted EXR file produces a 4-byte heap-buffer-overflow READ immediately after a buffer allocated by ojph::local::codestream::finalize_alloc(). The bug is reachable through the standard scanline-decode entry point used by every consumer of exr_decoding_run/Imf::checkOpenEXRFile, including thumbnailers, asset pipelines, and the exrcheck utility — i.e. any application that opens untrusted EXR files. The result is a deterministic crash (DoS) and potential adjacent-heap leak. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12.
CWE
  • CWE-122 - Heap-based Buffer Overflow
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr Affected: >= 3.4.0, < 3.4.11
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        {
          "product": "openexr",
          "vendor": "AcademySoftwareFoundation",
          "versions": [
            {
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          "value": "OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, the HTJ2K (High-Throughput JPEG 2000) decoder, ht_undo_impl() in OpenEXRCore is vulnerable to a heap-buffer-overflow READ. The  ht_undo_imp function copies decoded pixels out of a per-line OpenJPH buffer using the EXR channel\u0027s declared width as the iteration count. The codestream embedded in the EXR chunk can declare different (smaller) tile/line dimensions than the EXR header advertises, but ht_undo_impl() does not validate this \u2014 it pulls width 32-bit samples from cur_line-\u003ei32[] without checking the OpenJPH line buffer\u0027s actual length. A crafted EXR file produces a 4-byte heap-buffer-overflow READ immediately after a buffer allocated by ojph::local::codestream::finalize_alloc(). The bug is reachable through the standard scanline-decode entry point used by every consumer of exr_decoding_run/Imf::checkOpenEXRFile, including thumbnailers, asset pipelines, and the exrcheck utility \u2014 i.e. any application that opens untrusted EXR files. The result is a deterministic crash (DoS) and potential adjacent-heap leak. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12."
        }
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            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
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            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T20:31:56.603Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-gjpj-qv64-vwhf"
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        {
          "name": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/releases/tag/v3.4.12",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/releases/tag/v3.4.12"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-gjpj-qv64-vwhf",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OpenEXR HTJ2K decoder heap buffer over-read in ht_undo_impl() (DoS)"
    }
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    "datePublished": "2026-06-18T20:31:56.603Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-13T04:38:01.164Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T20:31:56.603Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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