CVE-2026-48168 (GCVE-0-2026-48168)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 18:29 – Updated: 2026-08-05 19:24
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name
Summary
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.
Severity
10 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-05 19:23 UTC
CWE
- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/securi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison | PraisonAI |
Affected:
< 4.6.40
|
guessed |
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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