Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-48797 (GCVE-0-2026-48797)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-16 23:35 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:28

Title

Backpropagate: backprop ui --auth and backprop ui --share do not enforce authentication

Summary

Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions.

Severity

9.3 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-358 - Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
CWE-1295 - Debug Messages Revealing Unnecessary Information

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/mcp-tool-shop-org/backpropagat…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/mcp-tool-shop-org/backpropagat…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
mcp-tool-shop-org	backpropagate	Affected: >= 1.1.0, < 1.2.0
mcp-tool-shop-org	@mcptoolshop/backpropagate	Affected: >= 1.1.0, < 1.2.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-48797

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-17 13:20 - Updated: 2026-06-18 16:16

Severity

9.3 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/mcp-tool-shop-org/backpropagate/releases/tag/v1.2.0
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/mcp-tool-shop-org/backpropagate/security/advisories/GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "backpropagate",
          "vendor": "mcp-tool-shop-org",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.1.0, \u003c 1.2.0"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "@mcptoolshop/backpropagate",
          "vendor": "mcp-tool-shop-org",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.1.0, \u003c 1.2.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass \u2014 documented as \"require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI.\" and--share \u2014 documented as \"expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth.\" When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: \u003cusername\u003e) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port \u2014 local or remote, depending on whether --share is used \u2014 has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: \"For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn\u0027t read it yet.\" This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 \u003ctraining-host\u003e) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-48797",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-18T16:16:55.427",
  "metrics": {
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        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 9.3,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-48797 (GCVE-0-2026-48797)

FKIE_CVE-2026-48797

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature