CVE-2026-54460 (GCVE-0-2026-54460)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 20:07 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:07
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
OpenReception: Unauthenticated WebAuthn passkey injection via `POST /api/auth/passkeys` leads to account takeover
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to 1.1.1, POST /api/auth/passkeys accepts a request-body userId and attacker-supplied passkey without an authenticated session, does not call WebAuthnService.verifyRegistration, and does not bind enrollment to locals.user.id. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the public tenant ID and the target staff email can use the public booking bootstrap and GET /api/tenants/[id]/appointments/staff-public-keys to obtain candidate userId values. The attacker first causes UserService.addAdditionalPasskey to store a controlled public key for a candidate userId, then attempts login with the target email; the login check compares verificationResult.userId with the email-resolved account and reveals whether the injected credential belongs to that target. Repeating this injection-before-login sequence identifies the matching userId, and the normal login endpoint accepts the attacker's assertion for the stored key and creates a STAFF session. The session can expose tenant data and reveal TENANT_ADMIN identifiers for further takeover; GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts are not reachable through this tenant-scoped path. A hijacked TENANT_ADMIN can modify or delete tenant resources and key shares, potentially making appointment data permanently undecryptable and taking booking services offline. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CWE
- CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| open-reception | appointment-booking-software |
Affected:
< 1.1.1
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "appointment-booking-software",
"vendor": "open-reception",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.1.1"
}
]
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "OpenReception\u0027s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to 1.1.1, POST /api/auth/passkeys accepts a request-body userId and attacker-supplied passkey without an authenticated session, does not call WebAuthnService.verifyRegistration, and does not bind enrollment to locals.user.id. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the public tenant ID and the target staff email can use the public booking bootstrap and GET /api/tenants/[id]/appointments/staff-public-keys to obtain candidate userId values. The attacker first causes UserService.addAdditionalPasskey to store a controlled public key for a candidate userId, then attempts login with the target email; the login check compares verificationResult.userId with the email-resolved account and reveals whether the injected credential belongs to that target. Repeating this injection-before-login sequence identifies the matching userId, and the normal login endpoint accepts the attacker\u0027s assertion for the stored key and creates a STAFF session. The session can expose tenant data and reveal TENANT_ADMIN identifiers for further takeover; GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts are not reachable through this tenant-scoped path. A hijacked TENANT_ADMIN can modify or delete tenant resources and key shares, potentially making appointment data permanently undecryptable and taking booking services offline. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T20:07:24.631Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-g233-m625-m3pc",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-g233-m625-m3pc"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5d29d9c1964ef7541a6e96d04d946c22f76eea00",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5d29d9c1964ef7541a6e96d04d946c22f76eea00"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/93040884b783573dbf161723e508676327fdf0bf",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/93040884b783573dbf161723e508676327fdf0bf"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v1.1.1",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v1.1.1"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-g233-m625-m3pc",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "OpenReception: Unauthenticated WebAuthn passkey injection via `POST /api/auth/passkeys` leads to account takeover"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-54460",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T20:07:24.631Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-15T15:30:40.318Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T20:07:24.631Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-54460\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"published\":\"2026-09-17T21:17:15.557\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-17T21:17:15.557\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"OpenReception\u0027s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to 1.1.1, POST /api/auth/passkeys accepts a request-body userId and attacker-supplied passkey without an authenticated session, does not call WebAuthnService.verifyRegistration, and does not bind enrollment to locals.user.id. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the public tenant ID and the target staff email can use the public booking bootstrap and GET /api/tenants/[id]/appointments/staff-public-keys to obtain candidate userId values. The attacker first causes UserService.addAdditionalPasskey to store a controlled public key for a candidate userId, then attempts login with the target email; the login check compares verificationResult.userId with the email-resolved account and reveals whether the injected credential belongs to that target. Repeating this injection-before-login sequence identifies the matching userId, and the normal login endpoint accepts the attacker\u0027s assertion for the stored key and creates a STAFF session. The session can expose tenant data and reveal TENANT_ADMIN identifiers for further takeover; GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts are not reachable through this tenant-scoped path. A hijacked TENANT_ADMIN can modify or delete tenant resources and key shares, potentially making appointment data permanently undecryptable and taking booking services offline. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"open-reception\",\"product\":\"appointment-booking-software\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"\u003c 1.1.1\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-306\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5d29d9c1964ef7541a6e96d04d946c22f76eea00\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/93040884b783573dbf161723e508676327fdf0bf\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v1.1.1\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-g233-m625-m3pc\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\"}]}}"
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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