CVE-2026-55739 (GCVE-0-2026-55739)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 06:58 – Updated: 2026-08-10 11:44- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/crater-invoice/crater | third-party-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crater-invoice | Crater |
Affected:
6.0.6
|
guessed |
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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