CVE-2026-5589 (GCVE-0-2026-5589)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-04 19:54 – Updated: 2026-06-04 19:54
VLAI
Title
Out-of-bounds write caused by an integer underflow in the Bluetooth Mesh subsystem.
Summary
An integer underflow in bt_mesh_sol_recv() in the Bluetooth Mesh solicitation handling (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c) leads to an out-of-bounds write. When CONFIG_BT_MESH_OD_PRIV_PROXY_SRV is enabled, the function parses solicitation PDUs from raw BLE advertising payloads. The AD parsing loop reads an attacker-controlled length byte (reported_len) and computes reported_len - 3 without checking that reported_len >= 3. When reported_len is less than 3, the subtraction is performed in signed int arithmetic and yields a negative value that bypasses the length guard and is then implicitly converted to a very large size_t when passed to net_buf_simple_pull_mem(). In builds without assertions, this wraps the buffer length and advances the data pointer far out of bounds, so subsequent reads dereference invalid memory. A nearby BLE device can trigger this with a non-connectable advertisement carrying a UUID16 AD structure and a crafted length byte, with no pairing or prior association required, potentially leading to denial of service or arbitrary code execution.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-787 - Out-of-bounds Write
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject-rtos | Zephyr |
Affected:
* , ≤ 4.3.0
(git)
|
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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