{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "dbhub",
          "vendor": "bytebase",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.22.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "DBHub is a database MCP server for Postgres, MySQL, SQL Server, Oracle, MariaDB, SQLite. Prior to version 0.22.6, setting `readonly = true` on the `execute_sql` tool does not make the connection read-only. The connectors are written to set PostgreSQL `default_transaction_read_only=on` (and open SQLite in `readOnly` mode), but that code is gated on a config value that is never populated, so it never runs. The only thing left enforcing read-only is a classifier that inspects the first keyword of each statement. Any `SELECT` that writes or has side effects through a function call passes it. With an ordinary role this allows sequence tampering; with a privileged role it allows writing arbitrary files on the server (`lo_export`), reading arbitrary host files (`pg_read_file`), and remote code execution (`dblink` + `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`). The HTTP transport is unauthenticated and binds to `0.0.0.0` by default, so this is reachable by any network caller of `/mcp`. Version 0.22.6 patches the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-61788",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-24T18:17:16.837",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-24T18:17:16.837",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/security/advisories/GHSA-mwwr-p57h-56pf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-184"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-636"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@bytebase/dbhub"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.22.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:37:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n \nSetting `readonly = true` on the `execute_sql` tool does not make the connection read-only. The connectors are written to set PostgreSQL `default_transaction_read_only=on` (and open SQLite in `readOnly` mode), but that code is gated on a config value that is never populated, so it never runs. The only thing left enforcing read-only is a classifier that inspects the first keyword of each statement. Any `SELECT` that writes or has side effects through a function call passes it. With an ordinary role this allows sequence tampering; with a privileged role it allows writing arbitrary files on the server (`lo_export`), reading arbitrary host files (`pg_read_file`), and remote code execution (`dblink` + `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`). The HTTP transport is unauthenticated and binds to `0.0.0.0` by default, so this is reachable by any network caller of `/mcp`.\n \n### Details\n \nTwo problems combine.\n \n**1. The database-level read-only control is dead code.**\n \n`PostgresConnector.connect()` only enables it when `config.readonly` is truthy (`src/connectors/postgres/index.ts:175-177`):\n \n```ts\n// SDK-level readonly enforcement: Set default_transaction_read_only for the entire connection\nif (config?.readonly) {\n  poolConfig.options = (poolConfig.options || \u0027\u0027) + \u0027 -c default_transaction_read_only=on\u0027;\n}\n```\n \nSQLite is gated the same way (`src/connectors/sqlite/index.ts:192`). `ConnectorConfig.readonly` is assigned in exactly one place, and only from `source.readonly` (`src/connectors/manager.ts:236-238`):\n \n```ts\n// Pass readonly flag for SDK-level enforcement (PostgreSQL, SQLite)\nif (source.readonly !== undefined) {\n  config.readonly = source.readonly;\n}\n```\n \n`source.readonly` can never have a value:\n \n- `SourceConfig` has no `readonly` field (`src/types/config.ts:49-62`). `readonly` exists only on the per-tool `ExecuteSqlToolConfig` / `CustomToolConfig`.\n- The TOML loader rejects `readonly` at source level (`src/config/toml-loader.ts:476-481`: \"readonly must be configured per-tool, not per-source\").\n- The `--readonly` CLI flag was removed and now hard-exits (`src/config/env.ts:30`).\n \nSo the `if (source.readonly !== undefined)` check is always false, `config.readonly` stays unset, and DB-level read-only is never applied in any configuration the loader accepts. The per-tool `readonly` only ever reaches the classifier; `executeSQL()` ignores `options.readonly` and runs multi-statement batches in a plain `BEGIN` rather than `BEGIN READ ONLY` (`src/connectors/postgres/index.ts:598-666`).\n \n(The docs already describe the classifier as \"a safety net... not a security boundary.\" This report is about the DB-level control above, which the code clearly means to apply \u2014 see the \"SDK-level readonly enforcement\" comments \u2014 but silently fails to wire up.)\n \n**2. The classifier only checks the leading keyword.**\n \n`areAllStatementsReadOnly()` (`src/tools/execute-sql.ts:24-27`) splits on `;` and runs `isReadOnlySQL()` (`src/utils/allowed-keywords.ts`) on each statement. `isReadOnlySQL` matches the first word against an allow-list, scans for mutating keywords only inside `WITH`, blocks `SELECT ... INTO`, and special-cases `EXPLAIN ANALYZE`. It never looks at the functions a statement calls. These all classify as read-only:\n \n- `SELECT setval(\u0027seq\u0027, n)` / `nextval(\u0027seq\u0027)` \u2014 sequence write. Needs UPDATE (setval) or USAGE/UPDATE (nextval) on the sequence, which read roles normally hold.\n- `SELECT lo_export(lo, \u0027/path\u0027)` \u2014 writes a file on the server. Needs superuser or `pg_write_server_files`.\n- `SELECT pg_read_file(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)` \u2014 reads any file the server user can read. Needs superuser or `pg_read_server_files`.\n- `SELECT dblink_exec(\u0027dbname=...\u0027, \u0027UPDATE ...\u0027)` \u2014 opens a fresh connection (not read-only) and runs writes/DDL. Needs the `dblink` extension.\n- `SELECT dblink_exec(\u0027dbname=...\u0027, $$COPY (SELECT 1) TO PROGRAM \u0027id\u0027$$)` \u2014 command execution. Needs superuser or `pg_execute_server_program`, plus `dblink`.\n \nThe read-only test suite covers none of these.\n \n### PoC\n \nPoint DBHub at a PostgreSQL source with read-only set on the tool:\n \n```toml\n[[sources]]\nid = \"default\"\ndsn = \"postgres://app:app@localhost:5432/app\"\n \n[[tools]]\nname = \"execute_sql\"\nsource = \"default\"\nreadonly = true\n```\n \nStart it and call `execute_sql`:\n \n```\nnpx @bytebase/dbhub@latest --transport http --port 8080\n```\n \nWith any role, a write that should be blocked goes through \u2014 the sequence value changes and the call returns success:\n \n```sql\nSELECT setval(\u0027users_id_seq\u0027, 1);\n```\n \nWith a privileged role, the rest are also accepted and executed:\n \n```sql\nSELECT lo_export(lo_from_bytea(0, decode(\u002748656c6c6f0a\u0027,\u0027hex\u0027)), \u0027/tmp/dbhub_poc\u0027);   -- writes /tmp/dbhub_poc\nSELECT pg_read_file(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027);                                                  -- reads a host file\nSELECT dblink_exec(\u0027dbname=app\u0027, \u0027UPDATE users SET admin=true\u0027);                     -- write via a new connection\nSELECT dblink_exec(\u0027dbname=app\u0027, $$COPY (SELECT 1) TO PROGRAM \u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027$$);  -- runs a shell command\n```\n \nThe decision can be reproduced without a database by running the project\u0027s own `isReadOnlySQL` + `splitSQLStatements` (with `areAllStatementsReadOnly` copied from `src/tools/execute-sql.ts`) over the strings above: direct INSERT/UPDATE/DROP, data-modifying CTEs, `SELECT ... INTO`, and `EXPLAIN ANALYZE INSERT` are all rejected, while every function-based statement above returns read-only = true.\n \n### Impact\n \nAffects all released versions up to and including 0.22.2, on both stdio and HTTP transports, for PostgreSQL and SQLite. `readonly = true` does not stop writes. Anyone who can reach the `execute_sql` input can modify data under read-only mode \u2014 a network caller of the unauthenticated `/mcp` endpoint, a malicious MCP client, or untrusted content reaching an agent wired to DBHub through prompt injection. When the configured database role is privileged (common, since DBHub is often pointed at an existing admin DSN), the same access yields arbitrary file write on the server, arbitrary host-file read, and remote code execution on the database host.\n \n\n---\n\n### Maintainer note (consolidation)\n\nTracking this as the canonical advisory for \"read-only mode does not prevent database writes.\" The following reports describe the same root cause (read-only enforced only by the keyword classifier; the connection-level backstop was never wired) and are closed as duplicates:\n\n- **GHSA-7rgf-cwgq-c2qc** \u2014 same unwired driver-level backstop, plus the SQLite write-effecting `PRAGMA` gap.\n- **GHSA-m689-287g-5xpc** \u2014 SQLite assignment-form `PRAGMA` write bypass (a subset of the above).\n\nPreserving the SQLite-specific remediation from those reports: in `isReadOnlySQL`, the assignment form `PRAGMA x = ...` must be classified as a write (only the query/introspection form is read-only), and SQLite read-only executions are additionally guarded at the engine via `PRAGMA query_only=ON`.\n\nGHSA-j656-3hf2-fvjc (MySQL/MariaDB `--` comment parsing + `multipleStatements`) is a distinct root cause and is tracked separately.\n\nFix: https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/pull/342 \u2014 adds engine-level read-only enforcement per tool (Postgres `BEGIN READ ONLY`, SQLite `query_only`, MySQL/MariaDB `START TRANSACTION READ ONLY`) plus the classifier hardening above.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwwr-p57h-56pf",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T19:38:00Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T19:37:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/security/advisories/GHSA-mwwr-p57h-56pf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/pull/342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/commit/872bb338f7d31f6afe517a076ac3e3edafaaaf08"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytebase/dbhub/releases/tag/v0.22.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@bytebase/dbhub\u0027s read-only mode does not prevent database writes"
}