CVE-2026-62331 (GCVE-0-2026-62331)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 19:00 – Updated: 2026-10-30 19:46
VLAI
Title
praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection
Summary
praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.
Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-30 19:45 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 8129 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
mtzanidakis praktor Affected: < 0.9.1
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
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