CVE-2026-66061 (GCVE-0-2026-66061)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-07 20:43 – Updated: 2026-08-10 13:51
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Home Assistant: iOS Companion app forwards NFC/QR tag scans without confirmation, enabling silent automation execution
Summary
Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.5.0, the iOS Companion app treats tag links (NFC or QR) delivered through an OS-level routing mechanism such as iOS universal links as if they were physically scanned, without validating the calling app or prompting the user. As a result, any untrusted app on the device can forward an arbitrary tag to Home Assistant, causing it to execute the associated automation as though a legitimate user had scanned an authorized tag. This allows silent, unattended automation execution by untrusted local callers. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.5.0.
Severity
7.1 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-10 13:50 UTC
CWE
- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/a… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/home-assistant/iOS/commit/45e0… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| home-assistant | core |
Affected:
< 2026.5.0
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.