CVE-2026-68160 (GCVE-0-2026-68160)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-10 11:59 – Updated: 2026-08-19 16:30
VLAI
Title
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < 0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793 (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < 9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295 (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1 (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < 71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a (git)
Affected: a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea , < 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 2.6.34
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.34 (semver)
Unaffected: 5.10.265 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver)
Unaffected: 5.15.216 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.1.183 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.148 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.101 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.42 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1.6 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
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          "programFiles": [
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              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-\u003esnap_trace_len);\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n    ...\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\n            ...\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n                                       false, \u0026realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(\u0026p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg-\u003efront buffer, and ri-\u003enum_snaps /\nri-\u003enum_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version \u003e= 2 .. msg_version \u003e= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg-\u003ehdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n \u003c= end - p,\nguarded by end \u003e= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 9.8,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:N - CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS is received over the kernel Ceph messenger TCP connection from an MDS peer; mds_dispatch() passes it directly to ceph_handle_caps(), so a malicious or compromised MDS (or on-path attacker on an unsigned msgr session) reaches the bug with network data alone.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls msg-\u003ehdr.version and snap_trace_len in the caps header; setting version=1 bypasses all version-gated decoders and snap_trace_len=0xFFFFFFFF yields a fake end pointer that reliably defeats ceph_decode_need(), with no race or memory-layout dependency.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires only the ability to send crafted caps messages as the remote MDS peer on an established session; the attacker needs no account, mount privilege, or other credentials on the victim host beyond the client already being connected to that cluster.\nUI:N - Once CephFS is mounted and the MDS session is open, CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT caps messages are delivered and processed automatically during normal cap migration and MDS failover; no additional local user action is needed at exploit time beyond prior cluster connectivity.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and resulting snap-realm corruption affect only the kernel CephFS client\u2019s internal state within the same kernel security authority; there is no VM escape, sandbox breakout, or cross-authority boundary crossing.\nC:H - ceph_update_snap_trace() decodes struct ceph_mds_snap_realm and snap arrays using an attacker-supplied fake end pointer, reading sizeof(*ri) and further attacker-influenced extents past the legitimate msg-\u003efront buffer into adjacent kernel memory without copying to userspace.\nI:H - Out-of-bounds kernel memory is interpreted as snap-realm metadata and copied via dup_array() into newly allocated kernel heap structures (realm-\u003esnaps, realm-\u003eprior_parent_snaps), corrupting authoritative snap state and providing a memory-corruption primitive that could be leveraged for further kernel compromise.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds reads can fault on unmapped pages causing a kernel oops; the ceph_update_snap_trace() error path issues WARN(1), fences I/O via CEPH_MOUNT_FENCE_IO, and can close all MDS sessions\u2014effects an attacker can trigger repeatedly at will."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T16:30:32.455Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02"
        }
      ],
      "title": "ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()",
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-68160",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-10T11:59:26.741Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.371Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T16:30:32.455Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-68160",
      "date": "2026-08-20",
      "epss": "0.00761",
      "percentile": "0.52554"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-68160\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-08-10T13:20:02.300\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-19T17:20:33.317\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\\n\\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\\n\\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-\u003esnap_trace_len);\\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\\n    ...\\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\\n            ...\\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\\n                                       false, \u0026realm)) { ... }\\n\\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(\u0026p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\\nthe legitimate msg-\u003efront buffer, and ri-\u003enum_snaps /\\nri-\u003enum_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\\n\\nThe eleven msg_version \u003e= 2 .. msg_version \u003e= 12 decoder blocks\\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\\nMDS that sets msg-\u003ehdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\\n\\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n \u003c= end - p,\\nguarded by end \u003e= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\\npath.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"fs/ceph/caps.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea\",\"lessThan\":\"4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"fs/ceph/caps.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"2.6.34\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"2.6.34\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"5.10.265\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"5.10.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"5.15.216\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"5.15.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.1.183\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.6.148\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.6.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.101\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.42\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1.6\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Important",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-13T23:08:47+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-68160",
      "id": "CVE-2026-68160",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-10T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "261",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "15",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-68160.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "suse_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "important",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-18T16:56:03Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-68160",
      "id": "CVE-2026-68160",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-18T16:56:03Z",
      "product_status:known_affected": "296",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-68160",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/cve-2026-68160.json",
      "version": "2"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.