CVE-2026-68498 (GCVE-0-2026-68498)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-16 21:11 – Updated: 2026-10-20 18:08 X_Open Source
VLAI
Title
jackson-core: Delayed maxNameLength enforcement for char-backed input (ReaderBasedJsonParser) allows memory-exhaustion denial of service
Summary
StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input — Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser — that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default. In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name — up to maxStringLength characters — has already been buffered in memory. A remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration. Byte-input parsers are not affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] — for example an HTTP request body already read into a String — rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-20 17:31 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Assigner
HeroDevs CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 82/100 over 17 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
FasterXML jackson-core Affected: 2.16.0 , < 2.18.10 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.18.10 (maven)
Affected: 2.19.0 , < 2.21.6 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.21.6 (maven)
Affected: 2.22.0 , < 2.22.2 (maven)
Unaffected: 2.22.2 (maven)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
FasterXML jackson-core Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.1.6 (maven)
Unaffected: 3.1.6 (maven)
Affected: 3.2.0 , < 3.2.2 (maven)
Unaffected: 3.2.2 (maven)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
tinyb0y tinyb0y cowtowncoder (Tatu Saloranta)
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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      "id": "CVE-2026-68498",
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      "product_status:fixed": "93",
      "product_status:known_affected": "39",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "159",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-68498.json",
      "version": "3"
    },
    "suse_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "important",
      "current_release_date": "2026-10-17T23:53:57Z",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-68498",
      "id": "CVE-2026-68498",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-09-18T00:29:46Z",
      "product_status:known_affected": "22",
      "product_status:recommended": "95",
      "source": "SUSE CSAF VEX",
      "status": "interim",
      "title": "SUSE CVE CVE-2026-68498",
      "url": "https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf-vex/2026/cve-2026-68498.json",
      "version": "6"
    },
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": {
        "adp": [
          {
            "metrics": [
              {
                "other": {
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2026-68498",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "yes"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2026-10-20T17:31:30.585739Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T18:07:52.129Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core",
              "product": "jackson-core",
              "programFiles": [
                "src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/ReaderBasedJsonParser.java"
              ],
              "programRoutines": [
                {
                  "name": "ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2"
                }
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core",
              "vendor": "FasterXML",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "2.18.10",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "2.16.0",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "2.18.10",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "lessThan": "2.21.6",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "2.19.0",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "2.21.6",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "lessThan": "2.22.2",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "2.22.0",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "2.22.2",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                }
              ]
            },
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core",
              "product": "jackson-core",
              "programFiles": [
                "src/main/java/tools/jackson/core/json/ReaderBasedJsonParser.java"
              ],
              "programRoutines": [
                {
                  "name": "ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2"
                }
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core",
              "vendor": "FasterXML",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "3.1.6",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "3.0.0",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "3.1.6",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "lessThan": "3.2.2",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "3.2.0",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "3.2.2",
                  "versionType": "maven"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "tinyb0y"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "remediation developer",
              "value": "tinyb0y"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "coordinator",
              "value": "cowtowncoder (Tatu Saloranta)"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eStreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input \u2014 Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser \u2014 that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name \u2014 up to maxStringLength characters \u2014 has already been buffered in memory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eByte-input parsers are \u003cb\u003enot\u003c/b\u003e affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] \u2014 for example an HTTP request body already read into a String \u2014 rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input \u2014 Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser \u2014 that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default.\n\n\n\nIn the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name \u2014 up to maxStringLength characters \u2014 has already been buffered in memory.\n\n\n\nA remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration.\n\n\n\nByte-input parsers are not affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] \u2014 for example an HTTP request body already read into a String \u2014 rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0."
            }
          ],
          "impacts": [
            {
              "capecId": "CAPEC-130",
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV3_1": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "baseScore": 7.5,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "format": "CVSS",
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "Application parses attacker-supplied JSON from a String, Reader or char[] source -- for example an HTTP request body read into a String -- using JsonFactory.createParser(String/Reader/char[]) directly or via jackson-databind. Byte-input and non-blocking parsers are not affected."
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-400",
                  "description": "CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
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            "orgId": "36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c",
            "shortName": "HeroDevs"
          },
          "references": [
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              "name": "GHSA-649p-m576-vr99",
              "tags": [
                "vendor-advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-649p-m576-vr99"
            },
            {
              "name": "FasterXML/jackson-core#1643 - Enforce maxNameLength incrementally in ReaderBasedJsonParser",
              "tags": [
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              "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1643"
            },
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              "name": "FasterXML/jackson-core@2cd206d - fix commit",
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              "tags": [
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              "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/blob/3.x/release-notes/VERSION"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
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            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
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              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-07-29T01:52:00.000Z",
              "value": "Fix merged upstream via FasterXML/jackson-core#1643"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-08-14T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "Fix released in jackson-core 2.21.6, 3.1.6 and 3.2.2"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-08-15T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "Fix released in jackson-core 2.18.10"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-08-16T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "Fix released in jackson-core 2.22.2"
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-09-11T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "GHSA-649p-m576-vr99 published by the maintainer in FasterXML/jackson-core"
            }
          ],
          "title": "jackson-core: Delayed maxNameLength enforcement for char-backed input (ReaderBasedJsonParser) allows memory-exhaustion denial of service",
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        "assignerShortName": "HeroDevs",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-68498",
        "datePublished": "2026-10-16T21:11:03.551Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-07-30T15:20:37.473Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T18:08:01.960Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
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    }
  }
}



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