Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-71569 (GCVE-0-2026-71569)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-29 10:31 – Updated: 2026-10-29 13:07

Title

Apache Camel: Camel-A2A Push Notification Webhook Guard Accepts IPv6 Unique Local Addresses Reached Through a Host Name

Summary

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel A2A component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.21.0 before 4.22.2. WebhookUrlValidator classified a push notification webhook host in two places that did not agree. A host written as an IP literal was matched against a list of string prefixes that named the IPv6 unique local range fc00::/7, while a host reached through a name was resolved and the resulting address classified with the InetAddress predicates isLoopbackAddress, isAnyLocalAddress, isLinkLocalAddress and isSiteLocalAddress. Those predicates do not cover the same ground as the prefix list: isSiteLocalAddress reports the deprecated fec0::/10 block and not the fc00::/7 unique local addresses that replaced it, and the JDK carries no predicate for them at all. The same address was therefore accepted or rejected depending on how it was written, and a webhook URL whose host name resolved into fc00::/7 passed a guard that refused the identical address given as a literal. PushNotificationDispatcher then sent the push notification to that address, together with any Authorization header carried in the same configuration, whose scheme and credentials the registering caller supplies. The webhook URL arrives as TaskPushNotificationConfig.url from the caller registering the push notification, so it is attacker-controlled, and allowLocalWebhookUrls is false by default, which is the configuration in which the guard is expected to hold. The response is not relayed back to the caller who registered the configuration, so what the gap yields is a blind outbound HTTPS request from the Camel process to an internal address the guard was written to refuse; reaching a service that way additionally requires that the name resolve into fc00::/7 in the target environment, that an HTTPS service be listening on that address, and that the TLS handshake succeed for the name being requested, which is why the severity is assessed medium. The same string pre-check was also wrong in the other direction: it matched the raw host string without first establishing that the host was an IP literal, so any name merely beginning with fc or fd, such as fcm.googleapis.com, was refused outright. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.21.x release line reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on it must move to a supported release. Both the literal and the resolved path now classify the address from its raw bytes with one shared classifier, which recognises fc00::/7 and the shared address space 100.64.0.0/10, as well as IPv4-compatible, NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses whose embedded IPv4 address is not globally routable. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place authentication in front of the A2A push notification configuration path so that the webhook URL does not arrive from an untrusted caller, and deny egress from the Camel process to fc00::/7 at the network level; where the deployment has no need of IPv6, starting the JVM with -Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true removes the address class the gap turns on. Note that allowLocalWebhookUrls=false is already the default and does not by itself close the gap.

Severity

4.8 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-29 12:54 UTC

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1076 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-71569.html	vendor-advisory
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24371	issue-tracking
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25406	patch
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26583	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Camel	Affected: 4.21.0 , < 4.22.2 (maven) Unaffected: 4.22.2 (maven) Unaffected: 4.23.0 (maven)	guessed

Credits

2122295973@qq.com Andrea Cosentino

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                }
              ],
              "value": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel A2A component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.21.0 before 4.22.2.\n\n\n\nWebhookUrlValidator classified a push notification webhook host in two places that did not agree. A host written as an IP literal was matched against a list of string prefixes that named the IPv6 unique local range fc00::/7, while a host reached through a name was resolved and the resulting address classified with the InetAddress predicates isLoopbackAddress, isAnyLocalAddress, isLinkLocalAddress and isSiteLocalAddress. Those predicates do not cover the same ground as the prefix list: isSiteLocalAddress reports the deprecated fec0::/10 block and not the fc00::/7 unique local addresses that replaced it, and the JDK carries no predicate for them at all. The same address was therefore accepted or rejected depending on how it was written, and a webhook URL whose host name resolved into fc00::/7 passed a guard that refused the identical address given as a literal. PushNotificationDispatcher then sent the push notification to that address, together with any Authorization header carried in the same configuration, whose scheme and credentials the registering caller supplies. The webhook URL arrives as TaskPushNotificationConfig.url from the caller registering the push notification, so it is attacker-controlled, and allowLocalWebhookUrls is false by default, which is the configuration in which the guard is expected to hold. The response is not relayed back to the caller who registered the configuration, so what the gap yields is a blind outbound HTTPS request from the Camel process to an internal address the guard was written to refuse; reaching a service that way additionally requires that the name resolve into fc00::/7 in the target environment, that an HTTPS service be listening on that address, and that the TLS handshake succeed for the name being requested, which is why the severity is assessed medium. The same string pre-check was also wrong in the other direction: it matched the raw host string without first establishing that the host was an IP literal, so any name merely beginning with fc or fd, such as fcm.googleapis.com, was refused outright.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.21.x release line reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on it must move to a supported release. Both the literal and the resolved path now classify the address from its raw bytes with one shared classifier, which recognises fc00::/7 and the shared address space 100.64.0.0/10, as well as IPv4-compatible, NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses whose embedded IPv4 address is not globally routable. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place authentication in front of the A2A push notification configuration path so that the webhook URL does not arrive from an untrusted caller, and deny egress from the Camel process to fc00::/7 at the network level; where the deployment has no need of IPv6, starting the JVM with -Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true removes the address class the gap turns on. Note that allowLocalWebhookUrls=false is already the default and does not by itself close the gap."
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV3_1": {
                "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-71569

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-29 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-29 14:17

Severity

4.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-71569.html
	security@apache.org	https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25406
	security@apache.org	https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26583
	security@apache.org	https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24371

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-a2a",
          "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.camel/camel-a2a",
          "product": "Apache Camel",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.22.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.21.0",
              "versionType": "maven"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "4.22.2",
              "versionType": "maven"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "4.23.0",
              "versionType": "maven"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel A2A component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.21.0 before 4.22.2.\n\n\n\nWebhookUrlValidator classified a push notification webhook host in two places that did not agree. A host written as an IP literal was matched against a list of string prefixes that named the IPv6 unique local range fc00::/7, while a host reached through a name was resolved and the resulting address classified with the InetAddress predicates isLoopbackAddress, isAnyLocalAddress, isLinkLocalAddress and isSiteLocalAddress. Those predicates do not cover the same ground as the prefix list: isSiteLocalAddress reports the deprecated fec0::/10 block and not the fc00::/7 unique local addresses that replaced it, and the JDK carries no predicate for them at all. The same address was therefore accepted or rejected depending on how it was written, and a webhook URL whose host name resolved into fc00::/7 passed a guard that refused the identical address given as a literal. PushNotificationDispatcher then sent the push notification to that address, together with any Authorization header carried in the same configuration, whose scheme and credentials the registering caller supplies. The webhook URL arrives as TaskPushNotificationConfig.url from the caller registering the push notification, so it is attacker-controlled, and allowLocalWebhookUrls is false by default, which is the configuration in which the guard is expected to hold. The response is not relayed back to the caller who registered the configuration, so what the gap yields is a blind outbound HTTPS request from the Camel process to an internal address the guard was written to refuse; reaching a service that way additionally requires that the name resolve into fc00::/7 in the target environment, that an HTTPS service be listening on that address, and that the TLS handshake succeed for the name being requested, which is why the severity is assessed medium. The same string pre-check was also wrong in the other direction: it matched the raw host string without first establishing that the host was an IP literal, so any name merely beginning with fc or fd, such as fcm.googleapis.com, was refused outright.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.21.x release line reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on it must move to a supported release. Both the literal and the resolved path now classify the address from its raw bytes with one shared classifier, which recognises fc00::/7 and the shared address space 100.64.0.0/10, as well as IPv4-compatible, NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses whose embedded IPv4 address is not globally routable. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place authentication in front of the A2A push notification configuration path so that the webhook URL does not arrive from an untrusted caller, and deny egress from the Camel process to fc00::/7 at the network level; where the deployment has no need of IPv6, starting the JVM with -Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true removes the address class the gap turns on. Note that allowLocalWebhookUrls=false is already the default and does not by itself close the gap."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-71569",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-29T14:17:58.923",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 2.5,
        "source": "security@apache.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-71569",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-29T12:54:30.239589Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-29T11:17:34.093",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-71569.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25406"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26583"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24371"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W3R7-VR6P-3QQR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-29 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-29 12:30

Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel A2A component.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.21.0 before 4.22.2.

WebhookUrlValidator classified a push notification webhook host in two places that did not agree. A host written as an IP literal was matched against a list of string prefixes that named the IPv6 unique local range fc00::/7, while a host reached through a name was resolved and the resulting address classified with the InetAddress predicates isLoopbackAddress, isAnyLocalAddress, isLinkLocalAddress and isSiteLocalAddress. Those predicates do not cover the same ground as the prefix list: isSiteLocalAddress reports the deprecated fec0::/10 block and not the fc00::/7 unique local addresses that replaced it, and the JDK carries no predicate for them at all. The same address was therefore accepted or rejected depending on how it was written, and a webhook URL whose host name resolved into fc00::/7 passed a guard that refused the identical address given as a literal. PushNotificationDispatcher then sent the push notification to that address, together with any Authorization header carried in the same configuration, whose scheme and credentials the registering caller supplies. The webhook URL arrives as TaskPushNotificationConfig.url from the caller registering the push notification, so it is attacker-controlled, and allowLocalWebhookUrls is false by default, which is the configuration in which the guard is expected to hold. The response is not relayed back to the caller who registered the configuration, so what the gap yields is a blind outbound HTTPS request from the Camel process to an internal address the guard was written to refuse; reaching a service that way additionally requires that the name resolve into fc00::/7 in the target environment, that an HTTPS service be listening on that address, and that the TLS handshake succeed for the name being requested, which is why the severity is assessed medium. The same string pre-check was also wrong in the other direction: it matched the raw host string without first establishing that the host was an IP literal, so any name merely beginning with fc or fd, such as fcm.googleapis.com, was refused outright.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.21.x release line reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on it must move to a supported release. Both the literal and the resolved path now classify the address from its raw bytes with one shared classifier, which recognises fc00::/7 and the shared address space 100.64.0.0/10, as well as IPv4-compatible, NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses whose embedded IPv4 address is not globally routable. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place authentication in front of the A2A push notification configuration path so that the webhook URL does not arrive from an untrusted caller, and deny egress from the Camel process to fc00::/7 at the network level; where the deployment has no need of IPv6, starting the JVM with -Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true removes the address class the gap turns on. Note that allowLocalWebhookUrls=false is already the default and does not by itself close the gap.

Severity

4.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71569"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T11:17:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel A2A component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.21.0 before 4.22.2.\n\n\n\nWebhookUrlValidator classified a push notification webhook host in two places that did not agree. A host written as an IP literal was matched against a list of string prefixes that named the IPv6 unique local range fc00::/7, while a host reached through a name was resolved and the resulting address classified with the InetAddress predicates isLoopbackAddress, isAnyLocalAddress, isLinkLocalAddress and isSiteLocalAddress. Those predicates do not cover the same ground as the prefix list: isSiteLocalAddress reports the deprecated fec0::/10 block and not the fc00::/7 unique local addresses that replaced it, and the JDK carries no predicate for them at all. The same address was therefore accepted or rejected depending on how it was written, and a webhook URL whose host name resolved into fc00::/7 passed a guard that refused the identical address given as a literal. PushNotificationDispatcher then sent the push notification to that address, together with any Authorization header carried in the same configuration, whose scheme and credentials the registering caller supplies. The webhook URL arrives as TaskPushNotificationConfig.url from the caller registering the push notification, so it is attacker-controlled, and allowLocalWebhookUrls is false by default, which is the configuration in which the guard is expected to hold. The response is not relayed back to the caller who registered the configuration, so what the gap yields is a blind outbound HTTPS request from the Camel process to an internal address the guard was written to refuse; reaching a service that way additionally requires that the name resolve into fc00::/7 in the target environment, that an HTTPS service be listening on that address, and that the TLS handshake succeed for the name being requested, which is why the severity is assessed medium. The same string pre-check was also wrong in the other direction: it matched the raw host string without first establishing that the host was an IP literal, so any name merely beginning with fc or fd, such as fcm.googleapis.com, was refused outright.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.21.x release line reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on it must move to a supported release. Both the literal and the resolved path now classify the address from its raw bytes with one shared classifier, which recognises fc00::/7 and the shared address space 100.64.0.0/10, as well as IPv4-compatible, NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses whose embedded IPv4 address is not globally routable. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place authentication in front of the A2A push notification configuration path so that the webhook URL does not arrive from an untrusted caller, and deny egress from the Camel process to fc00::/7 at the network level; where the deployment has no need of IPv6, starting the JVM with -Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true removes the address class the gap turns on. Note that allowLocalWebhookUrls=false is already the default and does not by itself close the gap.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3r7-vr6p-3qqr",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T12:30:37Z",
  "published": "2026-10-29T12:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71569"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25406"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-71569.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24371"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-71569 (GCVE-0-2026-71569)

FKIE_CVE-2026-71569

GHSA-W3R7-VR6P-3QQR

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Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour