CVE-2026-71850 (GCVE-0-2026-71850)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-07 18:41 – Updated: 2026-08-10 13:26
VLAI
Title
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Summary
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
Severity
4.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-10 13:26 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-488 - Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7994 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
honojs hono Affected: >= 3.8.0, < 4.12.34
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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