CVE-2026-73040 (GCVE-0-2026-73040)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 20:29 – Updated: 2026-09-24 14:19
VLAI
Title
Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion
Summary
Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.
Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-21 16:21 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 7433 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
louislam dockge Affected: 0 , ≤ 1.5.0 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-08-14 00:00
Credits
HK4zCzi
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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            "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
            "shortName": "VulnCheck"
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          "references": [
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              "name": "GitHub Issue #994",
              "tags": [
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              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge/issues/994"
            },
            {
              "name": "Unvalidated path getter at 1.5.0",
              "tags": [
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              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L155-L157"
            },
            {
              "name": "Stack.getStack joining an unvalidated stack name at 1.5.0",
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              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L377-L379"
            },
            {
              "name": "delete() removing the traversed path recursively at 1.5.0",
              "tags": [
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              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L218-L232"
            },
            {
              "name": "getStack and deleteStack handlers checking only the argument type at 1.5.0",
              "tags": [
                "technical-description"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts#L43-L78"
            },
            {
              "tags": [
                "product"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/louislam/dockge"
            },
            {
              "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion",
              "tags": [
                "third-party-advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dockge-path-traversal-via-unvalidated-stack-name-allows-arbitrary-compose-and-env-disclosure-and-arbitrary-directory-deletion"
            }
          ],
          "title": "Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-73040",
        "datePublished": "2026-08-20T20:29:00.157Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-08-10T19:06:03.364Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T14:19:06.908Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



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Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.