Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-78066 (GCVE-0-2026-78066)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-21 11:53 – Updated: 2026-10-30 16:59

Title

Apache bRPC: Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Decompression and Unvalidated Wire-Declared Sizes

Summary

Resource exhaustion in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms: multiple parsers that accept wire-controlled input bound no limit on the sizes declared by the client or on decompressed output, which attackers can use to drive disproportionate memory use and crash the process. Root Cause: 1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g. 64 MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB. 2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available. 3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing. 4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size. 5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process. Affected Scenarios: Any bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients. How to Fix:(Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476 Note: After the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size).

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-30 16:59 UTC

CWE

CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1094 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95…	vendor-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache bRPC	Affected: 0 , < 1.18.0 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Claude

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-78066

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-21 12:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 17:17

Severity

7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

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  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "apache/brpc",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/apache/brpc",
          "product": "Apache bRPC",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.18.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Resource exhaustion in Apache bRPC (version \u003c 1.18.0) on all platforms: multiple parsers that accept wire-controlled input bound no limit on the sizes declared by the client or on decompressed output, which attackers can use to drive disproportionate memory use and crash the process.\n\nRoot Cause:\n1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g.\u00a064\u00a0MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB.\n2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available.\n3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing.\n4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size.\n5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process.\n\nAffected Scenarios:\nAny bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients.\n\nHow to Fix:(Choose one of the following options)\u00a01. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.\n\n2. Apply this patch:\u00a0https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476\n\nNote:\nAfter the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size)."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Agotamiento de recursos en Apache bRPC (versiones anteriores a la 1.18.0) en todas las plataformas: varios analizadores que aceptan entrada controlada por el cable no imponen l\u00edmite en los tama\u00f1os declarados por el cliente o en la salida descomprimida, lo que los atacantes pueden usar para generar un uso desproporcionado de memoria y provocar el bloqueo del proceso.\\n\\nCausa ra\u00edz:\\n1) Los descompresores gzip/zlib/snappy no imponen l\u00edmite de salida: -max_body_size solo se verifica contra los bytes comprimidos, de modo que un cuerpo que cumple el l\u00edmite (p. ej., 64?MiB) puede descomprimirse a decenas de GiB.\\n2) Los lectores de cadenas AMF asignan la longitud declarada antes de que los bytes est\u00e9n realmente disponibles.\\n3) Los encabezados de fragmentos RTMP pueden volver a declarar una longitud de mensaje a mitad del flujo; la longitud declarada nunca estuvo limitada y el b\u00fafer de reensamblado parcial sigui\u00f3 creciendo.\\n4) El analizador sofa-pbrpc no limita meta_size.\\n5) mcpack2pb conf\u00eda en los recuentos de \u00edtems declarados por el cable para Reserve() y un value_size de cadena de 0 provoca un subdesbordamiento del tama\u00f1o del b\u00fafer, abortando el proceso.\\n\\nEscenarios afectados:\\nCualquier servicio bRPC que acepte cuerpos comprimidos con gzip/zlib/snappy o mensajes rtmp, sofa-pbrpc o mcpack2pb de clientes no confiables.\\n\\nC\u00f3mo corregir (elija una de las siguientes opciones):\\n1. Actualice bRPC a la versi\u00f3n 1.18.0, que corrige este problema.\\n2. Aplique este parche: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476\\n\\nNota:\\nDespu\u00e9s de la correcci\u00f3n, las solicitudes cuyo tama\u00f1o descomprimido, longitud de mensaje RTMP o recuento declarado por mcpack superen los nuevos l\u00edmites son rechazadas. Los operadores que necesiten valores mayores de forma leg\u00edtima pueden elevar la bandera correspondiente (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size)."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-78066",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T17:17:29.110",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-78066",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-30T16:59:01.033553Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-21T12:17:23.527",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QVXP-6V5R-47H4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 18:32

Details

Root Cause: 1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g. 64 MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB. 2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available. 3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing. 4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size. 5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process.

Affected Scenarios: Any bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients.

How to Fix:(Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.

Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476

Note: After the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size).

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78066"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T12:17:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Resource exhaustion in Apache bRPC (version \u003c 1.18.0) on all platforms: multiple parsers that accept wire-controlled input bound no limit on the sizes declared by the client or on decompressed output, which attackers can use to drive disproportionate memory use and crash the process.\n\nRoot Cause:\n1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g.\u00a064\u00a0MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB.\n2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available.\n3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing.\n4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size.\n5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process.\n\nAffected Scenarios:\nAny bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients.\n\nHow to Fix:(Choose one of the following options)\u00a01. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.\n\n2. Apply this patch:\u00a0https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476\n\nNote:\nAfter the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size).",
  "id": "GHSA-qvxp-6v5r-47h4",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T18:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T12:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78066"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-78066 (GCVE-0-2026-78066)

FKIE_CVE-2026-78066

GHSA-QVXP-6V5R-47H4

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