Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-91085 (GCVE-0-2026-91085)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 08:39 – Updated: 2026-10-01 14:18

Title

Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Summary

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-01 14:17 UTC

CWE

CWE-862

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1276 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Karaf	Affected: 0 , < 4.4.12 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Rin Ray <rindilray@gmail.com>

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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                  "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                  "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                  "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
                  "baseScore": 6.3,
                  "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                  "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
                  "integrityImpact": "LOW",
                  "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                  "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                  "userInteraction": "NONE",
                  "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
                  "version": "3.1"
                }
              },
              {
                "other": {
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2026-91085",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "no"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:15:06.530Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "product": "Apache Karaf",
              "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "4.4.12",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "0",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "reporter",
              "value": "Rin Ray \u003crindilray@gmail.com\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (\u003ccode\u003eetc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u0026lt;scope\u0026gt;.cfg\u003c/code\u003e).\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eSecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, \u003cb\u003efails open\u003c/b\u003e:\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;sets\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003epassCheck = true\u003c/code\u003e. The safety valve for this,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.secured.command.compulsory.roles\u003c/code\u003e, ships commented out in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/system.properties\u003c/code\u003e, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eThe shipped\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;ACL (\u003ccode\u003eassemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml\u003c/code\u003e, mirrored into\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u003c/code\u003e) has no\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstall\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;entry. It restricts\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003edelete\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e, restricts\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eedit\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eproperty-*\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eupdate\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;on the\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ejmx.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;PIDs to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e, and allows\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003emanager\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;for everything else, but\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eviewer\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;role.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003econfig:install \u0026lt;url\u0026gt; \u0026lt;finalname\u0026gt;\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;fetches\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eurl\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and writes it into\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e${karaf.etc}\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;as\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efinalname\u003c/code\u003e. It calls\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ePathUtils.checkWithin()\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;to block\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e..\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;traversal outside\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.etc\u003c/code\u003e, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eusers.properties\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekeys.properties\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ehost.key\u003c/code\u003e, and all\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eorg.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e-o\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003e--override\u003c/code\u003e, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eBecause\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efelix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(\u003ccode\u003eetc/config.properties\u003c/code\u003e), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e.cfg\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eBy contrast,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ebundle:install\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003efeature:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekar:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;are all\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e-only in their own ACLs, and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:delete\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;is\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eadmin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in this same ACL,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003econfig:install\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;was the outlier.\u003c/div\u003e\u003ch3\u003eMitigation\u003c/h3\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eAdd\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003einstall = admin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(create the file is absent), and/or set\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003ekaraf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eetc/system.properties\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.\u003c/div\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default."
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "other": {
                "content": {
                  "text": "moderate"
                },
                "type": "Textual description of severity"
              },
              "scenarios": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "GENERAL"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-862",
                  "description": "CWE-862",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z",
            "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
            "shortName": "apache"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "tags": [
                "vendor-advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "assignerShortName": "apache",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-91085",
        "datePublished": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-09-14T17:55:38.562Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-91085

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-29 09:17 - Updated: 2026-10-07 20:11

Severity

6.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt	Vendor Advisory, Mailing List
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10	Mailing List, Third Party Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	apache	karaf	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Apache Karaf",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "532915B7-A52C-450A-A6BF-0FAE4B4144CD",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.4.12",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-91085",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-07T20:11:43.353",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.4,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-91085",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-29T09:17:10.347",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory",
        "Mailing List"
      ],
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8G53-M82P-XQF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-29 12:31

Details

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.

The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-/update on the jmx.acl., org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.

config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf..acl. files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.

Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.

By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-91085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T09:17:10Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.",
  "id": "GHSA-8g53-m82p-xqf5",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T12:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T09:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-91085 (GCVE-0-2026-91085)

FKIE_CVE-2026-91085

GHSA-8G53-M82P-XQF5

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