CVE-2026-93757 (GCVE-0-2026-93757)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-29 03:39 – Updated: 2026-10-29 10:45
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Wild Apricot Login <= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite
Summary
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-29 10:34 UTC
CWE
- CWE-287 - Improper Authentication
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wild-apricot | Wild Apricot Login |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.0.18
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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