GHSA-2M8G-3CMR-WG3W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-01 19:24 – Updated: 2026-09-01 19:24Summary
While investigating Django REST Framework's request parsing behavior, I identified that DRF's high-level request.data parsing appears to bypass Django's configured DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE protection for application/json and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies.
In the tested configurations, Django correctly raises RequestDataTooBig when applications access request.body or Django's native request.POST, but DRF successfully parses the same oversized payloads through request.data.
This behavior appears to occur because DRF passes the underlying HttpRequest object directly to parsers, which consume the request stream through Django's lower-level streaming interface rather than the guarded request.body path.
I am reporting this privately because I am unsure whether this behavior is considered part of DRF's intended security boundary, but it appears to bypass a documented Django request-size protection for common DRF request parsing paths and may have availability implications.
What I Verified
I verified the behavior locally using the following combinations:
- Django 6.0.7 + DRF 3.17.1 → Affected
- Django 6.0.7 + DRF current upstream main → Affected
For both versions, the observed behavior was:
Django request.body
→ RequestDataTooBig
Django request.POST (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
→ RequestDataTooBig
Django request.read()
→ Reads the entire oversized request body
DRF request.data
→ Successfully parses oversized JSON and urlencoded request bodies
I also confirmed that:
multipart/form-dataremains protected because DRF delegates multipart parsing to Django's multipart parser.- The behavior reproduces on both direct WSGI and ASGI servers without a reverse proxy or external request-size middleware.
Technical Details
The relevant execution flow is:
APIView
↓
rest_framework.request.Request
↓
request.data
↓
Request._load_data_and_files()
↓
Request._parse()
↓
Request._load_stream()
↓
self._stream = self._request
↓
JSONParser.parse(...)
or
FormParser.parse(...)
↓
stream.read() / json.load(...)
The important implementation detail is that DRF assigns the original Django HttpRequest object as the parser stream.
Unlike request.body and Django's native form parsing, consuming the stream through HttpRequest.read() does not trigger Django's RequestDataTooBig protection.
As a result, DRF's built-in parsers successfully consume oversized request bodies that Django itself would reject through its higher-level request interfaces.
Reproduction Steps
Environment
Python 3.13
Django 6.0.7
Django REST Framework 3.17.1 (also reproduced on current upstream main)
Configure:
DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE = 10
Create a simple DRF API view:
from rest_framework.views import APIView
from rest_framework.response import Response
class DemoView(APIView):
def post(self, request):
return Response(request.data)
Start the application.
Send an oversized JSON request:
POST /demo
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: >10 bytes
Example:
{
"value": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..."
}
Observed:
HTTP 200
JSON successfully parsed
Now compare against:
request.body
Observed:
RequestDataTooBig
Likewise, compare against:
request.POST
using
application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Observed:
RequestDataTooBig
This demonstrates different enforcement depending on which request API is used.
Root Cause
Django documents HttpRequest.read() as a streaming interface.
DRF exposes request.data as the primary high-level request parsing API.
Currently, DRF forwards the raw Django request stream directly to parsers before any request-size validation equivalent to Django's request.body path occurs.
Consequently:
- JSONParser
- FormParser
fully consume oversized request bodies despite Django's configured request-size limit.
Security Impact
This does not appear to introduce:
- Authentication bypass
- Authorization bypass
- Remote code execution
- Information disclosure
- Integrity compromise
However, it may reduce the effectiveness of deployments relying on Django's DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE to limit request-body resource consumption.
Potential consequences include:
- Additional memory allocation during JSON parsing
- Additional CPU usage while decoding large JSON payloads
- Increased resource consumption when handling oversized request bodies
- Reduced effectiveness of Django's configured request-size protection for DRF endpoints using
request.data
The practical impact depends on deployment configuration, including:
- upstream request-size limits
- reverse proxy configuration
- authentication
- rate limiting
- endpoint exposure
Memory Observations
During local testing I observed successful parsing of oversized request bodies despite the configured limit.
Representative measurements showed significantly increased memory allocation while parsing large JSON and urlencoded payloads.
I intentionally did not perform destructive concurrency testing or attempt to exhaust system resources.
Scope
Confirmed affected:
- application/json
- application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Confirmed not affected:
- multipart/form-data
Suggested Fix Direction
One possible approach would be for DRF to enforce Django's configured DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE before handing the raw request stream to parsers that fully materialize request bodies in memory.
This would preserve Django's configured request-size protection for the common request.data API without requiring broader changes to Django's documented streaming interface.
Versions Tested
Affected:
- Django 6.0.7 + DRF 3.17.1
- Django 6.0.7 + DRF current upstream main
I did not perform a complete historical version bisect.
Disclosure
I have not publicly disclosed this behavior.
I am submitting it privately in accordance with the project's security policy because I am unsure whether maintainers consider this part of DRF's intended security boundary.
Note:
Thank you for taking the time to review this report.
If you determine that this behavior should be addressed, I would be happy to help investigate further, develop a fix, add regression tests, and submit a patch if you'd find that helpful.
I have experience as a Python/Django software engineer, security researcher, and open-source contributor, and I'd be glad to contribute if you think that would be useful.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djangorestframework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.17.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-01T19:24:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T19:18:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhile investigating Django REST Framework\u0027s request parsing behavior, I identified that DRF\u0027s high-level `request.data` parsing appears to bypass Django\u0027s configured `DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE` protection for `application/json` and `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` request bodies.\n\nIn the tested configurations, Django correctly raises `RequestDataTooBig` when applications access `request.body` or Django\u0027s native `request.POST`, but DRF successfully parses the same oversized payloads through `request.data`.\n\nThis behavior appears to occur because DRF passes the underlying `HttpRequest` object directly to parsers, which consume the request stream through Django\u0027s lower-level streaming interface rather than the guarded `request.body` path.\n\nI am reporting this privately because I am unsure whether this behavior is considered part of DRF\u0027s intended security boundary, but it appears to bypass a documented Django request-size protection for common DRF request parsing paths and may have availability implications.\n\n\n# What I Verified\n\nI verified the behavior locally using the following combinations:\n\n* Django **6.0.7** + DRF **3.17.1** \u2192 **Affected**\n* Django **6.0.7** + DRF **current upstream main** \u2192 **Affected**\n\nFor both versions, the observed behavior was:\n\n```\nDjango request.body\n\u2192 RequestDataTooBig\n\nDjango request.POST (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)\n\u2192 RequestDataTooBig\n\nDjango request.read()\n\u2192 Reads the entire oversized request body\n\nDRF request.data\n\u2192 Successfully parses oversized JSON and urlencoded request bodies\n```\n\nI also confirmed that:\n\n* `multipart/form-data` remains protected because DRF delegates multipart parsing to Django\u0027s multipart parser.\n* The behavior reproduces on both direct WSGI and ASGI servers without a reverse proxy or external request-size middleware.\n\n\n# Technical Details\n\nThe relevant execution flow is:\n\n```\nAPIView\n\n\u2193\n\nrest_framework.request.Request\n\n\u2193\n\nrequest.data\n\n\u2193\n\nRequest._load_data_and_files()\n\n\u2193\n\nRequest._parse()\n\n\u2193\n\nRequest._load_stream()\n\n\u2193\n\nself._stream = self._request\n\n\u2193\n\nJSONParser.parse(...)\nor\nFormParser.parse(...)\n\n\u2193\n\nstream.read() / json.load(...)\n```\n\nThe important implementation detail is that DRF assigns the original Django `HttpRequest` object as the parser stream.\n\nUnlike `request.body` and Django\u0027s native form parsing, consuming the stream through `HttpRequest.read()` does not trigger Django\u0027s `RequestDataTooBig` protection.\n\nAs a result, DRF\u0027s built-in parsers successfully consume oversized request bodies that Django itself would reject through its higher-level request interfaces.\n\n\n# Reproduction Steps\n\n## Environment\n\nPython 3.13\n\nDjango 6.0.7\n\nDjango REST Framework 3.17.1 (also reproduced on current upstream main)\n\nConfigure:\n\n```python\nDATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE = 10\n```\n\nCreate a simple DRF API view:\n\n```python\nfrom rest_framework.views import APIView\nfrom rest_framework.response import Response\n\nclass DemoView(APIView):\n def post(self, request):\n return Response(request.data)\n```\n\nStart the application.\n\nSend an oversized JSON request:\n\n```\nPOST /demo\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: \u003e10 bytes\n```\n\nExample:\n\n```json\n{\n \"value\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA...\"\n}\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```\nHTTP 200\n\nJSON successfully parsed\n```\n\nNow compare against:\n\n```python\nrequest.body\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```\nRequestDataTooBig\n```\n\nLikewise, compare against:\n\n```python\nrequest.POST\n```\n\nusing\n\n```\napplication/x-www-form-urlencoded\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```\nRequestDataTooBig\n```\n\nThis demonstrates different enforcement depending on which request API is used.\n\n\n# Root Cause\n\nDjango documents `HttpRequest.read()` as a streaming interface.\n\nDRF exposes `request.data` as the primary high-level request parsing API.\n\nCurrently, DRF forwards the raw Django request stream directly to parsers before any request-size validation equivalent to Django\u0027s `request.body` path occurs.\n\nConsequently:\n\n* JSONParser\n* FormParser\n\nfully consume oversized request bodies despite Django\u0027s configured request-size limit.\n\n\n# Security Impact\n\nThis does **not** appear to introduce:\n\n* Authentication bypass\n* Authorization bypass\n* Remote code execution\n* Information disclosure\n* Integrity compromise\n\nHowever, it may reduce the effectiveness of deployments relying on Django\u0027s `DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE` to limit request-body resource consumption.\n\nPotential consequences include:\n\n* Additional memory allocation during JSON parsing\n* Additional CPU usage while decoding large JSON payloads\n* Increased resource consumption when handling oversized request bodies\n* Reduced effectiveness of Django\u0027s configured request-size protection for DRF endpoints using `request.data`\n\nThe practical impact depends on deployment configuration, including:\n\n* upstream request-size limits\n* reverse proxy configuration\n* authentication\n* rate limiting\n* endpoint exposure\n\n\n# Memory Observations\n\nDuring local testing I observed successful parsing of oversized request bodies despite the configured limit.\n\nRepresentative measurements showed significantly increased memory allocation while parsing large JSON and urlencoded payloads.\n\nI intentionally did **not** perform destructive concurrency testing or attempt to exhaust system resources.\n\n\n# Scope\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n* application/json\n* application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nConfirmed not affected:\n\n* multipart/form-data\n\n\n# Suggested Fix Direction\n\nOne possible approach would be for DRF to enforce Django\u0027s configured `DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE` before handing the raw request stream to parsers that fully materialize request bodies in memory.\n\nThis would preserve Django\u0027s configured request-size protection for the common `request.data` API without requiring broader changes to Django\u0027s documented streaming interface.\n\n\n# Versions Tested\n\nAffected:\n\n* Django 6.0.7 + DRF 3.17.1\n* Django 6.0.7 + DRF current upstream main\n\nI did not perform a complete historical version bisect.\n\n\n# Disclosure\n\nI have not publicly disclosed this behavior.\n\nI am submitting it privately in accordance with the project\u0027s security policy because I am unsure whether maintainers consider this part of DRF\u0027s intended security boundary.\n\n# Note:\n\n**Thank you for taking the time to review this report.**\n\nIf you determine that this behavior should be addressed, I would be happy to help investigate further, develop a fix, add regression tests, and submit a patch if you\u0027d find that helpful.\n\nI have experience as a **Python/Django software engineer, security researcher, and open-source contributor**, and I\u0027d be glad to contribute if you think that would be useful.",
"id": "GHSA-2m8g-3cmr-wg3w",
"modified": "2026-09-01T19:24:51Z",
"published": "2026-09-01T19:24:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-2m8g-3cmr-wg3w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/pull/10013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/2912dc98042f78e27636551fc22eeaf10f725fdd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/82ef7b7e4e0a73ba5c489b465fae7e76d948da4e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/releases/tag/3.17.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Django REST framework: Potential bypass of Django `DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE` when parsing oversized JSON and urlencoded request bodies via DRF `request.data`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.