GHSA-69MH-GVH4-8GP7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 21:19 – Updated: 2026-09-03 21:19CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-68587.
Summary
Three "heading transaction" endpoints /api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction, /api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction, and /api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction return the rendered block DOM of a heading and its subtree in the computed transaction payload, with no publish-access check. They are gated by CheckAuth only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Despite their write-implying names, these endpoints perform no mutation on this path, they compute a transaction object and return it, and that object contains RenderNodeBlockDOM output. As a result, an anonymous reader who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a document that has been explicitly marked publish-disabled by an administrator, content that the reader-facing /api/filetree/getDoc path correctly refuses to return.
Details
Route / auth tier. All three routes are registered CheckAuth-only (no CheckAdminRole). CheckAuth admits RoleReader, and the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous account when publish auth is disabled). Anonymous/reader reachable.
No publish-access filter. GetHeadingDeleteTransaction / GetHeadingLevelTransaction / GetHeadingInsertTransaction load the heading's block tree and render its DOM into the returned transaction's operation data. None of the three invokes IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter that the reader-safe content path (getDoc) applies. The reader-facing content endpoints (getDoc, and the CheckAdminRole-gated getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown) treat rendered block DOM as gated content; these three transaction endpoints return the same rendered DOM without that gate.
Write-implying name, read behavior. On this code path the endpoints only compute the transaction (e.g. the undoOperations a delete would produce) and return it; nothing is deleted or modified. The returned operation data includes the rendered HTML of the heading subtree. This mismatch, mutation-shaped name, content-returning behavior is why the gap is easy to miss.
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). DOC is a document containing a heading HEADING whose body contains the unique marker UNIQUE_MARKER_99, and DOC is marked publish-disabled by the administrator.
1. Confirm the document is publish-disabled (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess
Authorization: Token <admin-token>
{"id":"DOC","visible":false,"password":"","disable":true}
2. Baseline: the reader-safe content path correctly blocks it (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc
{"id":"DOC"}
Returns the blocked/placeholder response, the publish filter is applied, no content.
3. Disclosure: the transaction endpoint returns the content (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction
{"id":"HEADING"}
Returns HTTP 200; data.undoOperations[].data contains the rendered HTML of the heading subtree, including the hidden body text UNIQUE_MARKER_99. Nothing is deleted — the endpoint only computes the transaction. This is the full content of a publish-disabled document returned to an anonymous reader.
4. Sibling endpoints: same disclosure, same input:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction
{"id":"HEADING","level":2}
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction
{"id":"HEADING"}
Both return the rendered DOM of the heading subtree in their operation data.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a publish-disabled document, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured.
Precondition: the request requires the target heading's block ID. Block IDs are high-entropy and are not returned by this endpoint, so this endpoint alone does not permit untargeted enumeration of arbitrary documents. However, block/heading IDs for publish-disabled documents are obtainable from other CheckAuth-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (the publish-boundary handler set reported separately, e.g. getHeadingChildrenIDs). Chained with such an ID source, this yields end-to-end unauthenticated full-content disclosure of publish-disabled documents. Presented standalone, the attacker must already possess the heading ID.
Impact is confidentiality-only: these endpoints return content but do not (on this path) modify data. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check the content path uses IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter used by getDoc to all three getHeading*Transaction handlers, or gate them behind CheckAdminRole consistent with getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown. Any endpoint that returns rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the primary content path.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260721013353-69db783b782a"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T21:19:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-68587](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68587).\n\n### Summary\n\nThree \"heading transaction\" endpoints `/api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction`, `/api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction`, and `/api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction` return the rendered block DOM of a heading and its subtree in the computed transaction payload, with no publish-access check. They are gated by `CheckAuth` only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\nDespite their write-implying names, these endpoints perform no mutation on this path, they compute a transaction object and return it, and that object contains `RenderNodeBlockDOM` output. As a result, an anonymous reader who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a document that has been explicitly marked publish-disabled by an administrator, content that the reader-facing `/api/filetree/getDoc` path correctly refuses to return.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route / auth tier.** All three routes are registered `CheckAuth`-only (no `CheckAdminRole`). `CheckAuth` admits `RoleReader`, and the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous account when publish auth is disabled). Anonymous/reader reachable.\n\n**No publish-access filter.** `GetHeadingDeleteTransaction` / `GetHeadingLevelTransaction` / `GetHeadingInsertTransaction` load the heading\u0027s block tree and render its DOM into the returned transaction\u0027s operation data. None of the three invokes `IsReadOnlyRoleContext` / the publish-access filter that the reader-safe content path (`getDoc`) applies. The reader-facing content endpoints (`getDoc`, and the `CheckAdminRole`-gated `getBlockDOM`/`getBlockKramdown`) treat rendered block DOM as gated content; these three transaction endpoints return the same rendered DOM without that gate.\n\n**Write-implying name, read behavior.** On this code path the endpoints only *compute* the transaction (e.g. the `undoOperations` a delete would produce) and return it; nothing is deleted or modified. The returned operation data includes the rendered HTML of the heading subtree. This mismatch, mutation-shaped name, content-returning behavior is why the gap is easy to miss.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). `DOC` is a document containing a heading `HEADING` whose body contains the unique marker `UNIQUE_MARKER_99`, and `DOC` is marked publish-disabled by the administrator.\n\n**1. Confirm the document is publish-disabled (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess\nAuthorization: Token \u003cadmin-token\u003e\n{\"id\":\"DOC\",\"visible\":false,\"password\":\"\",\"disable\":true}\n```\n\n**2. Baseline: the reader-safe content path correctly blocks it (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc\n{\"id\":\"DOC\"}\n```\nReturns the blocked/placeholder response, the publish filter is applied, no content.\n\n**3. Disclosure: the transaction endpoint returns the content (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction\n{\"id\":\"HEADING\"}\n```\nReturns HTTP 200; `data.undoOperations[].data` contains the rendered HTML of the heading subtree, including the hidden body text `UNIQUE_MARKER_99`. Nothing is deleted \u2014 the endpoint only computes the transaction. This is the full content of a publish-disabled document returned to an anonymous reader.\n\n**4. Sibling endpoints: same disclosure, same input:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction\n{\"id\":\"HEADING\",\"level\":2}\n\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction\n{\"id\":\"HEADING\"}\n```\nBoth return the rendered DOM of the heading subtree in their operation data.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a publish-disabled document, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured.\n\n**Precondition:** the request requires the target heading\u0027s block ID. Block IDs are high-entropy and are not returned by this endpoint, so this endpoint alone does not permit untargeted enumeration of arbitrary documents. However, block/heading IDs for publish-disabled documents are obtainable from other `CheckAuth`-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (the publish-boundary handler set reported separately, e.g. `getHeadingChildrenIDs`). Chained with such an ID source, this yields end-to-end unauthenticated full-content disclosure of publish-disabled documents. Presented standalone, the attacker must already possess the heading ID.\n\nImpact is confidentiality-only: these endpoints return content but do not (on this path) modify data. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same publish-access check the content path uses `IsReadOnlyRoleContext` / the publish-access filter used by `getDoc` to all three `getHeading*Transaction` handlers, or gate them behind `CheckAdminRole` consistent with `getBlockDOM`/`getBlockKramdown`. Any endpoint that returns rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the primary content path.",
"id": "GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7",
"modified": "2026-09-03T21:19:42Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T21:19:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/69db783b782aea865ea70a1c5ab656e5c0f3dadb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-getheading-transaction"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Full-content disclosure of publish-disabled documents via getHeading*Transaction endpoints (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered DOM with no publish-access check"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.