GHSA-GJW9-34GF-RP6M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:53 – Updated: 2026-04-09 14:28
VLAI
Summary
Budibase: Command Injection in Bash Automation Step
Details

Location: packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts

Description

The bash automation step executes user-provided commands using execSync without proper sanitization or validation. User input is processed through processStringSync which allows template interpolation, potentially allowing arbitrary command execution.

Code Reference

```21:28:packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts const command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)

let stdout,
  success = true
try {
  stdout = execSync(command, {
    timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT,
  }).toString()


#### Attack Vector
An attacker with access to create or modify automations can inject malicious shell commands by including template syntax that evaluates to command injection payloads (e.g., `$(rm -rf /)`, `; malicious-command`, `| malicious-command`).

#### Impact
- Remote code execution (RCE)
- Complete system compromise
- Data exfiltration
- Lateral movement within the infrastructure

#### Recommendation
1. **Immediate**: Disable bash automation step in production until fixed
2. Implement a whitelist of allowed commands
3. Use parameterized command execution with proper escaping
4. Implement command argument validation
5. Consider using a restricted shell or command sandboxing
6. Add rate limiting and monitoring for command execution

#### Example Fix
```typescript
import { spawn } from "child_process"

// Validate against whitelist
const ALLOWED_COMMANDS = ["echo", "date", "pwd"] // Extend as needed

function sanitizeCommand(input: string): string {
  // Remove dangerous characters and command chaining
  return input.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]]/g, "").trim()
}

function validateCommand(cmd: string): boolean {
  const parts = cmd.split(/\s+/)
  return ALLOWED_COMMANDS.includes(parts[0])
}

export async function run({ inputs, context }) {
  if (!inputs.code) {
    return { stdout: "Budibase bash automation failed: Invalid inputs" }
  }

  const processedCommand = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)
  const sanitized = sanitizeCommand(processedCommand)

  if (!validateCommand(sanitized)) {
    return {
      success: false,
      stdout: "Command not allowed"
    }
  }

  // Use spawn instead of execSync with proper argument handling
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    const [command, ...args] = sanitized.split(/\s+/)
    const proc = spawn(command, args, {
      timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT,
    })

    let stdout = ""
    proc.stdout.on("data", (data) => { stdout += data })
    proc.on("close", (code) => {
      resolve({ stdout, success: code === 0 })
    })
  })
}
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.33.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25044"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:53:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Location**: `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts`  \n\n#### Description\nThe bash automation step executes user-provided commands using `execSync` without proper sanitization or validation. User input is processed through `processStringSync` which allows template interpolation, potentially allowing arbitrary command execution.\n\n#### Code Reference\n```21:28:packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts\n    const command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\n\n    let stdout,\n      success = true\n    try {\n      stdout = execSync(command, {\n        timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT,\n      }).toString()\n```\n\n#### Attack Vector\nAn attacker with access to create or modify automations can inject malicious shell commands by including template syntax that evaluates to command injection payloads (e.g., `$(rm -rf /)`, `; malicious-command`, `| malicious-command`).\n\n#### Impact\n- Remote code execution (RCE)\n- Complete system compromise\n- Data exfiltration\n- Lateral movement within the infrastructure\n\n#### Recommendation\n1. **Immediate**: Disable bash automation step in production until fixed\n2. Implement a whitelist of allowed commands\n3. Use parameterized command execution with proper escaping\n4. Implement command argument validation\n5. Consider using a restricted shell or command sandboxing\n6. Add rate limiting and monitoring for command execution\n\n#### Example Fix\n```typescript\nimport { spawn } from \"child_process\"\n\n// Validate against whitelist\nconst ALLOWED_COMMANDS = [\"echo\", \"date\", \"pwd\"] // Extend as needed\n\nfunction sanitizeCommand(input: string): string {\n  // Remove dangerous characters and command chaining\n  return input.replace(/[;\u0026|`$(){}[\\]]/g, \"\").trim()\n}\n\nfunction validateCommand(cmd: string): boolean {\n  const parts = cmd.split(/\\s+/)\n  return ALLOWED_COMMANDS.includes(parts[0])\n}\n\nexport async function run({ inputs, context }) {\n  if (!inputs.code) {\n    return { stdout: \"Budibase bash automation failed: Invalid inputs\" }\n  }\n\n  const processedCommand = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\n  const sanitized = sanitizeCommand(processedCommand)\n  \n  if (!validateCommand(sanitized)) {\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      stdout: \"Command not allowed\"\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Use spawn instead of execSync with proper argument handling\n  return new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n    const [command, ...args] = sanitized.split(/\\s+/)\n    const proc = spawn(command, args, {\n      timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT,\n    })\n    \n    let stdout = \"\"\n    proc.stdout.on(\"data\", (data) =\u003e { stdout += data })\n    proc.on(\"close\", (code) =\u003e {\n      resolve({ stdout, success: code === 0 })\n    })\n  })\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-gjw9-34gf-rp6m",
  "modified": "2026-04-09T14:28:10Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T21:53:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gjw9-34gf-rp6m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25044"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase: Command Injection in Bash Automation Step"
}



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