GHSA-F8MR-JV2C-V8MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-09 17:29 – Updated: 2024-11-18 22:41Impact
The Python TUF reference implementation tuf<0.12 will incorrectly trust a previously downloaded root metadata file which failed verification at download time. This allows an attacker who is able to serve multiple new versions of root metadata (i.e. by a man-in-the-middle attack) culminating in a version which has not been correctly signed to control the trust chain for future updates.
While investigating the reported vulnerability, we discovered that the detailed client workflow was not fully implemented. Specifically, for step 1.3 the newly downloaded root metadata was not being verified with a threshold of keys specified in the new root metadata file. This missing step of the client workflow has been implemented in PR #1101, which is included in v0.14.0 of tuf.
Patches
A fix, is available in version 0.12 and newer.
Workarounds
No workarounds are known for this issue.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tuf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-15163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-09-09T17:27:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-09T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe Python TUF reference implementation `tuf\u003c0.12` will incorrectly trust a previously downloaded root metadata file which failed verification at download time. This allows an attacker who is able to serve multiple new versions of root metadata (i.e. by a man-in-the-middle attack) culminating in a version which has not been correctly signed to control the trust chain for future updates.\n\nWhile investigating the reported vulnerability, we discovered that the detailed client workflow was not fully implemented. Specifically, for step 1.3 the newly downloaded root metadata was not being verified with a threshold of keys specified in the new root metadata file.\nThis missing step of the client workflow has been implemented in [PR #1101](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/1101), which is included in [v0.14.0](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.14.0) of tuf.\n\n### Patches\nA [fix](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885), is available in version [0.12](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.12.0) and newer.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are known for this issue.\n\n### References\n* Pull request resolving the invalid root becoming trusted issue [PR 885](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885)\n* Pull request implementing self verification of newly downloaded root metadata [PR 1101](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/1101)",
"id": "GHSA-f8mr-jv2c-v8mg",
"modified": "2024-11-18T22:41:33Z",
"published": "2020-09-09T17:29:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-f8mr-jv2c-v8mg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/commit/3d342e648fbacdf43a13d7ba8886aaaf07334af7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tuf/PYSEC-2020-145.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.12.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/tuf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Invalid root may become trusted root in The Update Framework (TUF)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.