GHSA-FRRJ-87JH-2772
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 23:21 – Updated: 2026-07-09 23:21Found through variant analysis based on CVE-2026-41643
Summary
GoBGP accepts a zero-length AS_PATH during UPDATE decoding and later panics while validating that attribute for a confederation eBGP peer. The vulnerable path is in the BGP UPDATE validator: a malformed UPDATE that should be rejected as a malformed AS_PATH instead reaches an unchecked p.Value[0] access, allowing a configured confederation eBGP peer to trigger a denial of service.
Affected
- Project: gobgp
- Repo: https://github.com/osrg/gobgp
- Pinned ref: c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016
Root cause
An established peer's receive path reads BGP bytes from the network connection in pkg/server/fsm.go:1267, parses UPDATE bodies through the BGP message decoder, and validates decoded UPDATEs with peer state at pkg/server/fsm.go:1849. The UPDATE decoder walks the path-attribute list in pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:15773 and selects the concrete attribute parser from the attacker-controlled attribute type at pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:15855. For AS_PATH, PathAttributeAsPath.DecodeFromBytes returns nil when the decoded attribute length is zero (pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:11533, pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:11538), leaving p.Value empty rather than reporting a malformed attribute. Validation then dispatches each decoded attribute through ValidateAttribute (pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go:34); in the confederation eBGP branch, pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go:162 indexes p.Value[0] before checking that any AS_PATH segment was decoded. The eBGP and confederation guards are normal peer-state gates: pkg/config/oc/util.go:127 defines eBGP as peer AS differing from local AS, pkg/config/oc/util.go:116 checks confederation membership, and pkg/server/fsm.go:740 and pkg/server/fsm.go:741 copy those results into the FSM state used by the validator.
Reproduction
INT-bgp-gobgp-confed-empty-aspath-panic.zip
bash ./poc/run.sh
TRIGGERED: confed empty AS_PATH validation panic: runtime error: index out of range
The TRIGGERED line is the recovered panic fingerprint from the confederation eBGP validation path after a zero-length AS_PATH has decoded successfully. A build failure or any output without that fingerprint would not demonstrate this bug, because the signal is tied to the unchecked AS_PATH segment access.
Impact
A remote unauthenticated peer that is configured as a confederation eBGP neighbor can establish a BGP session and send a single malformed UPDATE containing a syntactically valid AS_PATH attribute header with zero value length. Because the decode path does not turn that empty AS_PATH into a MessageError, normal malformed-attribute handling is bypassed and validation panics before GoBGP can return a BGP NOTIFICATION. The demonstrated effect is denial of service for the receive goroutine and peer session, with potential process termination if the panic is not recovered by the runtime path; no memory corruption, data disclosure, authentication bypass, or code execution is claimed.
Suggested fix
diff --git a/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go b/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go
index 2237afb..f07f4fa 100644
--- a/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go
+++ b/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go
@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ func ValidateAttribute(a PathAttributeInterface, rfs map[Family]BGPAddPathMode,
case *PathAttributeAsPath:
if isEBGP {
if isConfed {
+ if len(p.Value) == 0 {
+ return false, NewMessageError(eCode, eSubCodeMalformedAspath, nil, "empty AS_PATH for confederation eBGP")
+ }
if segType := p.Value[0].GetType(); segType != BGP_ASPATH_ATTR_TYPE_CONFED_SEQ {
return false, NewMessageError(eCode, eSubCodeMalformedAspath, nil, fmt.Sprintf("segment type is not confederation seq (%d)", segType))
}
Resources
- https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/blob/c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016/pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go#L11533-L11540
- https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/blob/c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go#L159-L164
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/osrg/gobgp/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:21:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Found through variant analysis based on `CVE-2026-41643`\n\n## Summary\nGoBGP accepts a zero-length AS_PATH during UPDATE decoding and later panics while validating that attribute for a confederation eBGP peer. The vulnerable path is in the BGP UPDATE validator: a malformed UPDATE that should be rejected as a malformed AS_PATH instead reaches an unchecked `p.Value[0]` access, allowing a configured confederation eBGP peer to trigger a denial of service.\n\n## Affected\n- Project: gobgp\n- Repo: https://github.com/osrg/gobgp\n- Pinned ref: c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016\n\n## Root cause\nAn established peer\u0027s receive path reads BGP bytes from the network connection in `pkg/server/fsm.go:1267`, parses UPDATE bodies through the BGP message decoder, and validates decoded UPDATEs with peer state at `pkg/server/fsm.go:1849`. The UPDATE decoder walks the path-attribute list in `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:15773` and selects the concrete attribute parser from the attacker-controlled attribute type at `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:15855`. For AS_PATH, `PathAttributeAsPath.DecodeFromBytes` returns nil when the decoded attribute length is zero (`pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:11533`, `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go:11538`), leaving `p.Value` empty rather than reporting a malformed attribute. Validation then dispatches each decoded attribute through `ValidateAttribute` (`pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go:34`); in the confederation eBGP branch, `pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go:162` indexes `p.Value[0]` before checking that any AS_PATH segment was decoded. The eBGP and confederation guards are normal peer-state gates: `pkg/config/oc/util.go:127` defines eBGP as peer AS differing from local AS, `pkg/config/oc/util.go:116` checks confederation membership, and `pkg/server/fsm.go:740` and `pkg/server/fsm.go:741` copy those results into the FSM state used by the validator.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n[INT-bgp-gobgp-confed-empty-aspath-panic.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28203698/INT-bgp-gobgp-confed-empty-aspath-panic.zip)\n\n```bash\nbash ./poc/run.sh\n```\n\n```text\nTRIGGERED: confed empty AS_PATH validation panic: runtime error: index out of range\n```\n\nThe `TRIGGERED` line is the recovered panic fingerprint from the confederation eBGP validation path after a zero-length AS_PATH has decoded successfully. A build failure or any output without that fingerprint would not demonstrate this bug, because the signal is tied to the unchecked AS_PATH segment access.\n\n## Impact\nA remote unauthenticated peer that is configured as a confederation eBGP neighbor can establish a BGP session and send a single malformed UPDATE containing a syntactically valid AS_PATH attribute header with zero value length. Because the decode path does not turn that empty AS_PATH into a `MessageError`, normal malformed-attribute handling is bypassed and validation panics before GoBGP can return a BGP NOTIFICATION. The demonstrated effect is denial of service for the receive goroutine and peer session, with potential process termination if the panic is not recovered by the runtime path; no memory corruption, data disclosure, authentication bypass, or code execution is claimed.\n\n## Suggested fix\n```001-fix.diff\ndiff --git a/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go b/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go\nindex 2237afb..f07f4fa 100644\n--- a/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go\n+++ b/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go\n@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ func ValidateAttribute(a PathAttributeInterface, rfs map[Family]BGPAddPathMode,\n \tcase *PathAttributeAsPath:\n \t\tif isEBGP {\n \t\t\tif isConfed {\n+\t\t\t\tif len(p.Value) == 0 {\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn false, NewMessageError(eCode, eSubCodeMalformedAspath, nil, \"empty AS_PATH for confederation eBGP\")\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\tif segType := p.Value[0].GetType(); segType != BGP_ASPATH_ATTR_TYPE_CONFED_SEQ {\n \t\t\t\t\treturn false, NewMessageError(eCode, eSubCodeMalformedAspath, nil, fmt.Sprintf(\"segment type is not confederation seq (%d)\", segType))\n \t\t\t\t}\n```\n\n## Resources\n- https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/blob/c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016/pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go#L11533-L11540\n- https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/blob/c24629411ba49f160d9dc09126f418218127e016/pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go#L159-L164",
"id": "GHSA-frrj-87jh-2772",
"modified": "2026-07-09T23:21:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T23:21:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/osrg/gobgp/security/advisories/GHSA-frrj-87jh-2772"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/osrg/gobgp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GoBGP confederation validation panics on empty AS_PATH attribute"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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