GHSA-G7VJ-C29H-3H5M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 15:55 – Updated: 2026-09-25 20:30
VLAI
Summary
FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider
Details

Impact

An unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in fof/oauth when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.

Discord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with "verified": false.

Affected versions of fof/oauth did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via provideTrustedEmail(). Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.

An attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.

Preconditions for exploitation

  1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.
  2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.
  3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.
  4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it and verifies a phone number instead.
  5. The attacker authenticates to the forum using that Discord account.

The issue is specific to Discord's ability to return an unverified email address through OAuth. Other bundled providers were not confirmed to be practically exploitable through the same method because they only return verified or confirmed email addresses in the relevant authentication flow.

Patched Versions

Workarounds

Administrators who cannot update immediately should disable the Discord OAuth provider in the extension settings.

Credits

Reported by @faran1512

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "fof/oauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "fof/oauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0-beta.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92161"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-25T15:55:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T16:17:29Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user\u0027s email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim\u0027s email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim\u0027s email address without verifying it and verifies a phone number instead.\n5. The attacker authenticates to the forum using that Discord account.\n\nThe issue is specific to Discord\u0027s ability to return an unverified email address through OAuth. Other bundled providers were not confirmed to be practically exploitable through the same method because they only return verified or confirmed email addresses in the relevant authentication flow.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\n- [1.7.4](https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/releases/tag/1.7.4)\n- [2.0.0-beta.4](https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/releases/tag/2.0.0-beta.4)\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAdministrators who cannot update immediately should disable the Discord OAuth provider in the extension settings.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by @faran1512",
  "id": "GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T20:30:07Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T15:55:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/security/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92161"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/commit/baca3466b3b7be51c70a7e0ba966901aefeb344a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/commit/bb4bf376832e6bb68c579715d2a4b5a92c4a2567"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/releases/tag/1.7.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/oauth/releases/tag/2.0.0-beta.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider"
}



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Sightings

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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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