GHSA-PG59-5VWG-4JXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 19:57 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:57
VLAI
Summary
SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated Content-Length in the stream parser
Details

Summary

The stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the Content-Length header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS.

Details

ParserStream.parseSingle allocates the body buffer from the declared Content-Length with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L195):

body := make([]byte, contentLength)   // contentLength is client-controlled, up to 2^32-1 (uint32)

The ParseMaxMessageLength (65535) check is in the caller ParseNext (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L132), and only runs after parseSingle has already allocated the buffer.

PoC

Tested on emiago/sipgo v1.4.0 (latest).

Send a single message with a large Content-Length and no body to a SIP server:

INVITE sip:victim@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP attacker.example;branch=z9hG4bK1
From: <sip:attacker@attacker.example>;tag=1
To: <sip:victim@example.com>
Call-ID: 1@attacker.example
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Content-Length: 4000000000                     // <- a large Content-Length

Suggested Fix

Validate contentLength against ParseMaxMessageLength before the allocation.

Impact

Unauthenticated DoS. Any service using sipgo with a stream transport (TCP/TLS/WS/WSS) can be forced to run out of memory.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/emiago/sipgo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-58268"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T19:57:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the `Content-Length` header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS.\n\n### Details\n\n`ParserStream.parseSingle` allocates the body buffer from the declared `Content-Length` with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L195):\n\n```go\nbody := make([]byte, contentLength)   // contentLength is client-controlled, up to 2^32-1 (uint32)\n```\n\nThe `ParseMaxMessageLength` (65535) check is in the caller `ParseNext` (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L132), and only runs after `parseSingle` has already allocated the buffer.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on emiago/sipgo v1.4.0 (latest).\n\nSend a single message with a large `Content-Length` and no body to a SIP server:\n\n```\nINVITE sip:victim@example.com SIP/2.0\nVia: SIP/2.0/TCP attacker.example;branch=z9hG4bK1\nFrom: \u003csip:attacker@attacker.example\u003e;tag=1\nTo: \u003csip:victim@example.com\u003e\nCall-ID: 1@attacker.example\nCSeq: 1 INVITE\nContent-Length: 4000000000                     // \u003c- a large Content-Length\n\n```\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nValidate `contentLength` against `ParseMaxMessageLength` before the allocation.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated DoS. Any service using `sipgo` with a stream transport (TCP/TLS/WS/WSS) can be forced to run out of memory.",
  "id": "GHSA-pg59-5vwg-4jxq",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T19:57:52Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T19:57:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/security/advisories/GHSA-pg59-5vwg-4jxq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/commit/a7be60a07f48c06b3cdd5a7d35eb820b3df5736c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/emiago/sipgo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/releases/tag/v1.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated Content-Length in the stream parser"
}



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