AZL-106035 (CVE-2026-98369)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: add missing rcu_read_lock(), skb_dst_force() and dev_hold() for xfrm_trans_reinject()
syzbot reported a suspicious RCU usage warning in ip6_pkt_drop():
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in ip6_pkt_drop include/net/addrconf.h:389 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
Call Trace: __in6_dev_get_safely include/net/addrconf.h:389 [inline] ip6_pkt_drop+0x596/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:4620 ip6_pkt_discard+0x1c/0x30 net/ipv6/route.c:4651 xfrm_trans_reinject+0x324/0x630 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:806 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
When commit 4f4920669d21 ("xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through workqueue") converted xfrm_trans_reinject from a tasklet to a workqueue, the reinjection loop ceased running in softirq context. Workqueue workers run in process context where local_bh_disable() does not enter an RCU read-side critical section under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU.
Because finish callbacks (such as ip6_rcv_finish) expect to run under an RCU read lock (performing route lookups, l3mdev lookups, and accessing RCU-protected data structures), invoking them in workqueue context without rcu_read_lock() triggers RCU lockdep warnings.
Furthermore, packets queued to the workqueue via xfrm_trans_queue_net() may carry non-refcounted (noref) dst entries (e.g. from ip_route_input_noref). Additionally, on netdevice unregistration, dst_dev_put() replaces dst->dev with blackhole_netdev, so dst entries do not keep skb->dev alive while queued in the workqueue.
Fix these issues by: 1. Calling skb_dst_force(skb) in xfrm_trans_queue_net() while still in the caller's RCU section to ensure dst is reference-counted before queuing. 2. Holding a reference on skb->dev via dev_hold()/dev_put() across workqueue deferral so skb->dev remains valid during finish() callback processing. 3. Acquiring rcu_read_lock() around the finish callback invocation loop in xfrm_trans_reinject().
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98369 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: add missing rcu_read_lock(), skb_dst_force() and dev_hold() for xfrm_trans_reinject()\n\nsyzbot reported a suspicious RCU usage warning in ip6_pkt_drop():\n\n WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in ip6_pkt_drop\n include/net/addrconf.h:389 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!\n\n Call Trace:\n __in6_dev_get_safely include/net/addrconf.h:389 [inline]\n ip6_pkt_drop+0x596/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:4620\n ip6_pkt_discard+0x1c/0x30 net/ipv6/route.c:4651\n xfrm_trans_reinject+0x324/0x630 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:806\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405\n worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486\n\nWhen commit 4f4920669d21 (\"xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through\nworkqueue\") converted xfrm_trans_reinject from a tasklet to a workqueue,\nthe reinjection loop ceased running in softirq context. Workqueue workers\nrun in process context where local_bh_disable() does not enter an RCU\nread-side critical section under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU.\n\nBecause finish callbacks (such as ip6_rcv_finish) expect to run under an\nRCU read lock (performing route lookups, l3mdev lookups, and accessing\nRCU-protected data structures), invoking them in workqueue context without\nrcu_read_lock() triggers RCU lockdep warnings.\n\nFurthermore, packets queued to the workqueue via xfrm_trans_queue_net()\nmay carry non-refcounted (noref) dst entries (e.g. from ip_route_input_noref).\nAdditionally, on netdevice unregistration, dst_dev_put() replaces dst-\u003edev\nwith blackhole_netdev, so dst entries do not keep skb-\u003edev alive while\nqueued in the workqueue.\n\nFix these issues by:\n1. Calling skb_dst_force(skb) in xfrm_trans_queue_net() while still in the\n caller\u0027s RCU section to ensure dst is reference-counted before queuing.\n2. Holding a reference on skb-\u003edev via dev_hold()/dev_put() across workqueue\n deferral so skb-\u003edev remains valid during finish() callback processing.\n3. Acquiring rcu_read_lock() around the finish callback invocation loop in\n xfrm_trans_reinject().",
"id": "AZL-106035",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98369"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98369 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98369"
]
}
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