AZL-106251 (CVE-2026-98344)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 – Updated: 2026-11-01 07:13 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: Fix device kref underflow in dma_chan_put()
dma_chan_get() takes chan->device->ref only on the slow path:
/* no kref on fast path */
if (chan->client_count) {
__module_get(owner);
chan->client_count++;
return 0;
}
if (!try_module_get(owner))
return -ENODEV;
if (!dma_device_get(chan->device)) { // calls kref_get_unless_zero()
dma_chan_put() drops the ref unconditionally, so every fast-path get/put pair drops one extra device reference.
The bug fires when two conditions hold together: a non-private provider has a persistent client holding chan->client_count > 0 and another client cycles dmaengine_get()/dmaengine_put(). When the kref hits zero, the subsequent dma_find_channel() returns NULL even though the provider module is still loaded.
Fix this by dropping device->ref only on the last put, matching the single slow-path get.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98344 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.158.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.158.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: Fix device kref underflow in dma_chan_put()\n\ndma_chan_get() takes chan-\u003edevice-\u003eref only on the slow path:\n\n\t/* no kref on fast path */\n\tif (chan-\u003eclient_count) {\n\t\t__module_get(owner);\n\t\tchan-\u003eclient_count++;\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}\n\tif (!try_module_get(owner))\n\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n\tif (!dma_device_get(chan-\u003edevice)) { // calls kref_get_unless_zero()\n\ndma_chan_put() drops the ref unconditionally, so every fast-path\nget/put pair drops one extra device reference.\n\nThe bug fires when two conditions hold together: a non-private\nprovider has a persistent client holding chan-\u003eclient_count \u003e 0\nand another client cycles dmaengine_get()/dmaengine_put().\nWhen the kref hits zero, the subsequent dma_find_channel() returns\nNULL even though the provider module is still loaded.\n\nFix this by dropping device-\u003eref only on the last put, matching the\nsingle slow-path get.",
"id": "AZL-106251",
"modified": "2026-11-01T07:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98344"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-98344 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.158.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-98344"
]
}
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