AZL-43306 (CVE-2021-47482)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-05-22 09:15 – Updated: 2025-04-02 17:08 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: batman-adv: fix error handling
Syzbot reported ODEBUG warning in batadv_nc_mesh_free(). The problem was in wrong error handling in batadv_mesh_init().
Before this patch batadv_mesh_init() was calling batadv_mesh_free() in case of any batadv_*_init() calls failure. This approach may work well, when there is some kind of indicator, which can tell which parts of batadv are initialized; but there isn't any.
All written above lead to cleaning up uninitialized fields. Even if we hide ODEBUG warning by initializing bat_priv->nc.work, syzbot was able to hit GPF in batadv_nc_purge_paths(), because hash pointer in still NULL. [1]
To fix these bugs we can unwind batadv_init() calls one by one. It is good approach for 2 reasons: 1) It fixes bugs on error handling path 2) It improves the performance, since we won't call unneeded batadv_free() functions.
So, this patch makes all batadv_init() clean up all allocated memory before returning with an error to no call correspoing batadv_free() and open-codes batadv_mesh_free() with proper order to avoid touching uninitialized fields.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47482 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 5.15.176.3-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.15.176.3-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: batman-adv: fix error handling\n\nSyzbot reported ODEBUG warning in batadv_nc_mesh_free(). The problem was\nin wrong error handling in batadv_mesh_init().\n\nBefore this patch batadv_mesh_init() was calling batadv_mesh_free() in case\nof any batadv_*_init() calls failure. This approach may work well, when\nthere is some kind of indicator, which can tell which parts of batadv are\ninitialized; but there isn\u0027t any.\n\nAll written above lead to cleaning up uninitialized fields. Even if we hide\nODEBUG warning by initializing bat_priv-\u003enc.work, syzbot was able to hit\nGPF in batadv_nc_purge_paths(), because hash pointer in still NULL. [1]\n\nTo fix these bugs we can unwind batadv_*_init() calls one by one.\nIt is good approach for 2 reasons: 1) It fixes bugs on error handling\npath 2) It improves the performance, since we won\u0027t call unneeded\nbatadv_*_free() functions.\n\nSo, this patch makes all batadv_*_init() clean up all allocated memory\nbefore returning with an error to no call correspoing batadv_*_free()\nand open-codes batadv_mesh_free() with proper order to avoid touching\nuninitialized fields.",
"id": "AZL-43306",
"modified": "2025-04-02T17:08:17Z",
"published": "2024-05-22T09:15:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47482"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2021-47482 affecting package kernel for versions less than 5.15.176.3-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2021-47482"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.