AZL-59748 (CVE-2025-21943)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-04-01 16:15 – Updated: 2025-04-28 23:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: protect driver attr handlers against module unload
Both new_device_store and delete_device_store touch module global resources (e.g. gpio_aggregator_lock). To prevent race conditions with module unload, a reference needs to be held.
Add try_module_get() in these handlers.
For new_device_store, this eliminates what appears to be the most dangerous scenario: if an id is allocated from gpio_aggregator_idr but platform_device_register has not yet been called or completed, a concurrent module unload could fail to unregister/delete the device, leaving behind a dangling platform device/GPIO forwarder. This can result in various issues. The following simple reproducer demonstrates these problems:
#!/bin/bash while :; do # note: whether 'gpiochip0 0' exists or not does not matter. echo 'gpiochip0 0' > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-aggregator/new_device done & while :; do modprobe gpio-aggregator modprobe -r gpio-aggregator done & wait
Starting with the following warning, several kinds of warnings will appear and the system may become unstable:
------------[ cut here ]------------ list_del corruption, ffff888103e2e980->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1327 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 [...] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 [...] Call Trace: ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xf2 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 ? report_bug+0xe6/0x170 ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x39/0xe0 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 gpiod_remove_lookup_table+0x22/0x60 new_device_store+0x315/0x350 [gpio_aggregator] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x137/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x262/0x430 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [...] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21943 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 5.15.180.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.15.180.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngpio: aggregator: protect driver attr handlers against module unload\n\nBoth new_device_store and delete_device_store touch module global\nresources (e.g. gpio_aggregator_lock). To prevent race conditions with\nmodule unload, a reference needs to be held.\n\nAdd try_module_get() in these handlers.\n\nFor new_device_store, this eliminates what appears to be the most dangerous\nscenario: if an id is allocated from gpio_aggregator_idr but\nplatform_device_register has not yet been called or completed, a concurrent\nmodule unload could fail to unregister/delete the device, leaving behind a\ndangling platform device/GPIO forwarder. This can result in various issues.\nThe following simple reproducer demonstrates these problems:\n\n #!/bin/bash\n while :; do\n # note: whether \u0027gpiochip0 0\u0027 exists or not does not matter.\n echo \u0027gpiochip0 0\u0027 \u003e /sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-aggregator/new_device\n done \u0026\n while :; do\n modprobe gpio-aggregator\n modprobe -r gpio-aggregator\n done \u0026\n wait\n\n Starting with the following warning, several kinds of warnings will appear\n and the system may become unstable:\n\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n list_del corruption, ffff888103e2e980-\u003enext is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1327 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120\n [...]\n RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120\n [...]\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120\n ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xf2\n ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120\n ? report_bug+0xe6/0x170\n ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x39/0xe0\n ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20\n ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120\n gpiod_remove_lookup_table+0x22/0x60\n new_device_store+0x315/0x350 [gpio_aggregator]\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x137/0x1f0\n vfs_write+0x262/0x430\n ksys_write+0x60/0xd0\n do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n [...]\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---",
"id": "AZL-59748",
"modified": "2025-04-28T23:15:40Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T16:15:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21943"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2025-21943 affecting package kernel for versions less than 5.15.180.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-21943"
]
}
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