AZL-83216 (CVE-2026-31488)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-22 14:16 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-31488 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Do not skip unrelated mode changes in DSC validation

Starting with commit 17ce8a6907f7 ("drm/amd/display: Add dsc pre-validation in atomic check"), amdgpu resets the CRTC state mode_changed flag to false when recomputing the DSC configuration results in no timing change for a particular stream.

However, this is incorrect in scenarios where a change in MST/DSC configuration happens in the same KMS commit as another (unrelated) mode change. For example, the integrated panel of a laptop may be configured differently (e.g., HDR enabled/disabled) depending on whether external screens are attached. In this case, plugging in external DP-MST screens may result in the mode_changed flag being dropped incorrectly for the integrated panel if its DSC configuration did not change during precomputation in pre_validate_dsc().

At this point, however, dm_update_crtc_state() has already created new streams for CRTCs with DSC-independent mode changes. In turn, amdgpu_dm_commit_streams() will never release the old stream, resulting in a memory leak. amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail() will never acquire a reference to the new stream either, which manifests as a use-after-free when the stream gets disabled later on:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88813d836524 by task kworker/9:9/29977

Workqueue: events drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x320 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] print_report+0xfc/0x1ff ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x225/0x4e0 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_report+0xe1/0x180 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] dc_state_destruct+0x14d/0x5c0 [amdgpu] dc_state_release.part.0+0x4e/0x130 [amdgpu] dm_atomic_destroy_state+0x3f/0x70 [amdgpu] drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x8ee/0xf30 ? drm_mode_object_put.part.0+0xb1/0x130 __drm_atomic_state_free+0x15c/0x2d0 atomic_remove_fb+0x67e/0x980

Since there is no reliable way of figuring out whether a CRTC has unrelated mode changes pending at the time of DSC validation, remember the value of the mode_changed flag from before the point where a CRTC was marked as potentially affected by a change in DSC configuration. Reset the mode_changed flag to this earlier value instead in pre_validate_dsc().

(cherry picked from commit cc7c7121ae082b7b82891baa7280f1ff2608f22b)

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Do not skip unrelated mode changes in DSC validation\n\nStarting with commit 17ce8a6907f7 (\"drm/amd/display: Add dsc pre-validation in\natomic check\"), amdgpu resets the CRTC state mode_changed flag to false when\nrecomputing the DSC configuration results in no timing change for a particular\nstream.\n\nHowever, this is incorrect in scenarios where a change in MST/DSC configuration\nhappens in the same KMS commit as another (unrelated) mode change. For example,\nthe integrated panel of a laptop may be configured differently (e.g., HDR\nenabled/disabled) depending on whether external screens are attached. In this\ncase, plugging in external DP-MST screens may result in the mode_changed flag\nbeing dropped incorrectly for the integrated panel if its DSC configuration\ndid not change during precomputation in pre_validate_dsc().\n\nAt this point, however, dm_update_crtc_state() has already created new streams\nfor CRTCs with DSC-independent mode changes. In turn,\namdgpu_dm_commit_streams() will never release the old stream, resulting in a\nmemory leak. amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail() will never acquire a reference to\nthe new stream either, which manifests as a use-after-free when the stream gets\ndisabled later on:\n\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu]\nWrite of size 4 at addr ffff88813d836524 by task kworker/9:9/29977\n\nWorkqueue: events drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0\n print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x320\n ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu]\n print_report+0xfc/0x1ff\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x225/0x4e0\n ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu]\n kasan_report+0xe1/0x180\n ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu]\n kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200\n dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu]\n dc_state_destruct+0x14d/0x5c0 [amdgpu]\n dc_state_release.part.0+0x4e/0x130 [amdgpu]\n dm_atomic_destroy_state+0x3f/0x70 [amdgpu]\n drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x8ee/0xf30\n ? drm_mode_object_put.part.0+0xb1/0x130\n __drm_atomic_state_free+0x15c/0x2d0\n atomic_remove_fb+0x67e/0x980\n\nSince there is no reliable way of figuring out whether a CRTC has unrelated\nmode changes pending at the time of DSC validation, remember the value of the\nmode_changed flag from before the point where a CRTC was marked as potentially\naffected by a change in DSC configuration. Reset the mode_changed flag to this\nearlier value instead in pre_validate_dsc().\n\n(cherry picked from commit cc7c7121ae082b7b82891baa7280f1ff2608f22b)",
  "id": "AZL-83216",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T14:16:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31488"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-31488 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-31488"
  ]
}



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