AZL-83231 (CVE-2026-31504)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-22 14:16 – Updated: 2026-04-29 06:35 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix fanout UAF in packet_release() via NETDEV_UP race
packet_release() has a race window where NETDEV_UP can re-register a
socket into a fanout group's arr[] array. The re-registration is not
cleaned up by fanout_release(), leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout
array.
packet_release() does NOT zero po->num in its bind_lock section.
After releasing bind_lock, po->num is still non-zero and po->ifindex
still matches the bound device. A concurrent packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)
that already found the socket in sklist can re-register the hook.
For fanout sockets, this re-registration calls __fanout_link(sk, po)
which adds the socket back into f->arr[] and increments f->num_members,
but does NOT increment f->sk_ref.
The fix sets po->num to zero in packet_release while bind_lock is
held to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window.
This bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based on CVE-2025-38617.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31504 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.134.1-2 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.134.1-2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: fix fanout UAF in packet_release() via NETDEV_UP race\n\n`packet_release()` has a race window where `NETDEV_UP` can re-register a\nsocket into a fanout group\u0027s `arr[]` array. The re-registration is not\ncleaned up by `fanout_release()`, leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout\narray.\n`packet_release()` does NOT zero `po-\u003enum` in its `bind_lock` section.\nAfter releasing `bind_lock`, `po-\u003enum` is still non-zero and `po-\u003eifindex`\nstill matches the bound device. A concurrent `packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)`\nthat already found the socket in `sklist` can re-register the hook.\nFor fanout sockets, this re-registration calls `__fanout_link(sk, po)`\nwhich adds the socket back into `f-\u003earr[]` and increments `f-\u003enum_members`,\nbut does NOT increment `f-\u003esk_ref`.\n\nThe fix sets `po-\u003enum` to zero in `packet_release` while `bind_lock` is\nheld to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window.\n\nThis bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based\non CVE-2025-38617.",
"id": "AZL-83231",
"modified": "2026-04-29T06:35:10Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T14:16:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31504"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-31504 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.134.1-2",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-31504"
]
}
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