AZL-83843 (CVE-2026-31649)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-24 15:16 – Updated: 2026-05-06 06:22 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit() decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value (~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally, and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31649 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.137.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.137.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode\n\nThe jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes\n\n len = nopaged_len - bmax;\n\nwhere nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is\nBUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit()\ndecides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb-\u003elen (total length including\npage fragments):\n\n is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb-\u003elen, enh_desc);\n\nWhen a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len \u003c= bmax) but a\nlarge total length due to page fragments (skb-\u003elen \u003e bmax), the\nsubtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value\n(~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute\nhundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb-\u003edata + bmax * i\npointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less\nSoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel\nmemory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and\npotential memory corruption from hardware.\n\nFix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to\nmin(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then\nalways safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single\ndescriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally,\nand the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward.",
"id": "AZL-83843",
"modified": "2026-05-06T06:22:03Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T15:16:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31649"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-31649 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.137.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-31649"
]
}
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