AZL-88836 (CVE-2026-46176)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks "if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised; users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same goto unlock in the s1 failure path.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46176 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()\n\nmlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When\nib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls\nthrough and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to\ndevr-\u003es0 and devr-\u003es1.\n\nThis leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks\n\"if (devr-\u003es1) return 0;\" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;\nusers in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via\nto_msrq(devr-\u003es0)-\u003emsrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences\nthe ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.\n\nFix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path.",
"id": "AZL-88836",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46176"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46176 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46176"
]
}
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