AZL-89102 (CVE-2026-46133)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing
Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.
The check added there reads
pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to
pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes
rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES
which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(), causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.
Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after
rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0
A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170
Read of size 1 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region
Call Trace:
crc32_le+0x115/0x170
rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300
rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0
rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0
rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0
Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no QP, no connection, and no authentication.
Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry, detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic runs.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46133 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing\n\nEven after applying commit 7244491dab34 (\"RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC\nbefore payload_size() in rxe_rcv\"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet\ncan still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only\nfor valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown\nopcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit\nand reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.\n\nThe check added there reads\n\n pkt-\u003epaylen \u003c header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE\n\nwhere header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt-\u003eopcode].length. The\nrxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB\nopcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so\nlength == 0 and the check degenerates to\n\n pkt-\u003epaylen \u003c 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE\n\nwhich does not constrain pkt-\u003epaylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes\n\n rxe_opcode[pkt-\u003eopcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES\n\nwhich underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),\ncausing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.\n\nReproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with\nCONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after\n\n rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0\n\nA single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and\nQPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170\n Read of size 1 at addr ...\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 704-byte region\n Call Trace:\n crc32_le+0x115/0x170\n rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300\n rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0\n rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0\n rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320\n udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0\n\nSubsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic\nthe kernel. The trigger requires only module load and \"rdma link add\"; no\nQP, no connection, and no authentication.\n\nFix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry,\ndetected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic\nruns.",
"id": "AZL-89102",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46133"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46133 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46133"
]
}
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