AZL-90732 (CVE-2026-53225)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-06-25 09:16 – Updated: 2026-06-27 18:19 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-53225 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.143.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()

__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.

An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.

Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.

The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.143.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.143.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()\n\n__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF\nchunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls\naf-\u003efrom_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6)\ntrusting the parameter\u0027s declared length.\n\nAn unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that\ndeclares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter\nheader; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then\nreads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.\n\nImpact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16\nbytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.\n\nThe sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with\nsctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound.\nVerify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before\nfrom_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43\n(\"net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop\").",
  "id": "AZL-90732",
  "modified": "2026-06-27T18:19:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:16:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53225"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-53225 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.143.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-53225"
  ]
}



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