AZL-95106 (CVE-2026-68245)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()
The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a use after unlock problem.
Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid() through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while it is still in use.
(cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7)
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68245 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()\n\nThe vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only\nvalid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is\ncalled and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject\nto modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm-\u003etask_info in\namdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a\nuse after unlock problem.\n\nRemove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()\nthrough removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from\namdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while\nit is still in use.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7)",
"id": "AZL-95106",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68245"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-68245 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-68245"
]
}
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