Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
An open redirect vulnerability was found in Keycloak. A specially crafted URL can be constructed where the referrer and referrer_uri parameters are made to trick a user to visit a malicious webpage. A trusted URL can trick users and automation into believing that the URL is safe, when, in fact, it redirects to a malicious server. This issue can result in a victim inadvertently trusting the destination of the redirect, potentially leading to a successful phishing attack or other types of attacks.
Once a crafted URL is made, it can be sent to a Keycloak admin via email for example. This will trigger this vulnerability when the user visits the page and clicks the link. A malicious actor can use this to target users they know are Keycloak admins for further attacks. It may also be possible to bypass other domain-related security checks, such as supplying this as a OAuth redirect uri. The malicious actor can further obfuscate the redirect_uri using URL encoding, to hide the text of the actual malicious website domain.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "keycloak",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/keycloak"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "24.0.7"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:redhat:build_of_keycloak:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"cpe:2.3:a:keycloak:keycloak:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "An open redirect vulnerability was found in Keycloak. A specially crafted URL can be constructed where the referrer and referrer_uri parameters are made to trick a user to visit a malicious webpage. A trusted URL can trick users and automation into believing that the URL is safe, when, in fact, it redirects to a malicious server. This issue can result in a victim inadvertently trusting the destination of the redirect, potentially leading to a successful phishing attack or other types of attacks.\r\n\r\nOnce a crafted URL is made, it can be sent to a Keycloak admin via email for example. This will trigger this vulnerability when the user visits the page and clicks the link. A malicious actor can use this to target users they know are Keycloak admins for further attacks. It may also be possible to bypass other domain-related security checks, such as supplying this as a OAuth redirect uri. The malicious actor can further obfuscate the redirect_uri using URL encoding, to hide the text of the actual malicious website domain.",
"id": "BIT-keycloak-2024-7260",
"modified": "2026-08-26T10:56:00.040Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T11:41:23.833Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:6502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:6503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-7260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2301875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7260"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "Keycloak-core: open redirect on account page"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.