BREW-ALOT-CVE-2026-106454 (GHSA-8PQF-F4M5-798G)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-08 10:49 – Updated: 2026-10-08 10:49 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Twisted: IMAP wildcardToRegexp() ReDoS
Details

Summary

wildcardToRegexp() in twisted/mail/imap4.py converts IMAP LIST/LSUB wildcard patterns to Python regular expressions. It substitutes the two IMAP wildcards (* → (?:.*?) and % → (?:(?:[^\\/])*?)) but passes every other character through unchanged to re.compile(). This means that an authenticated IMAP client can send a quoted pattern string containing arbitrary regex syntax - including catastrophic-backtracking constructs such as (a+)+z.

Because Twisted runs a cooperative, single-threaded reactor, a blocking regex match freezes all I/O on the server for the duration of the match.

Vulnerable Code

twisted/mail/imap4.py

# line 4595
def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):
    wildcard = wildcard.replace("*", "(?:.*?)")
    if delim is None:
        wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:.*?)")
    else:
        wildcard = wildcard.replace("%", "(?:(?:[^%s])*?)" % re.escape(delim))
    return re.compile(wildcard, re.I)   # ← user input compiled verbatim

# line 4993
class MemoryAccountWithoutNamespaces:
    def listMailboxes(self, ref, wildcard):
        ref = self._inferiorNames(_parseMbox(ref.upper()))
        wildcard = wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, "/")   # ← user-supplied wildcard
        return [(i, self.mailboxes[i]) for i in ref if wildcard.match(i)]

Proof of Concept

from twisted.mail.imap4 import wildcardToRegexp
import time

rx = wildcardToRegexp("(a+)+z", "/")
for n in [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]:
    victim = "a" * n
    t0 = time.perf_counter()
    rx.match(victim)
    print(f"n={n}: {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s")

Output on Twisted 25.5.0:

[*] Compiled regex: '(a+)+z'
[*] Note: metacharacters ( ) + ? are NOT escaped - they go straight to re.compile()

    n        time
  ---  ----------
   20       0.153s
   22       0.651s
   24       2.941s
   26      14.545s
   28      55.019s

Timing doubles roughly every two characters (exponential growth), confirming catastrophic backtracking.

Impact

Twisted's reactor is single-threaded and cooperative. A blocking re.match() call suspends the entire event loop - no other connection can be accepted, read, or written while the match runs. A single authenticated LIST command with a 28-character target mailbox name can stall the server for ~55 seconds.

An attacker who can register an account (or obtain credentials through other means) can:

  1. CREATE a mailbox whose name is an exponential-blowup trigger string.
  2. Issue LIST "" "(a+)+z" (or equivalent ReDoS pattern).
  3. Repeat at ~1-minute intervals to keep the server permanently unavailable.

No exploit code or special privileges beyond an IMAP login are required.

Fix

Escape non-wildcard characters before compiling:

def wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):
    # Split on the two IMAP wildcards, escape everything else
    parts = re.split(r'([*%])', wildcard)
    result = []
    for p in parts:
        if p == '*':
            result.append('(?:.*?)')
        elif p == '%':
            if delim is None:
                result.append('(?:.*?)')
            else:
                result.append('(?:(?:[^%s])*?)' % re.escape(delim))
        else:
            result.append(re.escape(p))   # ← escape all other characters
    return re.compile(''.join(result), re.I)

Alternatively, apply re.escape() to the entire wildcard first, then substitute the (now-escaped) \* and \% tokens back with their regex equivalents.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "twisted",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/twisted@26.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "alot",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/alot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/twisted@26.4.0",
        "name": "twisted",
        "resource": "twisted",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "26.4.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`wildcardToRegexp()` in `twisted/mail/imap4.py` converts IMAP LIST/LSUB wildcard patterns to Python regular expressions.  It substitutes the two IMAP wildcards (`*` \u2192 `(?:.*?)` and `%` \u2192 `(?:(?:[^\\\\/])*?)`) but passes every other character through unchanged to `re.compile()`.  This means that an authenticated IMAP client can send a quoted pattern string containing arbitrary regex syntax - including catastrophic-backtracking constructs such as `(a+)+z`.\n\nBecause Twisted runs a cooperative, single-threaded reactor, a blocking regex match freezes **all** I/O on the server for the duration of the match.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### `twisted/mail/imap4.py`\n\n```python\n# line 4595\ndef wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):\n    wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"*\", \"(?:.*?)\")\n    if delim is None:\n        wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"%\", \"(?:.*?)\")\n    else:\n        wildcard = wildcard.replace(\"%\", \"(?:(?:[^%s])*?)\" % re.escape(delim))\n    return re.compile(wildcard, re.I)   # \u2190 user input compiled verbatim\n```\n\n```python\n# line 4993\nclass MemoryAccountWithoutNamespaces:\n    def listMailboxes(self, ref, wildcard):\n        ref = self._inferiorNames(_parseMbox(ref.upper()))\n        wildcard = wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, \"/\")   # \u2190 user-supplied wildcard\n        return [(i, self.mailboxes[i]) for i in ref if wildcard.match(i)]\n```\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nfrom twisted.mail.imap4 import wildcardToRegexp\nimport time\n\nrx = wildcardToRegexp(\"(a+)+z\", \"/\")\nfor n in [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]:\n    victim = \"a\" * n\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    rx.match(victim)\n    print(f\"n={n}: {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s\")\n```\n\n**Output on Twisted 25.5.0:**\n\n```\n[*] Compiled regex: \u0027(a+)+z\u0027\n[*] Note: metacharacters ( ) + ? are NOT escaped - they go straight to re.compile()\n\n    n        time\n  ---  ----------\n   20       0.153s\n   22       0.651s\n   24       2.941s\n   26      14.545s\n   28      55.019s\n```\n\nTiming doubles roughly every two characters (exponential growth), confirming catastrophic backtracking.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nTwisted\u0027s reactor is single-threaded and cooperative.  A blocking `re.match()` call suspends the entire event loop - no other connection can be accepted, read, or written while the match runs.  A single authenticated LIST command with a 28-character target mailbox name can stall the server for ~55 seconds.\n\nAn attacker who can register an account (or obtain credentials through other means) can:\n\n1. `CREATE` a mailbox whose name is an exponential-blowup trigger string.\n2. Issue `LIST \"\" \"(a+)+z\"` (or equivalent ReDoS pattern).\n3. Repeat at ~1-minute intervals to keep the server permanently unavailable.\n\nNo exploit code or special privileges beyond an IMAP login are required.\n\n---\n\n## Fix\n\nEscape non-wildcard characters before compiling:\n\n```python\ndef wildcardToRegexp(wildcard, delim=None):\n    # Split on the two IMAP wildcards, escape everything else\n    parts = re.split(r\u0027([*%])\u0027, wildcard)\n    result = []\n    for p in parts:\n        if p == \u0027*\u0027:\n            result.append(\u0027(?:.*?)\u0027)\n        elif p == \u0027%\u0027:\n            if delim is None:\n                result.append(\u0027(?:.*?)\u0027)\n            else:\n                result.append(\u0027(?:(?:[^%s])*?)\u0027 % re.escape(delim))\n        else:\n            result.append(re.escape(p))   # \u2190 escape all other characters\n    return re.compile(\u0027\u0027.join(result), re.I)\n```\n\nAlternatively, apply `re.escape()` to the entire wildcard first, then substitute the (now-escaped) `\\*` and `\\%` tokens back with their regex equivalents.",
  "id": "BREW-alot-CVE-2026-106454",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T10:49:47Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T10:49:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/security/advisories/GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/pull/12788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/2f8a3c29246f4eb324690e06a9767a11dc4aec9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Twisted: IMAP wildcardToRegexp() ReDoS",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-8pqf-f4m5-798g",
    "CVE-2026-106454"
  ]
}



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