BREW-CORE-LIGHTNING-CVE-… (GHSA-V92G-XGXW-VVMM)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:41 – Updated: 2026-09-12 08:48 – Source websiteSummary
TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:
Template.__init__strips one leading/usingif/sliceTemplateLookup.get_template()strips all leading/usingre.sub(r"^\/+", "")
When a URI like //../../../../etc/passwd is passed:
1. get_template() strips all / → ../../../../etc/passwd → file found via posixpath.join(dir_, u)
2. Template.__init__ strips one / → /../../../../etc/passwd → normpath → /etc/passwd
3. /etc/passwd.startswith(..) → False → check bypassed
Impact
Arbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template().
Note: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python's BaseHTTPRequestHandler which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.
Fix
Changed Template.__init__ to use lstrip("/") instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "mako",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/mako@1.4.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "1.3.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "core-lightning",
"purl": "pkg:brew/core-lightning"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.06.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/mako@1.4.1",
"name": "mako",
"resource": "mako",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "1.4.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`TemplateLookup.get_template()` is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with `//` (e.g., `//../../../secret.txt`). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:\n\n- `Template.__init__` strips **one** leading `/` using `if`/slice\n- `TemplateLookup.get_template()` strips **all** leading `/` using `re.sub(r\"^\\/+\", \"\")`\n\nWhen a URI like `//../../../../etc/passwd` is passed:\n1. `get_template()` strips all `/` \u2192 `../../../../etc/passwd` \u2192 file found via `posixpath.join(dir_, u)`\n2. `Template.__init__` strips one `/` \u2192 `/../../../../etc/passwd` \u2192 `normpath` \u2192 `/etc/passwd`\n3. `/etc/passwd`.startswith(`..`) \u2192 `False` \u2192 **check bypassed**\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`.\n\nNote: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python\u0027s `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.\n\n### Fix\n\nChanged `Template.__init__` to use `lstrip(\"/\")` instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.",
"id": "BREW-core-lightning-CVE-2026-41205",
"modified": "2026-09-12T08:48:34Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:41:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/e05ac61989a7fb9dd7dcde6cfd72dc48328719a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mako/PYSEC-2026-88.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/releases/tag/rel_1_3_11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmm",
"CVE-2026-41205",
"PYSEC-2026-88"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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